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Dieppe, a Massacre of Canadians


Guest Peeves

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http://archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/second_world_war/clips/13833/

A slaughter, I might suggest an unnecessary sacrifice to no purpose. I also might suggest the massacre was ill advised and once the element of surprise was lost, a retreat or cancellation of the invasion should have taken place.

Brave young men hung out dry, to be slaughtered with no chance of success as the were expected and sitting pigeons for the Germans who even dispatched the wounded with a head shot.

Hundreds of Canadians that had trained for two years never fired a shot, they were mowed down as the landing barges dropped the doors. Never had a chance.

Dieppe a fiasco! Dieppe, a Massacre of Canadians and British.

About the Battle of Dieppe:

The Battle of Dieppe was a test for the full-scale invasion of western Europe. The plan was to make a frontal assault on the town of Dieppe, across the English Channel on the coast of France. The raid on Dieppe would give the Allies a chance to test techniques and equipment for landing troops from the sea. The Battle of Dieppe was a disaster for the Canadians. Nearly 1000 Canadians died and nearly 2000 were taken prisoner.

Royal Regiment of Canada

Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment)

South Saskatchewan Regiment

Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

Essex Scottish Regiment

Les Fusiliers Mont Royal

Royal Hamilton Light Infantry

Calgary Regiment

The Toronto Scottish Regiment

Canadian Casualties at the Battle of Dieppe:

RCAF lost 13 aircraft and 10 pilots; RAF lost 106 planes and 81 airmen - the highest single day total of World War II

3,367 casualties - including 1,946 taken prisoner and 907 Canadians killed

Summary of the Battle of Dieppe:

Four flank attacks were planned for just before dawn, with the main frontal assault on the town of Dieppe a half hour later. Surprise was key to the plan.

Landing ships and escorts on the east met a small German convoy. The resulting battle alerted the Germans, eliminating the element of surprise.

The Royal Regiment of Canada landed late on Puys beach on the east, and the Germans were ready. Over 500 men were killed or taken prisoner and the Canadians were forced to surrender.

On the west at Pourville, the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders initially met only light resistance, but heavy fighting developed as they pushed toward the town of Dieppe. The Canadians could not reach their target, Most of the South Saskatchewans and Cameron Highlanders were successfully evacuated, but the rearguard did not make it out.

The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish Regiment landed on the main Dieppe beach and were met with German machine-gun fire. Shingles on the beach broke tank treads. All entrances to Dieppe were blocked by concrete barriers, trapping any tanks that made it that far.

An inaccurate message led the headquarters ship to assume the Essex Scottish Regiment was making headway, and the reserve battalion Les Fusiliers Mont Royal was sent in. They too were pinned on the beach.

A general withdrawal order was given at 11 am.

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Guest Derek L

http://archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/second_world_war/clips/13833/

A slaughter, I might suggest an unnecessary sacrifice to no purpose. I also might suggest the massacre was ill advised and once the element of surprise was lost, a retreat or cancellation of the invasion should have taken place.

Brave young men hung out dry, to be slaughtered with no chance of success as the were expected and sitting pigeons for the Germans who even dispatched the wounded with a head shot.

Hundreds of Canadians that had trained for two years never fired a shot, they were mowed down as the landing barges dropped the doors. Never had a chance.

Dieppe a fiasco! Dieppe, a Massacre of Canadians and British.

Royal Regiment of Canada

Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment)

South Saskatchewan Regiment

Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

Essex Scottish Regiment

Les Fusiliers Mont Royal

Royal Hamilton Light Infantry

Calgary Regiment

The Toronto Scottish Regiment

Canadian Casualties at the Battle of Dieppe:

RCAF lost 13 aircraft and 10 pilots; RAF lost 106 planes and 81 airmen - the highest single day total of World War II

3,367 casualties - including 1,946 taken prisoner and 907 Canadians killed

Summary of the Battle of Dieppe:

Four flank attacks were planned for just before dawn, with the main frontal assault on the town of Dieppe a half hour later. Surprise was key to the plan.

Landing ships and escorts on the east met a small German convoy. The resulting battle alerted the Germans, eliminating the element of surprise.

The Royal Regiment of Canada landed late on Puys beach on the east, and the Germans were ready. Over 500 men were killed or taken prisoner and the Canadians were forced to surrender.

On the west at Pourville, the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders initially met only light resistance, but heavy fighting developed as they pushed toward the town of Dieppe. The Canadians could not reach their target, Most of the South Saskatchewans and Cameron Highlanders were successfully evacuated, but the rearguard did not make it out.

The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish Regiment landed on the main Dieppe beach and were met with German machine-gun fire. Shingles on the beach broke tank treads. All entrances to Dieppe were blocked by concrete barriers, trapping any tanks that made it that far.

An inaccurate message led the headquarters ship to assume the Essex Scottish Regiment was making headway, and the reserve battalion Les Fusiliers Mont Royal was sent in. They too were pinned on the beach.

A general withdrawal order was given at 11 am.

Then you suggest incorrectly, the Dieppe raid was to test and demonstrate an new kind of warfare, combined amphibious operations (What was sorely lacking 27 years previous during the Dardanelles campaign). Without the lessons learned from the raid, unfortunately namely what not to do, many thousands of additional Commonwealth and American forces would have died on the beaches of North Africa, Italy, Normandy and on numerous Islands in the Pacific.

To say that those Canadians that lost their lives was to no purpose is factually wrong and doing any survivors a great disservice. It’s quite easy to armchair General after that fact.

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....To say that those Canadians that lost their lives was to no purpose is factually wrong and doing any survivors a great disservice. It’s quite easy to armchair General after that fact.

Agreed...it is far more difficult but necessary to integrate the lessons learned into the successfully coordinated amphibious operations that would follow. "Land the Landing Force!" now happens with a lot more planning and support.

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Guest Derek L

Agreed...it is far more difficult but necessary to integrate the lessons learned into the successfully coordinated amphibious operations that would follow. "Land the Landing Force!" now happens with a lot more planning and support.

Indeed, and many might question why Canadians were used as “lab rats” at Dieppe, the answer is quite clear. Aside from the ill fated defence of Hong Kong and individuals serving within British units, the Canadian army hadn’t yet seen service in the war. This is quite stark when considering nearly three years in, Commonwealth Forces had already been fighting in Europe, North Africa, Burma and the Malay Peninsula. Even the Americans, whom only joined the previous year, had already been fighting in the Philippines, Wake, Guam and only a few weeks prior to Dieppe, Guadalcanal.

The side bar to the Dieppe raid, is that PM King lobbied to have Canadians used as the primary assault force for numerous other reasons, on top of the Allied requirement of opening a “second front” to help Stalin fend off the Germans. Though the objectives of Dieppe were not to open the second front as of yet, the Raid did demonstrate to the Germans that they would require keeping regular army units in Western Europe to supplement their garrison troops, thus reducing some pressure off the Soviets.

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To say that those Canadians that lost their lives was to no purpose is factually wrong and doing any survivors a great disservice. It’s quite easy to armchair General after that fact.

To wit:

After the Dieppe raid Allied planners were forced to review their previously held supposition that the capture of a significant port was an essential precursor to an invasion of mainland Europe. This view had been justified by the perceived scale of logistical follow up and support following an invasion - it could, it was reasoned, only be provided through established port facilities. So with this option firmly placed on the back burner Dieppe became the inspiration behind the development of Mulberry Harbours, PLUTO (pipe-line under the Ocean), and other special initiatives that later contributed to the success of the Normandy invasion. It was also realized that much better intelligence would be required - not only about the defending forces but also on the topographical conditions in and around the landing area. Better communications were seen to be needed between the troop commanders afloat and the assaulting troops and command decisions required better organization. The need to develop armoured landing craft, at least proof against small arms fire, was now considered an imperative as was the case for heavier bombardment of entrenched defensive positions prior to the landing of men and supplies (Photo above: German soldiers inspect the wreckage on the beach.)

http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm

Valuable lessons learned that lead to major victories.

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...The side bar to the Dieppe raid, is that PM King lobbied to have Canadians used as the primary assault force for numerous other reasons, on top of the Allied requirement of opening a “second front” to help Stalin fend off the Germans.

That makes sense....the Allies learned a great deal from Mountbatten's foolish ambition, and he later stated " ...the Battle of Normandy was won at Dieppe". What a tool!

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Guest Derek L

To wit:

http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm

Valuable lessons learned that lead to major victories.

Exactly. The “failure” of Dieppe also garnered a much needed experienced cadre of surviving officers and NCOs that were able to use their experiences the following year in Italy, and two years later on Juno beach. Subsequently the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division coupled with the 2nd Canadian armoured regiment, was the only landing force on D-Day to reach their previous stated objectives on the first day. (Until meeting the Waffen-SS)

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Guest Derek L

That makes sense....the Allies learned a great deal from Mountbatten's foolish ambition, and he later stated " ...the Battle of Normandy was won at Dieppe". What a tool!

I don’t look at it like that……..The Allies required “a test subject” for future campaigns and the Canadians had yet seen combat…….On looking at the raid with hindsight, it’s quite obvious the numerous failures, but we’re looking at it with the knowledge of future successes…….

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I don’t look at it like that……..The Allies required “a test subject” for future campaigns and the Canadians had yet seen combat…….On looking at the raid with hindsight, it’s quite obvious the numerous failures, but we’re looking at it with the knowledge of future successes…….

Sure, I get all that, but the raid was not planned very well and key support elements weren't even provided. For instance, shore bombardment was declined because of possible collateral damage to Vichy/French civilians.

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Guest Derek L

Sure, I get all that, but the raid was not planned very well and key support elements weren't even provided. For instance, shore bombardment was declined because of possible collateral damage to Vichy/French civilians.

Exactly, as we discussed in another thread, the theory of “total war” wasn’t implemented…….This also made evident by the lack of aerial bombardment and radio broadcasts to French citizens that “something big was coming” prior to the attack.

As for lack of resources, in terms of shore and/or aerial bombardment, the number of available assets in the summer of ‘42 compared to ‘44 was quite different………Obviously the lack of Battleships and heavy Cruisers was further strained with the results of Pearl Harbour and the loss of Force Z only a few months prior, coupled with the requirements of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean.

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Then there was this:

The force commanders had no inkling that they were on a collision course with a German convoy proceeding from Boulogne to Dieppe. Radar stations on the English coast picked up these "unidentified vessels" and twice, at one thirty a.m. and again at 2.30 a.m. on August 19th, they radioed warnings to the naval commander Captain Hughes-Hallet. These warnings were not acknowledged and the raiding force took no evasive action.

http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm

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Guest Derek L

Then there was this:

The force commanders had no inkling that they were on a collision course with a German convoy proceeding from Boulogne to Dieppe. Radar stations on the English coast picked up these "unidentified vessels" and twice, at one thirty a.m. and again at 2.30 a.m. on August 19th, they radioed warnings to the naval commander Captain Hughes-Hallet. These warnings were not acknowledged and the raiding force took no evasive action.

http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm

Indeed, that demonstrates the inherent lack of control of the sea lanes prior to the raid which is clearly attributed to the lack of resources the Allies had……..Again this brings me make back to the losses attributed to not only the USN’s surface forces in the months prior (Pear Harbour/Java Sea/Savo Island), but the allies in general, which saw drastic losses in the preceding months for the Free Dutch, the Australian Navy and the Royal Navy proper………..December of 41’ wasn’t only a hard month for the USN, but also the RN that’s losses near equalled the USN in terms of capital ships…………HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse to the Japanese, but also HMS Warspite, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant to the Germans and Italian frogman.

Clearly, desperate times call for desperate measures………..And at times, you have to fight with what you have on hand, and rely on training, intelligence, tactics and the all important luck (see Midway)

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...Clearly, desperate times call for desperate measures………..And at times, you have to fight with what you have on hand, and rely on training, intelligence, tactics and the all important luck (see Midway)

Dieppe was a harrassing mission to destroy infrastructue and hold ground for only two tides. There was political pressure for a splashy assault in France even as the Allies planned to continue their methodic grind through Africa and then Italy.

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Dieppe was a harrassing mission to destroy infrastructue and hold ground for only two tides. There was political pressure for a splashy assault in France even as the Allies planned to continue their methodic grind through Africa and then Italy.

Not to mention the Canadians were being a bit of a hard drinkin', hard fightin', hard womanizin' hazard almost equal to the Blackout in terms of annoying the locals.

British Officer A: Hmmmm....isn't there anything that can be done about these damn logging Lotharios?

British Officer B: Come to think of it....

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Guest Derek L

Dieppe was a harrassing mission to destroy infrastructue and hold ground for only two tides. There was political pressure for a splashy assault in France even as the Allies planned to continue their methodic grind through Africa and then Italy.

Sure, and the raid was a tactical failure but a strategic coup in terms of costly lessons learned……..My point all along is that it wasn’t a wasteful venture for the Allies at the time, as it clearly demonstrated ones own failings and areas of obvious needed improvement.

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Not to mention the Canadians were being a bit of a hard drinkin', hard fightin', hard womanizin' hazard almost equal to the Blackout in terms of annoying the locals.

Dieppe actually had the unintended result of giving the Germans confidence in their ability to repel an invasion against their "Atlantic Wall".

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Guest Derek L

Dieppe actually had the unintended result of giving the Germans confidence in their ability to repel an invasion against their "Atlantic Wall".

That maybe so, but it also forced the General Staff to institute a rather large OMG in Western Europe as a reactionary force to any further Allied threat. Said force, could have potentially been decisive on the Eastern Front in the later half of ‘42 and early ‘43.

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That maybe so, but it also forced the General Staff to institute a rather large OMG in Western Europe as a reactionary force to any further Allied threat. Said force, could have potentially been decisive on the Eastern Front in the later half of ‘42 and early ‘43.

Yup...the 42 Summer Offensive in AGS's area also suffered from numerous 'Hitler Directives' giving impossible goals to very strung-out divisions. Letting the Rumanians and pals run block wasn't too smart, either.

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Guest Derek L

Yup...the 42 Summer Offensive in AGS's area also suffered from numerous 'Hitler Directives' giving impossible goals to very strung-out divisions. Letting the Rumanians and pals run block wasn't too smart, either.

I think the reaction that saw the Germans base several Army Groups (B & D), an entire Panzer army and several SS divisions in France clearly shows the Germans feared an invasion, somewhere along the coast of France. Who’s to say, one of those army groups, coupled with the Panzer army and SS forces could have been decisive during the summer of ‘42 and perhaps prevented Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk…….

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I think the reaction that saw the Germans base several Army Groups (B & D), an entire Panzer army and several SS divisions in France clearly shows the Germans feared an invasion, somewhere along the coast of France. Who’s to say, one of those army groups, coupled with the Panzer army and SS forces could have been decisive during the summer of ‘42 and perhaps prevented Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk…….

Thoughout the Summer of '42, Hitler also worried about a counter-offensive in AGC...constantly shifting dozens of divisions back-n-forth across the Don/Donets depending on the day of the week it seemed to those involved rather than driving eastward. Much fuel was wasted...all of which needed to be trucked-in (or 'horsed-in', even) since the rails hadn't been regauged yet.

Edited by DogOnPorch
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Guest Derek L

Thoughout the Summer of '42, Hitler also worried about a counter-offensive in AGC...constantly shifting dozens of divisions back-n-forth across the Don/Donets depending on the day of the week it seemed to those involved rather than driving eastward. Much fuel was wasted...all of which needed to be trucked-in (or 'horsed-in', even) since the rails hadn't been regauged yet.

Indeed, his shifting of the 4th Panzer Army to the Don offensive, that initially was to support the 6th Army’s drive on Stalingrad, ultimately detracted the 6th’s mobile punch and ultimately lead to the stalemate that was Stalingrad……….Now imagine Army Group South with an additional Army……..Or better yet, one of the Army’s Groups from France (in addition to another Panzer army and the SS units) attached to Army Group North and second offensive aimed at Moscow in concert with the Stalingrad campaign……..This could have severely limited the Soviets ability to counterattack and likely would have required additional aid by the Allies to prevent the complete collapse of European Russia......With the net effect of pushing back the invasion of Western Europe as planned.

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I agree that Dieppe was not a total waste and a screw-up.

WWII was a total waste and a screw-up. 50+ million dead (depends on your choice of estimates). Europe and much of Asia in ruins. Economies destroyed. And arguably, none of it would have happened had the major powers not been so determined to stick it to the Germans after WW1. Next to the main event, Dieppe was an irrelevant sideshow.

In fact, arguably the entire western front was a sideshow. The west looked on while Germany and the USSR ground each other away in a grueling war of attrition. For a long time it was fashionable for Americans to say things like if it wasnt for us, you would be speaking German. But if the truce between Hitler and Stalin had held, Hitlers grandkids might be running Europe today.

On the subject of WWII, it has become fashionable to blame Chamberlain for kowtowing to Hitler. But it is also convenient to forget how much support Hitler had around the world even as it became clear that he was persecuting the Jews. In particular, he had a lot of friends in the US. Luminaries like Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh. GM helped build his motorized divisions. Without the help of the German subsidiary of IBM (Dehomag), the Germans could not have conducted mass murder on the scale that they did. IBM CEO Thomas Watson accepted a medal from Hitler in 1937.

Edited by ReeferMadness
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I agree that Dieppe was not a total waste and a screw-up.

WWII was a total waste and a screw-up. 50+ million dead (depends on your choice of estimates). Europe and much of Asia in ruins. Economies destroyed. And arguably, none of it would have happened had the major powers not been so determined to stick it to the Germans after WW1. Next to the main event, Dieppe was an irrelevant sideshow.

In fact, arguably the entire western front was a sideshow. The west looked on while Germany and the USSR ground each other away in a grueling war of attrition. For a long time it was fashionable for Americans to say things like if it wasnt for us, you would be speaking German. But if the truce between Hitler and Stalin had held, Hitlers grandkids might be running Europe today.

On the subject of WWII, it has become fashionable to blame Chamberlain for kowtowing to Hitler. But it is also convenient to forget how much support Hitler had around the world even as it became clear that he was persecuting the Jews. In particular, he had a lot of friends in the US. Luminaries like Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh. GM helped build his motorized divisions. Without the help of the German subsidiary of IBM (Dehomag), the Germans could not have conducted mass murder on the scale that they did. IBM CEO Thomas Watson accepted a medal from Hitler in 1937.

Although I agree that the USSR could have probably ultimately defeated Germany without a second front, you forget to mention that the Reds got lots of aid from the west after the Battle of the Atlantic was won and while the war on the Eastern front was going on Allies were fighting in North Africa and Italy. So there kind of was a second front.

Also keep in mind the US was fighting a war on two fronts and they did it successfully.

As for 1919 being the ultimate cause of WW2, I can't disagree but would you say then that the armistice shouldn't have been signed and all and the Western allies should have brought Germany to its knees then? I recall hearing that on November 11, 1918 that the American forces fought until the last minute because they believed that if peace was called then that they'd have to come back and do the same thing all over again. Pretty prophetic. :huh:

Edited by Boges
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I don’t look at it like that……..The Allies required “a test subject” for future campaigns and the Canadians had yet seen combat…….On looking at the raid with hindsight, it’s quite obvious the numerous failures, but we’re looking at it with the knowledge of future successes…….

In looking at it at all what need be considered is the ultimate condition required that was in the plan, the element of SURPRISE! The invaders were sitting ducks. Even reinforcements that were landed in error were slaughtered

SURPRISE was THE condition required, but there was none. On exposure the invasion order should have been countermanded.

Sure it's hindsight, but it's my hindsight my opinion, and I one suspect shared by many.

Summary of the Battle of Dieppe:

Four flank attacks were planned for just before dawn, with the main frontal assault on the town of Dieppe a half hour later. Surprise was key to the plan.

Landing ships and escorts on the east met a small German convoy. The resulting battle alerted the Germans, eliminating the element of surprise.

http://canadaonline.about.com/od/ww2battles/p/dieppe.htm

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Guest Derek L

In looking at it at all what need be considered is the ultimate condition required that was in the plan, the element of SURPRISE! The invaders were sitting ducks. Even reinforcements that were landed in error were slaughtered

SURPRISE was THE condition required, but there was none. On exposure the invasion order should have been countermanded.

Sure it's hindsight, but it's my hindsight my opinion, and I one suspect shared by many.

http://canadaonline.about.com/od/ww2battles/p/dieppe.htm

There’s two kinds of “surprise” in warfare. Surprise at the tactical level (which beach will be landed on) and surprise at the strategic level (There’s going to be a landing). What was clearly lost initially we the strategic level, The Allies broadcast a warning to French civilians and German spies knew of an invasion force is Southern England……….As for the sighting by a German convoy, that’s a loss of tactical surprise, that if proper resources that could have been allocated to the raid had been present, the German convoy wouldn’t have mattered.

Where your belief/opinion is futile is that at such time as part of the force was sighted by the German’s, the initial inertia behind the raid was at full speed and the raiding force couldn’t have been “called back”.

Also the element of tactical surprise wasn’t as critical as you portray………….The German defenders, whether forewarned hours prior or during the initial bombardment, composition wouldn’t have changed……..What failed the Allies was the lack of prior bombardment of German postions, and the total control of the Air and Sea around the invasion beach.

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