Rovik Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 http://chuckercanuck.blogspot.com/2006/05/...ate-awards.htmlWednesday, May 17, 2006 Afghan Mission Debate Awards -snip- After tabulating the results from audience phone-ins, Chuckercanuck is thrilled to announce the winners of the 2nd Monthly Afghan Mission Debate Awards for the following categories: Pee-Wee Herman Award for Most Embarassing Question Jack Layton can't support a mission extension without first knowing how the mission ties into our foreign policy. aybe you agree with the answer to that question, maybe you don't; but the answer to that question has been given ad nauseum. To pretend the answer is unknown trivializes the debate by abdicating a parliamentarians responsibility to engage fully. A slew of questions can only mask your fear of answering any yourself for so long. ......... Are we suppose to take this seriously; from a blatant heavy pro-right wing blog. I'm sure a left winger can post from left leaning blogs saying how foolish the opinions and actions of Harper and the Conservatives. But of course, some of the extreme right wingers here have the opinion that Harper and the Conservatives can do no wrong, wonder where they bought their rose-coloured glasses. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
geoffrey Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 One good point, Martin sat this vote out. Couldn't face his responsibility apparently. This I'm not impressed with. I wish Martin never became PM, I would have had tons of respect for the man but instead my impression is just simply an irresponsible man with no decision making ability. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Army Guy Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 Leafless: You wrote- " Perhaps you can explain what the problem is, are you suggesting soldiers are incapable of developing democracy."To be blunt, yes. Perhaps you can explain our so many successes in regards to other long term peacekeeping/ peace making endevours. Afghanistan is a country that wheels and deals in opium, full of war lords and their militias, militants and terrorism that has increased since the Iraq effort. Yes it is, but that happens when your country has been at war for more than 50 years, with very little peace in between those years. But then again so were most of the countries that we have done peacekeeping mission in. But that is not really what your saying here is it, Afgan is not worthy of our help. There are different estimates of the number of coalition troops some peg at 17,000. but militants in Pakistan in the city of Karachi just across the border, it is estimated that over 25,000 graduates of Al Quaida training camp live along with several thousand renegade Taliban and militants in the border mountains. Coalition troops it seems are out numbered. Your numbers are right out of er, Nato alone has 16,000 troops in place by end year, plus there are 21,000 American troops plus 3500 under direct US control, The Americans have already begun to add to thier numbers by sending over an Airbourne Bn. If I were Mr. Harper I would use the extended two years to wind down our part in Afghanistan and write it off has a bad experience since that war has escalated and Canada really is not in the position military wise at this time to continue since it greatly exceed what our military is designed for primarily peace keeping efforts. The situation in Afghanistan will probably continue indefinitely without the U.S and it's allies taking another route of action. Then why go in there at all, rebuilding this nation is going to take 10 to 20 years, with the need of heavily armed forces atleast another 5 years. Nobody likes to start a job and not finish it, and by pulling out thats exactly what your telling our troops. Canada does have enough equipment and manpower to do this mission barely. What is suffering is the units based in Canada. Our Military is not designed for peacekeeping, which is a myth told to the people of Canada by our government. Despite the best efforts of previous governments to get rid of the military. Our Military blue print is based on a cold war situation, equipment wise we've gone from a high intensity warfare capabilty to a meduim intensity capability which is quickly being eroded. I wish you the best of luck with installing democracy since I believe that country will be corrupt for years to come as corruption is their buisness. Installing democracy as we know it is not the goal in Afgan, but rebuilding a government and nation that will improve it's quality of life for all Afganis. to bring peace to the region, And yes corruption is found at all levels in Afgan. what you fail to understand is there is nothing in Afgan, drugs and coruption is the only industry currently available to feed thier families. once security is established that will slowly change as new industry is interduced. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Temagami Scourge Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 Argoose: TS: What do you know about our military? Argo: Quite a bit, actually. TS: I'm actually talking military, not knowing how to surrender in a dozen different languages. TS: We should be in Darfur as well as Afghanistan! Argo: I find what is happening in Darfur distressing. But we really don't have the ability to go in there ourselves. TS: No, we need an allied force. We piggyback on allied equipment, and they use us to project strength. I don't accept excuses when this should be a multinational exercise. Argo: Are you forgetting, or do you even know, that we don't have any helicopters? We're getting around in Afghanistan only through the good-will of the US, Britian and other allied militaries. What did I just say? We need to cooperate with our allies. They have equipment we don't and vice versa. It's cheaper to piggyback than to make outright purchases and training investments. and don't give me this crap about the "goodwill" of our allies. We are taking the bullets and doing the tough jobs. they are happy to drive and fly us around because they don't take the casulties. I thought you said you knew something about the military? TS: Buck up now boy, and take it like a man! don't hide behind the "Left" as a foil, but just say that we need to project our power into areas where we need to. TS: Actually, this statement still applies. You are trying to make excuses for us to not go to Darfur and apologies for what we are doing in Afghanistan. As I said, just buck up, roll up your sleeves and get to work. Perhaps, but we do not have any ability to project what little power we have. Perhaps, if Harper is in power for a while, and follows through on promises to buy more long range air and sea transport, and to expand the size of the military, we might one day enjoy that ability. I disagree. Harper is a hypocrite and had proven that time and again already. He'll leave the military out to dry like everyone else. Quit being a dupe and grow a mind of your own...or better yet, be like me and criticize all parties until they get it right, and praise them when they do. TS: We embarrassed ourselves in Rwanda, and I for one don't want to see that happen gain, and nor do i think other Canadians want to see an abject failure, regardless of political stripe. Argo: We had very few people there, and they were taking orders from the UN. TS: Quit with the excuses. We could have done something unilaterally, or got at least the Belgians, French and local African nations to contribute more, or create a cease-fire line. Argo: Gee. And if I had the slightest hint of a fragment of respect for you I might even care. TS: What's this? Are you taking written redundancy lessons mixed in with advanced verbosity? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
scribblet Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 http://chuckercanuck.blogspot.com/2006/05/...ate-awards.html Wednesday, May 17, 2006 Afghan Mission Debate Awards ......... Are we suppose to take this seriously; from a blatant heavy pro-right wing blog. I'm sure a left winger can post from left leaning blogs saying how foolish the opinions and actions of Harper and the Conservatives. But of course, some of the extreme right wingers here have the opinion that Harper and the Conservatives can do no wrong, wonder where they bought their rose-coloured glasses. Take it how you like, there where some valid questions. Some of the extreme left wingers here have the opinion that liberals could no wrong, and are entitled to govern in peretuity. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Leafless Posted May 19, 2006 Author Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 Army Guy You wrote- " Perhaps you can explain our so many successes in regards to other long term/ peacekeeping endevours." Depends on the degree of success your talking about. Care to elaborate? See link 72.14.207.104 below. You also wrote- " But that is not what your really saying here is it, Afghan is not worthy of our help." What I'm saying it is like a war similar to the jungle war Vietnam except fought in the mountains and caves and financed by drug money. Nato forces are like sitting ducks...sacrificial lambs." see link- usdoj.gov, below. You also wrote- " Your numbers are right out of er, Nato alone gas 16,000 troops in place by years end plus there are 21,000 American troops plus 3500 under direct U.S. control." I said an ESTIMATED 17,000 U.S. coaliton troops NOW changed and is under under Nato control and you said 16,000 Nato troops by years end...so I was off by 1,000. American troop numbers are always changing they have presently 10,000 U.S. troops and WILL HAVE 21,000 U.S. troops only by November. Looks like you were off. See link below cbsnews.com You also wrote- " Installing democracy is not the goal as we know it in Afghan but rebuilding a government and nation that will improve the quality of life for all Afghanis." You will need the will of the people and some form of democratic government which you don't have. You cannot force a country to live under your idealistic conditons. You have already committed yourself in saying " are you suggesting soldiers are incapable of developing democracy." The least you can do is be consistent with your analysis. http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:xbOSp5...a&ct=clnk&cd=10 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/23/...in1534791.shtml http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct0...in1534791.shtml Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Argus Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 Argoose:TS: What do you know about our military? Argo: Quite a bit, actually. TS: I'm actually talking military, not knowing how to surrender in a dozen different languages. TS: We should be in Darfur as well as Afghanistan! Argo: I find what is happening in Darfur distressing. But we really don't have the ability to go in there ourselves. TS: No, we need an allied force. We piggyback on allied equipment, and they use us to project strength. I don't accept excuses when this should be a multinational exercise. Argo: Are you forgetting, or do you even know, that we don't have any helicopters? We're getting around in Afghanistan only through the good-will of the US, Britian and other allied militaries. What did I just say? We need to cooperate with our allies. They have equipment we don't and vice versa. It's cheaper to piggyback than to make outright purchases and training investments. and don't give me this crap about the "goodwill" of our allies. We are taking the bullets and doing the tough jobs. they are happy to drive and fly us around because they don't take the casulties. I thought you said you knew something about the military? TS: Buck up now boy, and take it like a man! don't hide behind the "Left" as a foil, but just say that we need to project our power into areas where we need to. TS: Actually, this statement still applies. You are trying to make excuses for us to not go to Darfur and apologies for what we are doing in Afghanistan. As I said, just buck up, roll up your sleeves and get to work. Perhaps, but we do not have any ability to project what little power we have. Perhaps, if Harper is in power for a while, and follows through on promises to buy more long range air and sea transport, and to expand the size of the military, we might one day enjoy that ability. I disagree. Harper is a hypocrite and had proven that time and again already. He'll leave the military out to dry like everyone else. Quit being a dupe and grow a mind of your own...or better yet, be like me and criticize all parties until they get it right, and praise them when they do. TS: We embarrassed ourselves in Rwanda, and I for one don't want to see that happen gain, and nor do i think other Canadians want to see an abject failure, regardless of political stripe. Argo: We had very few people there, and they were taking orders from the UN. TS: Quit with the excuses. We could have done something unilaterally, or got at least the Belgians, French and local African nations to contribute more, or create a cease-fire line. Argo: Gee. And if I had the slightest hint of a fragment of respect for you I might even care. TS: What's this? Are you taking written redundancy lessons mixed in with advanced verbosity? I have no idea what all that crap above is supposed to be saying. You're talking to yourself, you're talking to me, but you can't quite figure out what should be quoted or how to do it or what it is you're trying to say or respond to. Spend some time learning how to edit and get back to me. While you're doing that try and come up with a cohent idea of what it is you want to say. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Rue Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 We went to Afghanistan to get rid of the Taliban because it had provided a place for al-Qaeda to develop. Having succeeded in dislodging the Taliban regime, we haven't succeeded in ensuring it won't return to power. Hence, we can't exactly pack up and come home. --- Now then, your view of our activities abroad is interesting. Do you consider the money spent by CIDA and the activities it undertakes as "nothing more then a modern version of the Christian missionary off to Africa to save the savages from eating each other"? The U.S. went to Afghanistan allegedly in hot pursuit of Osama Ben Laden being protected by the Taliban. The Taliban and Al Queda are not the same. The Taliban or Mujadheen were created by the CIA to act as a movement to fight the Russians. The Taliban only became expendable or the enemy once they would not turn over Ben Laden. The Taliban did not develop nor did they organize nor did they have any affiliation with Ben Laden and in fact they didn't even like him. They reluctantly supported him since he was a brother Muslim. Now that Laden is not in Aghanistan what is the excuse for remaining? Well now we are told it is to keep the same Taliban who were allies against those darn Russian commies on the run. This by the way being the same Taliban that shut down the opium trade and as sexist and as barbaric as we may think it is, was at least not corupt. The puppet regime now in Afghanistan is not democratic. It is a council of drug war lords who in exchange for propping up the current puppet are allowed to grow poppies and dump their poison in the US, Canada and Europe. This is typical of American foreign policy - if you have to prop up a corupt leader who dumps drugs in your country, so be it. Noriega, Samosa are but two previous examples of drug lords who stayed in power as long as they were CIA stooges. So Canada now rushes in to do what? Hunt and kill Taliban not hunt and kill Osama Ben Laden. They are a proxy police force aand body guards for the government of the day and in that respect they are no different then any mercenary force or foreign force sent to kingdoms in the past to protect Kings or Queens. As for CIDA it wastes money and is a complete and utter joke. It wastes valuable money and basically is a vehicle for some guilt ridden white folk to feel good about themselves.You want an example of a true charity, try Unitarian Service Committee which is completely apolitical and teaches people how to be self-sufficient. CIDA is all about government grants going to Canadians who perport to helping third world types but waste the money on themselves. If I sound harsh on CIDA check it out for yourself. Its typical well intentioned misguided help. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Army Guy Posted May 19, 2006 Report Share Posted May 19, 2006 Leafless: You wrote- " Perhaps you can explain our so many successes in regards to other long term/ peacekeeping endevours."Depends on the degree of success your talking about. Care to elaborate? See link 72.14.207.104 below. What about Cypress, Golan, Bosina, to name a few. What I'm saying it is like a war similar to the jungle war Vietnam except fought in the mountains and caves and financed by drug money. Nato forces are like sitting ducks...sacrificial lambs." see link- usdoj.gov, below Your link is no good, perhaps you can explain just how it is similar to Vietnam. The taliban and Al Qaida are being funded by drug mooney ,but it is not the sole source of thier funding. As for Nato being sitting ducks, in regards to IED's,mines, yes i would agree with you, but the rest of the time they are the boys with all the toys, and when the insurgents decide to attack in numbers it normally ends one sided. It's funny that the soldiers don't feel like sitting ducks and actually believe they are making a difference. You also wrote- " Your numbers are right out of er, Nato alone gas 16,000 troops in place by years end plus there are 21,000 American troops plus 3500 under direct U.S. control."I said an ESTIMATED 17,000 U.S. coaliton troops NOW changed and is under under Nato control and you said 16,000 Nato troops by years end...so I was off by 1,000. No you said: which lead me to believe that there are only 17,000 troops in Afgan... There are different estimates of the number of coalition troops some peg at 17,000. but militants in Pakistan in the city of Karachi just across the border, it is estimated that over 25,000 graduates of Al Quaida training camp live along with several thousand renegade Taliban and militants in the border mountains. Coalition troops it seems are out numbered To which i replied: Your numbers are right out of er, Nato alone has 16,000 troops in place by end year, plus there are 21,000 American troops plus 3500 under direct US control, The Americans have already begun to add to thier numbers by sending over an Airbourne Bn. I think you misunderstood my numbers, NATO forces include all those under ISAF, and do not include US forces. NATO will have just over 16,000 by end year with numbers planned to go as high as 25,000 by end year. US numbers in AFGAN right now est over 19,500 and will decrease to 16,000 by end year. these numbers do not include the over 3500 other forces under direct command of the US. Note that total number of troops in afgan by end year is well over 37,500 with plans to bring that number to 46,000 troops in country this does not count the amount of troops out of country as reinforcements which i believe number another 3500. The US government has reinforced it's numbers by i Airbourne Bn due to recent violence, and is now reconsidering it's commitment to withdrawal down it's forces. So yes your numbers are right out of er. NATO forces are different than US forces as US forces are not there as part of the NATO force. which has created 2 separate chain of commands and 2 separate missions in the same country. My Webpage My Webpage You also wrote- " Installing democracy is not the goal as we know it in Afghan but rebuilding a government and nation that will improve the quality of life for all Afghanis."You will need the will of the people and some form of democratic government which you don't have. You cannot force a country to live under your idealistic conditons. You have already committed yourself in saying " are you suggesting soldiers are incapable of developing democracy." Sorry my bad, what i meant to say was the democracy being formed in afgan is not the same as the democracy as we know it here in Canada. It still a government that was elected by the Afgan People, and is a thousand times better than the taliban regime in regards to quality of life for the average Afganis. We are not forcing anything on the people, and they welcome all the changes with open arms actually some are complaining that the change is to slow. And if you mean idealistic conditions like being able to sleep in your own home without being awoken by terrorists that kill family members in front the rest of your family in the middle of the night, or being able to go to the now open markets and stores without fear of getting blown up. then yes And just to clarify , it's not our idealistic conditions but the ones that are set out by the elected afganis government. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Leafless Posted May 20, 2006 Author Report Share Posted May 20, 2006 Army Guy You wrote- " What about Cypress, Golan, to name a few." You still failed to elaborate on these countries on what you consider the degree of success pertaining to Canadian involvement and what was actually accomplished and instead threw the question back to me. Below is the missing link that would not open and covers quite a bit. Read it the best you can and tell me what you think. I really think this whole issue boils down to personal opinion and if your in the military you could possibly think a lot differently than someone who is not. For instance I believe some countries you simply cannot do nothing for as perhaps they could have the wrong demographics, no resources, a backward people, totally corrupt and so many other obstacles that there is no way you would be able to turn certain countries around. Here is the link: This is the html version of the file http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/doc...WP29-Donais.pdf. G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:xbOSp...a&ct=clnk&cd=10 Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content. These search terms have been highlighted: long term successful peacekeeping efforts canada -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 Peacekeeping’s Poor Cousin:Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict PolicingTimothy DonaisYCISS Working Paper Number 29August 2004 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 2 1Research for this paper was made possible through the financial support of both the Canadian Consortium on HumanSecurity (CCHS) and the Human Security Program of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade(DFAIT). The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the CCHS or itsaffiliated institutions. The author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this paper of participants at theworkshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” organized by York University’sCentre for Internationaland Security Studies in conjunction with the Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, heldat the Canadian Police College in Ottawa on 30 April 2004. Particular thanks are due to Doug Coates, Paul LaRose-Edwards, and Katie Kerr.Peacekeeping’s Poor Cousin:Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict PolicingTimothy DonaisCanadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS)Post-Doctoral Fellow1YCISS Working Paper Number 29August 2004The YCISS Working Paper Series is designed to stimulate feedback from other experts in thefield. The series explores topical themes that reflect work being undertaken at the Centre. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1For much of the past decade, Canada has been deeply engaged in the effort to remake Haiti’s policeforces in the image of a modern, democratic police service. As part of successive United Nations policesupport missions, upwards of 700 Canadian police officers served in Haiti during this period, mentoringand training their local counterparts and carrying out some law enforcement responsibilities. Haiti’srecent descent back into chaos and lawlessness following the flight of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,however, has left this process, as well as the broader international effort to stabilize the hemisphere’smost volatile and strife-ridden state, in ruins. Once again, the outside world – while hardly innocent inHaiti’s most recent bout of instability – finds itself struggling to restore order, security, and somemeasure of democracy to Haiti. And once again, Canada is part of a longer-term international effort totransform Haiti’s police, which had become increasingly corrupt, politicized, and thuggish, into a forcefor peace, order, and stability. While seemingly a Sisyphean task, the stakes surrounding police reform inHaiti are particularly high. With the disbanding of the Haitian military in 1994, the Haitian NationalPolice now stands as the country’s key security sector institution, and the most visible means throughwhich the Haitian state has attempted to exercise its legitimate authority. For the internationalcommunity, failing to get it right this time may simply set the stage for Haiti’s next round of turmoil.Haiti’s recurring nightmare dramatically illustrates the importance of addressing questions ofsecurity sector reform in weak, unstable, or post-conflict states, and underlines the direct links betweenan ineffective security sector and human insecurity. A relatively recent addition to the internationalrelations lexicon, the notion of security sector reform refers to efforts to strengthen the full range of toolsat the disposal of states – from armies and police to courts, penal institutions, and intelligence services –with which to exercise their monopoly on the legitimate use of force. At its core, security sector reformis based on the principle that a state’s security institutions should be democratically controlled, anchoredin the rule of law, and most importantly, sources of security rather than insecurity for citizens.This paper examines Canadian experiences, policies, and practices with regard to police reform –a key element of the security sector reform agenda – in post-conflict or failed states. While an entiremythology has developed around Canada’s role as originator and long-standing champion ofpeacekeeping in its military guise, less attention has been paid to policing as the second core pillar ofsecurity in transitions from conflict to peace. This is gradually changing, as the limitations of militarypeacekeepers as agents of peacebuilding become more evident, and as it is increasingly recognized thatbuilding sustainable peace in the absence of minimal levels of public security is next to impossible. In many ways, post-conflict police assistance – including the provision of international civilianpolice for monitoring or law enforcement roles as well as longer-term training and institutionaldevelopment assistance – is an issue tailor-made for Canadian foreign policy, combining nationalcommitments to human security, to peacebuilding, and to the export of core Canadian values such aspeace, order, and good government. However, while Canada’s contributions in this area to date are farfrom negligible, neither has it been an international leader. The paper will assess Canada’s contributions,and the possibilities for greater Canadian involvement, in this area. It will consider both domestic and -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 4 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 21Annika Hansen, “International Security Assistance to War-torn Societies,” in Michael Pugh, ed., Regeneration ofWar-Torn Societies (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000), 35.international obstacles to a greater Canadian role – such as chronic personnel shortages,interdepartmental politics, and the hodgepodge of inadequately coordinated institutional actors alreadyactive in the field – and examine ways in which some of these challenges might be overcome.Policing Post-Conflict Zones: The Evolving International ContextWhile it is now widely recognized that most contemporary conflicts occur within states rather thanbetween them, the international community is only slowly coming to terms with this new reality in termsof its conflict management toolkit. In the early 1990s, Bosnia in particular demonstrated the inadequacyof conventional peacekeeping in the face of unconventional ethnic conflict, in which there were fewclearly-demarcated front lines, little distinction between combatants and civilians, and precious littlepeace to keep. At the same time, it has become evident that post-conflict peacebuilding in dividedsocieties is less about separating opposing armed forces and more about a sustained process of state-building. If state-building equals peacebuilding in the contemporary era, then the most that outsidemilitary forces can contribute to this effort is to create a reasonably stable environment in which thestate-building process – which involves not only establishing sustainable institutions but also generatingdomestic confidence in them – can occur.Given the violent context from which post-conflict states struggle to emerge, it seemsuncontroversial to suggest that among the most important institutions to be re-constructed as part of thepeacebuilding process are those related to security. Clearly, if the citizens of war-torn states cannot relyon state institutions to provide for their security, they will have little incentive to either put down theirarms or abandon ‘their’ side of the armed struggle. As Annika Hansen has suggested, “security is the keyto a “new social contract” between the population and its government or society in which the populationis willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”1It is here, then,that security sector reform and peacebuilding intersect, with success in the former realm a keycontributing factor in the success of the overall peace process.Particularly in cases of intra-state conflict, recent experience underlines the fact that thoseinternal security sector institutions underpinning the rule of law are just as important as militaryinstitutions in the transition from war to peace. A key task of international peacekeeping efforts has beento isolate, contain, and remove domestic military forces from the political process, and ultimately re-direct their energies towards external rather than internal security tasks. Sustainable peace, however,requires an equally concerted effort to establish internal security and the rule of law by strengthening,professionalizing, and de-politicizing police, courts, and penal institutions. In fragile and highly-politicized post-conflict environments, none of these processes can beexpected to unfold quickly or easily. Within the security sector, therefore, peacebuilding processes can -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 32Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars,” GlobalGovernance 7 (2001), 157; see also Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs 81:6(November-December 2002).usually be understood as unfolding in two, often overlapping stages: the direct international provision ofsecurity in the interim period before domestic institutions are up to taking on these tasks themselves, andthe necessarily longer-term processes of building capacity within domestic security institutions.With a few prominent exceptions, however, the international community has been reluctant toimpose both military and public security in post-conflict environments, despite recognizing theimportance of each. This reluctance has allowed significant post-conflict security gaps to emerge, withpredictably deleterious consequences for fragile peace processes. Typically, security responsibilities inpost-conflict environments are divided among military peacekeepers, local police, and internationalcivilian police. Just as typically, the former have been unwilling and unprepared to take on mundanepublic security tasks, the latter have been under-powered and under-resourced, while local policeestablishments are often as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. More recently, and moretroublingly, post-conflict operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have unfolded in the absence of anactive international civilian police presence. This situation has left huge gaps in security provisionbetween international military forces, focused on force protection and terrorism interdiction, and localpolice forces, which are hopelessly under-resourced and overwhelmed by the chaotic and lawlessconditions of the after-war period. The dangers of allowing post-conflict security gaps to persist in post-conflict environments aremany. In this relatively lawless interregnum between war and peace, petty thieves, organized criminalsand remnants of ousted regimes may begin to regroup and assert themselves, ethnic or factional tensionsmay boil over into open conflict, forms of retributive or vigilante justice may emerge, and there are realrisks of local communities turning against a peace process that appears incapable of delivering security. At the same time, international actors, in the face of persistent insecurity, may begin to lose bothcredibility and resolve as time lines for achieving sustainable peace grow ever longer. In the worst-casescenario, any viable peace process is swamped by the combination of an increasingly criminalizedpolitical economy, an untenable public security situation, and the re-emergence of ethnic or factionalconflict. To greater or lesser degrees, all of these malign consequences have been evident inpeacebuilding processes in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti.To a large extent, militarized peacekeeping or peace-enforcement forces are incapable ofadequately addressing many of the public security challenges faced by post-conflict societies. AsCharles Call and William Stanley have argued, “most militaries are not appropriate for public securitytasks, since their training, equipment, and doctrine emphasize use of overwhelming force rather than thecontrolled application of force necessary for police work.”2At the same time, soldiers are also reluctant -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 4agents of law enforcement, and most militaries tend to view public security work as thankless, dull, and amisuse of valuable war-fighting capacity.International civilian police missions, or CIVPOL in UN terminology, emerged at least partly inresponse to the unmet security needs of post-conflict environments. With the exceptions of Kosovo andEast Timor, however, where international police were given executive law enforcement authority,international police missions have typically been provided with weak mandates and inadequate resourcesand asked to radically transform domestic security environments. At the same time, the reputation ofinternational civilian police has not been helped by the UN’s inability to effectively manage internationalpolice officers from dozens of member states representing an equal number of different policing cultures,or to ensure that individual police monitors meet minimal requirements in terms of skills andprofessionalism. In terms of stature, organization, and resources then, the civilian policing component ofthe international post-conflict security architecture is unquestionably the poor cousin of its morecelebrated military counterpart.If anything, the difficult realities of contemporary post-conflict environments have made this gapbetween international capacities in military security provision and public security provision that muchmore apparent. Notwithstanding the current turmoil in Iraq, militarized peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions have become relatively efficient at establishing a base level of military security inpost-conflict environments, especially when backed by the overwhelming military power of the UnitedStates. The development of international capacities in the provision of post-conflict public security overthe past decade, on the other hand, has been somewhat haphazard and uneven. Consequently, findingways to simultaneously stabilize the public security situation in strife-torn states, while at the same timebuilding up domestic law and order capacities, remains one of the international community’s keypeacebuilding challenges.The Canadian Contribution: Past, Present, and FutureThe Canadian police experience with modern peacekeeping began in 1989, when some 100 officers weredeployed to Namibia to help oversee transitional elections. Canadian police officers have subsequentlybeen involved in many of the most prominent peace support missions of the past 15 years. Yet while therole of international police as an integral component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts has beengrowing, Canadian commitments and capacities in this area have evolved only marginally. WhileCanadian police officers are, and continue to be, widely respected abroad for their professionalism,Canada’s mechanisms for identifying, preparing, and deploying police officers for post-conflict workcontinue to be largely ad hoc and provisional. At the same time, over the course of the past half-decadeCanada has rarely managed to have more than 100 police officers deployed in peace operations at anyone time, despite widespread recognition among policy-makers that Canada could, and probably should,be doing more. While Canadian contributions are not markedly out of line with the contributions ofother Western states (even if well below the contributions of developing states such as Jordan), Canada is -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 7 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 53“Monthly Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations, 31 July 2004; Availablefrom http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contribu...aryJuly2004.pdf (accessed August 2004); tobe fair, it should be noted that Canada is currently contributing some 20 police trainers to train Iraqi police recruits inJordan, and has recently committed an additional 100 police to the UN’s Haiti mission.4These general conclusions, as well as others in this paper, are drawn from the “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing” workshop (see footnote 1 above).5Doug Coates, “Canadian Police as Peacekeepers,” (Unpublished manuscript, April 2002), 28-30.far from an international leader in contributing to multinational police support efforts. Presently,according to the UN’s most recent monthly statistics, Canada is contributing 45 civilian police to UNpeace operations, fewer than countries such as Fiji, Bulgaria, and Ghana.3Since 1997, the deployment of Canadian police personnel in international peace supportoperations has been governed by the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA), a funding and administrativemechanism involving four major government actors: the Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade (now Foreign Affairs Canada), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), theRoyal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Department of the Solicitor General. Foreign Affairsprovides the policy lead, CIDA provides the funding – some $19 million over three years under thecurrent agreement – while the RCMP provides the bulk of personnel. In recent years, however, theRCMP has developed partnerships with local and regional police forces across the country, which nowprovide close to half of all officers for international missions. Currently, the CPA provides sufficientfunding to enable some 42 Canadian police officers to be deployed internationally each year, although incases of larger deployments, CPA funding is topped up from other government sources. The CPA doesnot provide for a dedicated pool of officers on standby for international missions; rather it facilitates theselection and deployment of officers on a case-by-case basis, primarily in response to requests frommultilateral organizations such as the UN.While many of those familiar with the CPA insist that it has worked reasonably well over thepast seven years, there is also a widespread consensus that it is no longer adequate.4Indeed, the CPAwas initially meant to be a temporary arrangement, put in place until a more permanent arrangementcould be developed and implemented.5Now in its eighth year, however, the CPA appears increasingly tobe a permanent fixture of Canada’s foreign policy landscape.Lying as it does at the intersection of foreign policy, international development, and policing, theissue of Canadian support to post-conflict policing has been marked by divergent policy priorities amongthe relevant participating departments. While formally managed by an interdepartmental committeerepresenting Canada’s development, foreign affairs, and policing communities, the Canadian PoliceArrangement has never been firmly anchored in a coherent national strategic vision around Canada’s rolein post-conflict public security. For its part, Foreign Affairs has led on the policy side, and has a clearinterest in an effective Canadian contribution to post-conflict policing as a means of enhancing Canada’s -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 8 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 66Author interview with Susan Brown, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Ottawa, 14 January 2004.7The term “policekeeper” is closely associated with the recent work of Graham Day; see Graham Day andChristopher Freeman, “Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq,”International Affairs 79:2 (2003).stature abroad and advancing its international policy goals, but lacks the financial clout to impose a clearvision and direction. Within CIDA, despite a growing recognition that police reform is a legitimate focusfor development assistance, police assistance issues have never been effectively integrated within theagency’s broader development programs or strategies.6Limited resources and conflicting mandates have also generated considerable ambivalencetowards the issue of international and post-conflict police assistance within the RCMP. On the one hand,there is an awareness that Canada not only has a responsibility to contribute, as part of its broaderinternational commitments, to post-conflict stabilization efforts through police assistance, but thatCanada also benefits from such assistance. Not only does it help prevent instability from enteringCanada in the form of refugee flows or cross-border crime, but participation in international policingmissions gives Canadian police personnel valuable experience. On the other hand, the terms of the CPAoften force a trade-off between domestic and international policing. Since the arrangement does notallow the RCMP to hire additional policing resources, every police officer sent on an internationalmission is one less police officer available for active duty at home. This situation is hardly unique toCanada, and is one of the key distinctions between military peacekeeping forces, who are essentially onstandby when stationed in their home countries, and “policekeepers,”7who typically have ongoingdomestic law enforcement responsibilities. In Canada, this reality has tempered the enthusiasm of seniorRCMP officials for international police work, since they tend to view such missions as at best adistraction, and at worst an obstacle to the force’s ability to perform its core tasks at home.The absence of a dedicated Canadian standby force of police personnel available forinternational duty has had a number of implications for the practice of deploying Canadian policeofficers abroad. While Canada has committed itself to supplying UN police support missions with up to50 officers on short notice, each request from the UN requires a relatively laborious process ofidentifying potential candidates who are qualified, willing, and in a position to be released by theirsuperior officers. This system, in addition to being relatively inefficient, also has implications in termsof training for international service. Since officers are not pre-selected, and since Canada aims toprovide personnel within eight weeks of an official request, the time frame between selection anddeployment provides little opportunity for training. And while Canadian police personnel are widelyconsidered to be well-trained in modern policing methods, even the best-trained officers benefit fromadditional training aimed at preparing them for the rigours of international police work in unstable post-conflict societies. Such supplementary training could include courses on international humanitarian law,on dealing with refugee or displaced populations or with questions of disarmament or demobilization, -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 9 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 78Currently, for example, Canadian officers being deployed on international policing missions receive a two-hourbriefing on international humanitarian law; author interview with Paul LaRose-Edwards, CANADEM, Ottawa, 15January 2004.9Comments made by DFAIT’s Wendy Gilmour at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-ConflictPolicing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.10See Louise Bell, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK government approach to reducing conflict(London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, August 2003); Available fromhttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/global_conflict_prevention_pool.pdf (accessed May 2004).and on the political dynamics of the specific country and conflict to which they are being deployed.8Issues of training and advance preparation are even more pressing given the relatively short rotations –between six to twelve months – typical of international police missions. All too often, by the time anindividual police monitor fully understands the local environment and is able to operate effectivelywithin it, he or she is being rotated back home again. This revolving door approach to post-conflictpolicing has eroded both the credibility and the effectiveness of UN police assistance missions.At the same time, much as the Canadian Police Arrangement has suffered somewhat from beingowned by several departments and championed by none, there has been little effort to integrate post-conflict policing issues with other elements of the security sector reform agenda, notably corrections orjudicial reform. This issue is crucial, since perhaps the clearest lesson from international reform effortsin the rule of law sector is that an effective police force means little if the local judiciary is corrupt or thepenal system dysfunctional. In other words, there is a growing recognition that restoring the rule of lawin post-conflict states must be a single, integrated process.At the moment, however, Canada’s capacity to deploy justice or penal reform experts intointernational missions is even less developed than its ability to deploy police officers. While Canadianpersonnel in these areas have served in international missions, Canada’s approach is far from systematic,and there has been little effort made to focus Canadian deployments in the areas of policing, justice, andcorrections into a coherent and integrated security sector reform strategy.9Again, Canada is far from theonly country grappling with such issues, and both the United Kingdom and the United States may offersome useful models for Canada as it contemplates future approaches in this area. In 2001, for example,the UK initiated a Global Conflict Prevention Pool, an exercise in ‘joined-up government’ aimed atpooling resources and strategies from the UK Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice, and the Department for International Development into a coherent national strategy for conflictreduction. The pool has enabled the participating departments to develop and implement joint strategiesgeographically, as in Afghanistan or the Balkans, or thematically, as in the area of small arms and lightweapons.10The United States has also acknowledged the inefficiencies of decentralized approaches tosecurity sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding, and is working towards the establishment of an -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 10 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 811Comments made by Dick Mayer, former deputy director of the United States’ International Criminal InvestigativeTraining Assistance Program (ICITAP), at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,”Ottawa, 30 April 2004.12James Traub, “Nation Building: Making Sense of the Mission,” New York Times Magazine, 11 April 2004, 34.Office of Post-Conflict Stabilization in order to lend clearer focus and greater coherence to USpeacebuilding efforts.11Canada has neither the international clout nor the financial resources of its more powerful allies,and thus might ultimately have to choose between either broadening or deepening its commitments tointernational security sector reform. Yet whether Canada chooses to develop coherent security sectorapproaches to be applied in long-term engagements with countries such as Haiti, or strives to become aninternational leader in the area of post-conflict police assistance, either would be a significantimprovement over the current state of affairs. As it stands now, there is a real danger that Canada’scommitment to engaged multilateralism in international peace and security issues is becoming morelegend than reality.The Challenge of MultilateralismOf course, given the previously mentioned problems with existing international mechanisms for theprovision of post-conflict police assistance, there are legitimate questions to be raised as to whether, andwhy, Canada would want to funnel significant resources into a system that is highly inefficient, if notwholly dysfunctional. It is also the case that in the case of post-conflict policing, ineffective internationalmechanisms regularly meet nearly intractable problems within post-conflict environments. Post-conflictpolice reform – as the Haiti case demonstrates with striking clarity – almost invariably involvepainstaking, long-term commitments, multiple and overlapping tasks and responsibilities, and uncertainrewards in terms of concrete, measurable, and sustainable indicators of success. Why, then, should webother?With regard to the inherent difficulty and thanklessness of post-conflict policing, the shortanswer is that simply avoiding the difficult problems will not make them go away. As argued above, therestoration of effective policing is now a crucial element of any peacebuilding process, and failure herecomes with a high risk of renewed conflict and instability. And as James Traub has recently written inthe context of post-conflict nation-building more generally:What is almost impossible turns out to be indispensable. It has become obvious since9/11 that we cannot allow collapsed states, or rogue states, to fester: their failures havebecome our problem. Nation-building is no longer a subject for debate: we will get itright or pay the price.12Concerning the well-publicized inefficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions, one possible option forCanada could be to direct more of its international policing resources along bilateral channels. Over the -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 913Author discussions and interviews with well over a dozen North American police officers with internationalexperience, August 2003 - April 2004.past several years, in fact, CIDA has funded numerous bilateral assistance projects, among them acapacity-building project for the Afghan National Police and a multi-year project – carried out by thePearson Peacekeeping Centre – aimed at preparing military and police personnel from FrancophoneAfrica to participate in international peace support operations. While such projects clearly make animportant contribution, within post-conflict situations donor-state bilateralism regularly exacerbatesproblems of international coherence and coordination, problems which can dilute the impact ofindividual projects. For all its warts, and particularly within the context of immediate post-conflictenvironments, the UN is often the only institution with the credibility, legitimacy, and ability to take onthe complex and long-term challenge of re-engineering domestic security institutions. There is,therefore, is a strong practical case to be made for Canada continuing to work within multilateral policingframeworks, while at the same time pushing for improvements in the realm of policy and practice.Indeed, given Canada’s past experience and its strong policing tradition, there is much thatCanada could contribute to a broader, long-term effort to enhance international and UN capacities in thearea of post-conflict police assistance. Several key problems within the current UN approach to post-conflict policing can be identified, and in each of these Canada could potentially contribute at leastpartial solutions.Personnel Training and Preparation: An oft-cited problem with international policing missionsis the rather uneven quality of personnel deployed to such missions. Part of the problem is the UN’srelatively underdeveloped capacities in the area of pre-deployment and continuing training for its missionstaff, which are exacerbated by the failure of countries, like Canada, to provide pre-deployment trainingof any significance. A second issue, far more sensitive because of its racial overtones, is the question ofthe training and competence of international police officers from developing nations. A near-universalsentiment among Western police officers with experience in international missions is a sense offrustration with counterparts from developing nations who show up in mission unable to drive, to speakEnglish, or perform basic policing duties in accordance with accepted international standards.13To befair, the situation has improved over the past decade or so as UN standards have been graduallytightened. However, significant questions still remain, among both Western police officers and thepopulations of post-conflict states, about the qualifications and credibility of officers from developingcountries – especially those with dubious human rights records – as trainers, mentors, and role models.Regardless of the depths of the North-South divide in policing capacities, much more could bedone to prepare police officers from all nations for international missions. Canada, for its part, has adeveloping capacity in this area, which could feed into a broader international training regime forinternational police work in post-conflict zones. Organizations such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centreand CANADEM, an Ottawa-based non-governmental organization which manages the deployment of -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 12 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1014Comments made by Claude Rochon, Director of CANPOL, at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.15See, for example, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Haiti,” Organization of American States, 20May 2003; Available from: http://www.oas.org/OASpage/Haiti_situation/CPdoc3750_03E.htm (accessed August2004).Canadian civilians into international peace operations, are expanding their efforts in the area ofinternational police training, one element of which involves training police officers of other nations forpeace support work. Building up a coherent Canadian capacity in this area, and coordinating thiscapacity with similar efforts in other countries, could form the basis of an integrated training system forinternational policekeepers.Strategic Planning and Development: At a recent Ottawa workshop examining Canadian andinternational responses to the challenges of post-conflict policing, one consistent theme concerned thelack of, and need for, coherent planning and development in international police support missions. Claude Rochon, a retired Canadian police officer with experience in missions all over the globe, notedthat missions in which strategic plans had been developed and implemented were very much theexception rather than the rule.14Such planning is crucial, however, both because of the inherentcomplexity of police reform and because of the chaotic and fluid nature of most post-conflictenvironments. In Haiti, for example, a relatively comprehensive international effort to build up theHaitian National Police (HNP) ultimately foundered on questions of professionalism and politicization,as senior Haitian police managers not only failed to ensure accountability within the ranks but also failedto resist politicization of the police apparatus as the country’s political crisis deepened.15While policereform in Haiti has in many ways been a victim of the country’s broader political crisis, the weaknesseswithin the HNP that the crisis exposed suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to the quality ofpolice leadership, to questions of accountability up and down the police hierarchy, and to the linksbetween police reform and the broader peacebuilding process.Strategic planning is all the more important given the regular turnover of personnel ininternational missions; setting goals, standards, policies and procedures that are clear, consistent andtransparent is crucial given endemic problems with personnel continuity, particularly within seniormanagement positions. On top of all this, the multidimensional nature of modern police supportoperations, which are often asked simultaneously to monitor and mentor local counterparts, recruit andtrain a new generation of officers, weed out bad apples from existing staff rosters, and re-organize entirenational policing infrastructures, requires considerable planning to ensure that these various elementswork together as a coherent whole. And while the UN’s Civilian Policing Division has been upgraded inrecent years, its strategic planning capacities remain largely inadequate in the face of such challenges.While a country like Canada could not realistically be expected to tackle the challenge of missionstrategic planning on its own, there are elements of the broader set of issues with which Canada could -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 13 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 11usefully engage in an effort to move international planning capacities forward. On its own or incollaboration with like-minded states, Canada could usefully explore options for improving UN post-conflict policing capacities in areas such as best practices and lessons learned, or in the development andinstitutionalization of standard rules, policies and procedures for post-conflict policing operations. Giventhe legal vacuums that often exist in post-conflict environments, there has also been some discussion ofthe need to develop a generic legal framework that could guide international police missions, particularlyin the early stages of a mission. Canada could also explore the feasibility and desirability of developingsuch a mechanism.Standby and Rapid Reaction Capability: Since most police officers have ongoing lawenforcement responsibilities in their home countries, questions of availability and staffing have doggedUN police support efforts for years. The challenge of finding enough qualified staff for internationalmissions also, of course, has had implications for the quality of international personnel, as it has forcedthe UN to focus on quantity over quality. And while there is growing talk of the UN moving to leaner,less personnel-intensive missions in the future, with the burden of law enforcement placed squarely onthe shoulders of domestic police within post-conflict states, this may ultimately prove to be wishfulthinking. In other words, major police missions à la Kosovo, East Timor, or even Bosnia may not beexceptions to the rule, but rather indicative of the range of post-conflict situations that will continue totest international capacities to deliver post-conflict public security. It may, therefore, not be so easy tosimply wish away questions of securing adequate personnel for international policing missions.In recognition of such realities, the European Union has moved to create a standby force of 5,000police officers available on short notice to respond to crisis situations. As discussed in more detailbelow, Canada could follow suit by improving its standby capacities through the creation of a standinginternational police support unit, which could also serve as both model and inspiration for other states. At the same time, through CANPOL, a division of CANADEM that provides retired police officers forinternational work, Canada already has a standing pool of experienced officers ready and willing to bedeployed on short notice. Working with the UN to institutionalize the use of such personnel, and tostreamline procedures through which retired officers are incorporated into international missions, couldbe another means by which the challenge of finding qualified and available policing personnel could beovercome.Coordination of Multilateral and Bilateral Efforts: Beyond getting the Canadian and UN housesin order on the question of post-conflict policing, there is also the question of enhancing coordinationamong the broader international community, including the range of bilateral and multilateral actorsinvolved in police reform in particular cases. Across the security and development sectors, the questionof international coordination is a difficult one, and levels of coordination are often so poor as to rendernonsensical the very notion of an ‘international community.’ In many cases, the relevant actorsrecognize that coordination should be improved, but feel powerless to make it happen. In post-conflictpolicing operations, the lack of overall donor coordination, combined with an absence of strategic -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 14 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1216Comments made by Glenn MacPhail, a retired RCMP officer with substantial international experience, at theworkshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.planning and direction, often leads to inefficient and ineffective allocation of scarce resources. In somecases, local police forces receive computers when they really need pens and paper, or motorcycles whenthen need flashlights.16While acknowledging that coordination among a multiplicity of agencies in chaotic post-conflictconditions will remain a considerable challenge, there are things that concerned countries such as Canadacould do to improve matters. In the policing field, for example, Canada could seek to identify andpromote best practices in the area of international donor coordination. One such example comes fromAlbania, where an international consortium on law enforcement assistance has been relatively successfulin coordinating police assistance efforts across a range of relevant actors. In this area as in others, thereis no guarantee that Canadian advocacy will be either heard or heeded. What is certain, however, is thateffective police reform in post-conflict environments requires international resources and assets to beused as efficiently as possible, and that the failure of contributing states to take this issue seriously willperpetuate a situation in which disoriented and uncoordinated international responses to chaotic post-conflict situations will produce unsatisfactory outcomes. Future Policy DirectionsCanada is current engaged in a foreign policy review, and there is a compelling case to be made for areview of Canadian policies concerning this country’s role in post-conflict policing. As things currentlystand, four different options present themselves.Business as usual: While this option requires no new resources, it leaves in place a policy toolthat does not deliver much bang for the buck. It also leaves unaddressed the dissatisfactions of each ofthe main government players with the current system and leaves Canada without a coherent mechanismto deal with broader questions of security sector reform. However, unless each of the departmentsinvolved in the international police assistance file begin to make a clear and coherent case that this is anarea in which Canada should be playing a stronger role, this option is also the most likely. From agovernment decision-making perspective, status quo inertia is rendered more likely because post-conflictpolice assistance does not enjoy the high profile that the deployment of military peacekeepers does. Conversely, however, the deployment of a handful of police officers to work in relative obscurity inBaghdad or Pristina or Freetown allows Canada to claim that it is contributing to post-conflict publicsecurity across the globe without a major commitment of money or personnel.Greater use of retired officers: This option also entails minimal risk or commitment on the partof the Canadian government. CANPOL, the policing arm of CANADEM, currently has some 800 retiredCanadian police officers on its roster, most of whom have considerable international experience andrelatively few domestic encumbrances. Indeed, retired officers are becoming a fixture of international -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 15 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1317Author interview with Ajay Bhatnagar, UN Civilian Policing Division, New York, 6 January 2004.18Author discussions with DFAIT officials, Ottawa, 15 January 2004.police missions, even if they represent at best a partial solution to the deficiencies of current Canadianand international systems. On the one hand, the UN still prefers to recruit actively-serving officers,partly because of age and fitness issues,17but also because active officers tend to come seconded withsponsoring-government salaries, and are thus less expensive. On the other hand, Canadian policy-makersthemselves remain wary of an over-reliance on retired personnel, in part because retired officers are notas accountable to their home governments and in part because they may not enjoy the same kind ofaccess to information or resources in the field as they would if they were full-time employees of theirhome governments.18At the same time, the use of retired officers in international missions has raised ahost of logistical questions, from issues of liability and insurance to more mundane questions of whetherretired RCMP officers working abroad should be allowed to wear RCMP uniforms and badges. Whilenone of these challenges is insurmountable, combined they do suggest that while there is a role for retiredpolice officers in international police support missions, there are limits to how far the privatization ofpolice assistance services can be taken.A broadened and/or deepened Canadian Police Arrangement: If Canada does want to take on amore prominent role in the provision of post-conflict public security, one option would be simply todirect more financial resources into the current CPA. Given that overhead and administration costs arerelatively fixed, doubling the CPA operating budget to $12.6 million per year should allow Canada tomore than double its standing commitment to the United Nations. The fact that different pots ofgovernment monies are often drawn on to support larger deployments of Canadian police personnel alsomeans that this is not necessarily a question of finding new money, but rather of pooling existing funds. At the same time, or alternately, the current CPA could be transformed into a broader vehicle forthe delivery of Canadian expertise in the area of security sector reform. Much like the UK’s GlobalConflict Prevention Pool, such a transformation of the CPA would not only provide a framework for theinternational deployment of Canadian personnel in the justice and penal sectors, but would also allow thegradual development of a coherent Canadian approach to questions of security sector reform. Moving inthis direction would also require a greater commitment to inter-departmental policy coordination, sincethe CPA’s policy-level steering committee is currently required to meet no more than once a year.The principal drawback of this option lies in the fact that, at least in the policing field, moremoney will not necessarily fix the current flaws in the CPA. In the absence of a sustained, long-termfunding commitment by its government partners, the RCMP still will not be in a position to hireadditional police officers to offset the greater numbers of its staff deployed internationally. In this sense,more money might simply add to the current headaches of the RCMP (and of other participating policeforces) in terms of having to identify, release, and cover for even greater numbers of field officers. At -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 16 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1419This estimate is based on the current CPA ratio of $150,000 per officer deployed per year. An annual budget of$30 million would provide for a 200-person standing force.20See also Paul LaRose-Edwards, “Canadian CivPol Division,” (Ottawa: CANADEM, May 1999).21Coates, “Canadian Police as Peacekeepers,” 46.the same time, while an expanded CPA might put greater numbers of Canadians into the field, it will not address existing tensions between adequate training and rapid deployment. Finally, as with the previoustwo options, neither a broadened nor a deepened CPA will facilitate a more robust Canadian contributionto improving current deficiencies within the international system around post-conflict police assistance. A dedicated International Civilian Police Division: The most ambitious option for upgradingCanadian capacities in the field of international police assistance – and the most logical if Canada is toestablish itself as a serious player in this area – is to establish a dedicated international police supportdivision within the RCMP. While requiring a considerable and sustained financial commitment on thepart of the Government of Canada – in the neighborhood of $30-50 million annually19– the creation of astanding unit would give Canada significant capacity not only to provide officers for internationalmissions but also to engage seriously in international training and research. Assuming that half of thestanding Canadian unit would be deployed abroad at any one time, this would still leave a substantialnumber of personnel available to either receive, develop or deliver specialized training in internationalpolice assistance, or to form the core of an Canadian policy unit on strengthening international capacitiesin the area of post-conflict policing. The idea for a dedicated Canadian international civilian policing unit is not new, and the RCMPhas been advocating such a move for a number of years.20From an RCMP perspective, the creation of aninternational standby unit neatly overcomes the tensions between international and domestic policingresponsibilities, as the unit would be fully separated from the RCMP’s domestic policing arms, and stablefunding would enable additional hiring to fill gaps left by police officers drawn into the unit. At thesame time, the formation of the unit would entail the automatic pre-selection of officers for overseasdeployments, enabling these officers to receive substantial pre-deployment training.The creation of an international civilian policing unit would also require alterations to currentadministrative arrangements. Given the level of funding involved, funding for this new initiative shouldcome directly from the Treasury Board, rather than through CIDA.21This would not only simplifyadministrative arrangements, but shift CIDA – which has proven to be somewhat ambivalent in itsapproach to the CPA – from the role of funder to the role of advisor. An inter-departmental committeecould still be struck to manage overall policy direction for the new mechanism, and this committee couldform the nucleus for an integrated Canadian strategy on security sector reform issues.Establishing a standing Canadian capacity for international police assistance would be a boldstep, and would send a strong signal that Canada is willing to put its money where its mouth is on -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 15questions of international peace and security. As well, since police assistance is increasingly consideredpart of official development assistance, it could also help bring Canada’s official aid levels back torespectable levels. Realistically, however, getting this issue on the government’s foreign policy agendawill require a considerable lobbying effort from a range of directions, particularly given the relativelylow profile of post-conflict policing both within the Canadian public and within the Canadiangovernment.ConclusionIn this paper I have made the case that questions of post-conflict public security are increasinglyrecognized as essential to the success or failure of peacebuilding operations, and have argued that Canadashould seriously consider upgrading its capacities in this area as part of a renewed Canadian commitmentto engaged multilateralism. Enhancing Canadian capacities for the provision of post-conflict policeassistance would not only be consistent with explicit Canadian foreign policy aims, it would also addsome needed balance between commitments and capabilities. At the same time, Canada currently enjoysa strong international reputation in the area of policing, and an equally strong – if slowly waning –reputation in the field of international peacekeeping. An expansion of Canadian capacities for post-conflict police assistance would build on both these traditions, and re-assert Canada’s stance as achampion of constructive solutions to international conflict. On the financial side, while establishing apermanent Canadian standby unit for international post-conflict policing would entail considerableexpansion of the monetary envelope currently devoted to such efforts, the required investment is not outof line given Canada’s $3.1 billion aid budget, and given the widely-acknowledged links betweeninsecurity and underdevelopment. If, as noted above, there can be no development without security, thenpractically speaking an investment in public security is an investment in development.More broadly, there is little question that expanding Canadian capacities for post-conflictpolicing would help fill existing gaps within international capacities in this area. Recent events in Haitisuggest that the provision of post-conflict public security will continue to stress the resources of theinternational community for many years to come. Conversely, ongoing instability in both Iraq andAfghanistan suggest that failing to respond to this challenge risks condemning post-conflict societies tofuture cycles of strife, conflict, and misery. By taking up its end of this challenge, Canada can not onlyposition itself as an international leader in this area and enhance its international reputation, it can alsomake a concrete and long-lasting contribution to international stability. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 20, 2006 Report Share Posted May 20, 2006 Hello. Nice forum. First post. PREAMBLE: Thank you in advance for your patience I am a 14-year veteran in the Armed Forces still serving, currently in Edmonton Alberta. I belong to a specialized recce unit attached to the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry, III Battalion. That's as specific as I'm going to get about that, except to say I am not 'Special Forces' or 'JTF2'. My unit was heavily involved in Operation Anaconda, Shahikot Valley (Task Force Rakassan, TF K-Bar) et. al. I have been involved in various recce and security missions from Rwanda to Somalia to Bosnia since 1992. I don't say that to lord it over on anyone, nor do I enjoy being tested, (but I will pass). I am not here to belittle the concerns or information any of you who are for or against the mission in Afghanistan, and finally, while I do believe I have an important perspective, point of view and information many are not privy to I don't believe that I 'know it all' and I am only interested in the ears of those who are mature or smart enough to believe the same. Unlike my peers I will not heap loads of "support the troops" on you and I will not belittle valid concerns people have about this conflict, even if I do believe they are missing information or the whole point entirely. I believe there are a lot of misconceptions about the state of Afghanistan today, the Taliban and their relationship with Afghans, the will of the majority of people over there and ultimately, the chances of a happy ending. With your patience I really cant do this without it being a two-parter. I'm not a fan of long-winded posts, but better to get as much on the table as I can at the start rather than dragging it out over 30 posts. First I would like to address how the media shapes our perception, and then I'd like to talk about what you never really see/read. If you stay on for the ride I think we can get a really good conversation going. Oh - just to get the ball rolling: A person who lives in Afghanistan can, if you must, be referred to as an Afghan (like the rug), but in any case an Afghani is a unit of their currency. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 20, 2006 Report Share Posted May 20, 2006 PART 1 Human Perception is a necessity, not a sense. There's no way to say what I'm about to say without pompously sounding like I came up with it myself and none of you ever thought about it before. That's not my intention. The way the brain navigates a universe is NOT by asking questions, but by confirming or excluding preconceived answers. When we do not know the answer to something we create a 'best guess' answer to fill the void and then endeavour to either confirm this guess or exclude it. This is because the human brain CANNOT function without pre-determined answers. When we are completely void of any best guess we almost always think the worst.... grown adults sometimes find themselves scared to open a closet door in a darkened room or seek out the nature of a noise the heard in the forest at night while sitting by the campfire. This illustrates how 'the Unknown' can, (is?) the scariest thing we can face for the very reason that our minds have a lot of trouble dealing without estimates or reliable guess. Or, consider the old "if a tree falls in the forest does anyone hear it?". Now the point of this question is to put a person in a state where their brain accepts that they cannot answer a question. This, supposedly will lead to an almost trance-like operation of the brain known as 'meditation' and is meant as an escape from the tiring and frustrating existence of a mind (all of us) that is, as Morrison put it, "squirming like a toad"....always looking for answers and often never liking them as they may not correspond to the preconceived answer the mind already provided itself with. What does this have to do with Afghanistan or the media? Well, for starters, we're not in Afghanistan and we have questions. Like it or not, and regardless of our willingness to admit it, we do have preconceived answers but as thinking adults we understand these answers are only estimates and guesses so we look for sources of information to either confirm or deny these guesses. Where do we look? The media. Where else? What's wrong with that, right? How does the media work? I'm not a journalist but I do know this: an international reporter is, more often than not, paid by the story. The story does not print, they do not get paid. Subsequently a reporter finds the stories they believe have a high chance of being printed by their editors. This will presuppose that they are stories the editor is interested in publishing. "IF IT BLEEDS IT LEADS." I don't intend to argue that the media is 'liberal bias' or that there is some 'anti-war' conspiracy to them. That's silly. But the effect is similar. For example there is issue of how a reporter wants to be viewed. They know that a pro-military operation story will be perceived, as propaganda and butt-kissing, but a negative story seems to imply that the reporter is covering the "hard stories" and finding the "hard answers". Baloney. Because they decide what is newsworthy, they also decide and manipulate (intentionally or not) our perception of Iraq OR Afghanistan. We take their word as gold and yet so many times the journalist hasn't even left the hotel, has paid a soldier or an eyewitness for the story, or has simply arrived at the scene last. Why is this important? Let me ask you: When was the last time you read in the paper or saw on the news a story about the Red Cross and all the good work they are doing in Iraq? (Notice that? I asked a question when I am already fairly certain of one of two answers.) I'm thinking that most people had no idea beyond peripheral assumption that the Red Cross was working in Iraq....until one of them gets kidnapped. Then and only then we learn of the Red Cross and not of all the fine work that they do but rather about how dangerous Iraq is and look here, Red Cross workers were kidnapped....must be a strange violent and uncontrolled place, right? What about reconstruction? When was the last time you read about a reconstruction story? Personally I can't remember the last time I read about one. Does that mean they aren't going on? No, of course not, right? But since we never read about all the Iraqi's helping the Red Cross and all that the Red Cross is doing to help them, or about reconstruction or about the Iraqis or Afghans who are working for democracy or change, but instead only what happens when things go bad. We don’t read about the IEDs that were found and disarmed, we only read about the ones that take life. Then there is the classic "liberal media" or "underground media" like Alternative Radio etc. I listen to them all the time. They are not always 'wrong', but there is no doubt that these people have chosen their "side" and will not tell any stories that do not conform with it (no different than the Bush admin.'s mouthpiece Fox news) They lie. They lie easily as much as any other media source lies or manipulates or makes it up as they go along. They lie for the same reason Fox will: Because they believe they are fighting the "good fight" and that justifies anything. They are the "I told you so" crowd and for most of them reality or the shaping of reality is more about fashion than actual reality. Who would they be to their peers if one day they woke up and didn’t tow the line? They would be excommunicated and their "Rage-Against-The-Machines" girlfriends would leave them. Yes: it is that simple. You will not read about Afghan fathers who want their children (girls as well) to attend school. You will find it hard to read about the people who believe and live for and fight for things like 'freedom', which let's face it, has become a cliché word without meaning. We do not understand because we live with about as much freedom as one can experience in this life or world. We will not read about the kids who are NOT being stoned to death or beaten for playing or singing. You will only read bad news because bad news is all that sells papers. Honestly, if you past a newspaper box with the front page heralding a new construction or government initiative would you bother to read the by-line? But if the headline read, "1000 Afghans killed, 20 Canadian soldiers killed" you'd stop, right? Whether it's 90% good news and 10% bad news or the other way around all you will ever read is the bad news. This shapes our perception to a point that most of us are too proud to admit or realize. Either way we are usually left with a grossly mis-informed and mis-interpreted version of what is going on and end up with a picture that is vstly different from reality. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 20, 2006 Report Share Posted May 20, 2006 PART 2 Misconceptions about Afghanistan. All over the net I read opinions about NATO's mission and Canada’s' involvement and I feel I really need to address some details that, IMO are seriously misunderstood by many if not most of the Canadian, American and European public regardless of which side they are on. I would like to list some of what I see as 'common denominator' concerns and address them. In a lot of ways I just want to get it off my chest and I don't suppose it will do much good, which is to be expected. I would point out that my political compass will be hard for most to determine accurately (so dont rush to label me and then hide behind that) and I do not like politicians very much - every election, to me, is a choice of lesser evils that seem to get worse every 4 years. 1. "Afhgans, the Afghan people = The Taliban" There is a really great article here on the genesis of the Taliban sect, and it's origins both in Afghanistan and Iran and Pakistan. The important part to understand for today is that the majority of al-Qaeda and even Taliban leadership is foreign. That is not to say that the sect is foreign but that the leadership has been for decades and this basically forms a foreign leadership of a sect that never controlled Afghanistan to begin with. When people say Afghanistan has never been conquered they're right - they weren't conquered they were hoodwinked into losing their leadership to Iranians, Arabs and Pakistanis. Afghans want it back. from the link: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/396/in4.htm " - One outcome has been the emerging modern notion of political participation, which has come into conflict with the political tradition of single ethno-hegemony. According to Iranian social scientist Changuiz Pahlavan, the modern idea of nationalism which emerged in recent years could no longer be based upon the rule of a single Pashtun ethnic community. The mass of non-Pashtun warriors who fought to oust the Russians from Afghanistan would no longer go home and submit to the rule of the Pashtuns. With the absence of a nationally unifying force, the continuing Pashtun supremacy rendered other ethnic groups even more aware of their identity. At a time when there was a need for a national consensus transcending ethnic divisions, therefore, ethnic loyalties were becoming even stronger. Although the Taliban are by and large of Pashtun origin, their emphasis on Islam as the religion of the nation, and their madrasas, which accept students of all ethnic affiliations, succeeded in giving people a sense of national unity beyond ethnicity. Upon the departure of the Soviets, and before the advent of the Taliban, the coalition of Afghan Mujahidin (consisting of different ethnic groups, both Shi'ite and Sunni) also attempted to build a national consensus, even managing to ratify a Constitution in the early 1990s. The Pashtun leaders again reinstated their dominance, however, thus causing dissent among other Mujahidin and undermining the coalition. Pakistan played a key role in instigating the ethnic dominance of the Pashtuns. Pakistan was adamant that the regime in Afghanistan be both Islamist and Pashtun, as the Pakistani army is largely made up of this ethnic group. The Taliban offered such an opportunity. But Pakistan's backing of the Taliban also had other significant advantages. It would give Pakistan a strategic ally in face of the ongoing conflict with India. In addition, because the US preferred the Taliban to the Mujahidin, the latter being close to Iran, it sought to have the pipeline project which is to bring oil and gas from central Asia to the Persian Gulf pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan instead of Iran. This project would provide Pakistan with oil and gas resources as well as rent income. UNOCAL, a US firm, and its Saudi partner Delta are bidding to construct the pipeline. Reportedly, UNOCAL has bribed Pakistani army officials and security forces to ensure their backing of the project. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which seeks to support suitable religious groups in the Muslim world, found in the Taliban a force which could undermine Iranian influence in Afghanistan. - The writer is associate professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo. " 2. "Afghanistan is a backwards country of illiterate war-like peasants and farmers who do not want to get along and who essentially aren't very much different, culturally, than the Taliban who ruled them. " It is true that there is a deepening divide between rural and urban Afghanistan, but this is a world-wide phenomenon and not the beginning of a civil war as Im sure the media would wish for. But Afghans are highly nationalistic despite all the hoopla that is made over 'tribal divisions'. However illiterate though they may be I feel frustrated that we never read about the highly masochistic paternal fathers who still want their sons AND daughters to attend school if they can. This is something the people want, yet the Taliban outlawed most of them and continue to burn them down today. With the Taliban it's either the boot on your neck or the rope. So illiterate though they may be they are neither as stupid nor as unaware of the outside world as many seem to think. Nor are they as internally war-like as we are lead to believe. 3. "We're there because of 9/11. The CIA created the Taliban. The created al-Qaeda. It's their problem. Why should we deal with it?" The CIA helped fund both the Taliban and al-Qaeda in modest terms compared with the support and funding they received from Arab/Other nations. They did not 'create' the Taliban, they were already there, but their already strict nature has been hijacked by foreign influence. This can be seen by observing their increasingly ruthless nature towards the people they supposedly govern. If you follow the timeline up to 2001 there is an unmistakable increase in brutality and the killing of civilians prior to 9/11. All the while the puppets of the Taliban having their strings pulled by foreign leaders. link: http://www.afghan-web.com/history/chron/index4.html It also seems to be lost on people that nearly 100% of their arms came/come from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan or Cambodia. 4. "The British could not occupy them. The Soviets could not occupy them. No can occupy them. Why do we think we can? Also, you cannot impose your belief system on other people. Why are we trying?" 5. "They do not want us there" So many ways to tackle this issue. The idea here I have to believe is that 'imposing' democracy....democracy being 'our values' and that these wild peasants couldn't fathom the idea of democracy let alone use it. This of course overlooks the fact that a democratic consensus had been reached in Afghanistan as well as a draft constitution laid out specifying a democratic nation under Islam - (which of course is a threat to serious Islamic fundamentalists and terror groups alike) and they even held elections in 1992. The Taliban did not concede power and instead started their long road of suppression and dominance of their sect. So they aren't really OUR values at all....this is what the Afghans started for themselves in '92....the fireign lead Taliban wouldn't stand for it. But what about occupation? Well it's really simple; we're not really trying to occupy them and the vast (VAST) majority understand this. I'm not going to try and kid you - they do not like foreigners very much and they do not like foreign warriors, but they are a very practical people and are not really as closed or stupid as people in the west seem to think. We are simply trying to provide the security to let them have the breathing space to decide themselves. Afghans and NATO alike understand that they could rout us. They fear the Taliban more than us, but they are still willing to give us a chance, by in large. Occupation is not the point at all. This seems to be a well-known anywhere inside Afghanistan. This is one of the reasons Canadian bases fly the Afghan flag alongside ours. As far as the Soviets not being able to occupy them, well people love to point out in one breath that the CIA funded/controlled/created the Mujahideen and that they wouldn't have been able to do it without their help, and in the next breath claim the the Afghans alone kicked the Soviets out -- e.g. "So why do we expect ot be able to do it?". So which is it? The Soviets couldn't occupy Afghanistan, or the Soviets couldn't occupy the unwilling Afghans AND the entire US war-machine? The British? Well look, a lot is made of the British colonial army but the truth is spears made them think twice. They were a commerce empire. Again none of it matters because the last thing anyone in NATO wants is to occupy, (i.e. forever, w/100000 troops) Afghanistan. That's not the mission at all and no one Afghans or NATO is going to argue that occupation would be suicidal. This is not the mandate and the only people under any illusions of such are (by in large) outside Afghanistan, thankfully. 6. "The Afghanistan invasion is just for corporate profits" A quick look will show that there is actually very little interest in Afghanistan and they are, in fact, entirely dependant of foreign corporate investment and are having trouble finding takers. I sincerely thank you if you actually read all of this. "Neither fire nor wind, birth nor death can erase our good deeds. " --Buddha Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Leafless Posted May 21, 2006 Author Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 killjoy What aspect concerning the 'war on terrorism' or 'occupation of Iraq-Afghanistan' or the advancement of 'U.S. world domination' as top cop are you promoting in the way of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan to encourage some form of intelligent debate? Or is it simply what you wrote is your general take and you really expect no reply. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Argus Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 killjoy What aspect concerning the 'war on terrorism' or 'occupation of Iraq-Afghanistan' or the advancement of 'U.S. world domination' as top cop are you promoting in the way of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan to encourage some form of intelligent debate? Or is it simply what you wrote is your general take and you really expect no reply. Perhaps he simply saw a lot of ignorant talk and wanted to enlighten some. Much of what he says strikes me as remarkably sound. I would only quibble by saying that some of the media certainly ARE anti-war and anti-military in a smug, comfortable, liberal sort of way. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Rovik Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 6. "The Afghanistan invasion is just for corporate profits"A quick look will show that there is actually very little interest in Afghanistan and they are, in fact, entirely dependant of foreign corporate investment and are having trouble finding takers. Well, there are certainly huge gas reserves in Afghanistan, and foreign companies would love to get access and control to their reserves. Here is a quote from the site: What's at Stake for Whom During the Soviets' decade-long occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow estimated Afghanistan's proven and probable natural gas reserves at around five trillion cubic feet. In the mid-1970s, production reached 275 million cubic feet per day.But Afghanistan's significance to the balance of energy and power in Central Asia stems from its geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. In January 1998, an agreement was signed between Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and the Taliban to arrange funding for a proposed 890-mile, US$2 billion natural gas pipeline project. The proposed pipeline would have transported natural gas from Turkmenistan's Dauletabad natural gas field to Pakistan, and most likely would have run from Dauletabad south to the Afghan border, through Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan, to Quetta, Pakistan. The line would then have linked with Pakistan's natural gas grid at Sui. U.S. oil company Unocal was to finance the bulk of the project. As it happened, Unocal pulled-out of the deal, citing political instability in Afghanistan. So as you can see, there is a huge potential for Afghanistan for oil and gas companies to make profits. In addition, because of America's heavy reliance on oil, it is in their best interest to see Afganistan under control of a govt. friendly to them Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Argus Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 The U.S. went to Afghanistan allegedly in hot pursuit of Osama Ben Laden being protected by the Taliban. Allegedly? The Taliban and Al Queda are not the same. The Taliban or Mujadheen were created by the CIA to act as a movement to fight the Russians. Oh yes, the all-powerful CIA. In fact, neither were created by the CIA. The Taliban only became expendable or the enemy once they would not turn over Ben Laden. The Taliban were never friends. Neither the US nor anyone else in the West liked them. They only became angry enough to topple the regime, however, when they sheltered a massive Islamist terrorist organization which repeatedly attacked other nations. The Taliban did not develop nor did they organize nor did they have any affiliation with Ben Laden and in fact they didn't even like him. Bin Laden had something like 10,000 men in Afghanistan, and was a major military and financial backer for the Taliban. They reluctantly supported him since he was a brother Muslim. When did the Taliban show any reluctance to murder brother Muslims? Now that Laden is not in Aghanistan what is the excuse for remaining? To keep the country from falling apart into warring camps. This by the way being the same Taliban that shut down the opium trade and as sexist and as barbaric as we may think it is, was at least not corupt. Hitler also shut down drug dealing. Are you a fan of Hitler? Do you have his picture over your bed? Do you wear a swastika on the arm of your pyjamas? Do you admire Joe Stalin? He executed drug dealers too. So did Mao. Brutal, thuggish dictators often have a salutary affect on crime. That doesn't mean we should seek their continued rule. Afghanistan is a failed state. We are there to help keep it stable so its people can get it organized again and develop some means of security and control in order to prevent the place from falling back into the swamps. That seems to be in line with decades of peacekeeping which everyone previously supported. Now that it is a little harder and more dangerous a lot of people seem to be demanding we cut and run. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 Leafless: "What aspect concerning the 'war on terrorism' or 'occupation of Iraq-Afghanistan' or the advancement of 'U.S. world domination' as top cop are you promoting in the way of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan to encourage some form of intelligent debate?" I dunno. Did you read it? How about the part where we aren't 'forcing our value system on them with democracy' when it's plain history that the majority was well on it's way to a strong democracy in '92 before foreign-led Taliban decided they 'knew what was best' for everyone. I was rather expecting a reply actually.....I was expecting someone to say, " I agree with this, but when you say 'this' over here you're dead wrong and this is why". 'U.S' world domination? Please. What are you taking about? You mean the way they keep the worlds sea lanes safe for everyone and almost never rub it in or ask for money? You mean dominance the way people and power structures all over the world continually invest in them because they feel they are safe to do so? Who would you rather be next door to instead of the USA? China? Nigeria? Biafra? Oh- wait that nation doesn’t exist anymore. I am tired....very weary of all the knee-jerk relactions in the country to any and all things American. Seems to me in this country we make ALL decisions based on what the US is doing or what it's not doing. If the USA jumped off a bridge we wouldn't, but if they didn't jump off the bridge we probably would and think of it as a sound decision simply because the Americans didn't do it. The real point I was trying to get across is the blatantly false impression we get about the world by listening to the media and yet what else can we do? You'd be stupid NOT to follow the news, and yer stupid (or missing something) if you do follow it. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Not much different than the US. How about we start with my rant about human perception and the media? Am I wrong? Seriously, ask yourself: When was the last time you read about a reconstruction initiative or the 3000+ schools that have been put back into business? Does that mean it doesnt happen? Well it kinda does. If we dont read it - it doesnt happen and when we do read it, that's ALL thats happening. So when its 50%bad news and 50% good news but all we hear is the bad news then we're not in a real good position to make an 'informed decision', are we? What about the thousands who want our involvement? They are there but we never hear their opinions.... but when a lunitic walks into a cafe and blows himself up and takes 30 peole with him --- oh well now HIS 'opinion' is splattered all over the front page and we can't really be blamed if our perception is that 'everyone' in Iraq (or Afghanistan) thinks like the sucide bomber or (Hudood Ordinance in the case of a car-bomber). It's false. A false impression that leads to false conclusions. I am not anti-media but it is plain fact that it is the media that is the tool of terrorism (Islamic, Irish, whatever doesnt matter) and not 'terror'. We read about it whether we feel 'terrorised' or not. "Neither fire nor wind, birth nor death can erase our good deeds. " --Buddha Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 "Well, there are certainly huge gas reserves in Afghanistan, and foreign companies would love to get access and control over" This is true. But unfortunately since it's so hard to get to it's not really as great a deal to do all by yourself --- and even then one pipeline doesn’t make for an economy......yes yes I've read all about UNICAL, the Americans turned a blind eye to what the Taliban was doing 92-94 so that they could use Pakistan and Iran to help create the pipeline deal. But so what? Would it not be better for that nation to be in a strong position to make profit on their own gas reserves? I would also like to point out that our definition of "oil producing nations" really needs to change since the US receives 17% of it's oil & gas from Canada and we still have 200 years in terms of reserves, add to that that Mexico supplies another 14% and the entire middle east (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) supplies only 8%. (why not invade Canada?) And for the last time the CIA did NOT CREATE the Taliban, they most assuredly created themselves and received some funding from the US/CIA but mostly during the Soviet occupation. In Tora Bora there are NORAD-style bunkers in the mountain. They are nuke-proof, gas-proof and highly modern....was it the US that built them? I used to think so until I learned it was the Pakistanis. "So as you can see, there is a huge potential for Afghanistan for oil and gas companies to make profits. In addition, because of America's heavy reliance on oil, it is in their best interest to see Afganistan under control of a govt. friendly to them". I agree with 90% of this ( i only disagree on the "huge" part really), and I do not deny that it would be favouable to the West in general and the US specifically to have friendly leadership there. But again i need to ask, so? If it was all about oil they could've done it in 92-94 and had the as much or more backing as anyone would have, instead they tried NOT to 'impose their belief system' on them, and deal with the current Taliban govt. This is monsterious? So they are trying to make deals....seriously: so what? So the reason we went to Afhgnaistan is because after years of attacks against the US all over the world, (our NATO ally and although it may bring the bile to your throat the fact of the matter is it benifits Canada greatly and has for years to be a member), and after years increasing lunacy from the Taliban in regards to their own people, (that never happened because we didnt read about it all the time, mind you :-) ), and then AFTER 9/11 they finally invade and kick the Taliban out in order to....what? Build a pipeline? That was their big plan? I admit big business is always right there like a fly on shit to try and make a prfit from situations like this, but that corporations for you. It's not the reason we're there. (sigh) yeah. Those evil Americans. I dunno. I admit it's a very hard postion to take these days because I in no way intend to defend the actions and apperent complete lack of competence on the part of the current Administration with regards to their mission in Iraq. But then we're not talking about Iraq (are we?). "Neither fire nor wind, birth nor death can erase our good deeds. " --Buddha Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Leafless Posted May 21, 2006 Author Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 killjoy You wrote- " How about the part were not forcing our value system on them with democracy." I am a strong supporter of the U.S and I believe we should have been in Iraq initially as this war was more legitimate I think than what the Canadian military is now participating in Afghanistan. Originally our mission there was peacekeeping and advanced (due to an increase in hostility caused by the Iraq effort) to the stage of actual military engagement in pursuit of the Taliban in Afghanistan. I have a basic problem with Afghanistan and that is American interest in the oil pipeline that you detailed in another post. Is it fair for Canada to participate in something that could be seen as soley an American interest issue? Has Canada's image been damaged as peacekeepers who now shoot bullets rather than build bridges? Now I know you discounted installing democracy in Afghanistan but it seems Mr. Harper says otherwise-see story: http://paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=144310 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 Leafless, " Originally our mission there was peacekeeping and advanced (due to an increase in hostility caused by the Iraq effort) to the stage of actual military engagement in pursuit of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Has Canada's image been damaged as peacekeepers who now shoot bullets rather than build bridges? ". This isn't exactly accurate. You speak of the ISAF mission? But right from some of the earliest days to the most vicious fighting in Anaconda and beyond we have had troops engaging very effectively directly against the Taliban. We were involved in the most 'offensive' of the offensives and captured or killed NCND* numbers of enemy combatants. One thing you should know, if you don't mind me saying, about most of the Canadian forces actions in Afghanistan ( and abroad in general), specifically the way it is reported in the news: "NATO/Coalition" forces kill/capture people. "Canadian" forces hand out candy. Even when the two are the same. Same was true in Bosnia. I would point out one positive, imo, about Afghanistan today as opposed to those early days in that we now hand over captured enemy combatants directly to Afghan forces rather than more-or-less handing them straight to gitmo. They are more able and willing to take responsibility for these things all the time, but it still takes time. I think our image is fantastic in Afghanistan. We need to overcome money however. Money greases the wheels over there and although it sounds harsh and brittle a lot of support is found when you can alleviate some poverty while your at it (fix a bridge, build a school)....Where we are right now and for this mission we need to realize everyone is taking a huge risk if they side with us, even if that's what they want to do they need support to go along with it. Americans previously were quite good at this. Elder bribes and such, but we need to also show them we're there because we honour the idea....because we honour them as people. We have to show them we're different than the Taliban or anyone else they see walk into town with arms and numbers. We're not there to push or to order anyone. Our people ride up and simply ask if they are having problems we try and make opportunity for elders to talk to as alone away from the other townspeople. It's a hard mission where Canadians are right now....you have to be ready to shake a hand or pull the trigger. " Is it fair for Canada to participate in something that could be seen as solely an American interest issue?" The thing is, to me, the somewhat simplistic and early optimistic view by corporations to tap Afghanistan gas reserves...How is this only going to benefit Americans? We sell oil&gas to the Americans. Does it only benefit them? S'likely not to benefit Americans too much at all, but in a highly nationalistic, proud, democratic and therefore diplomatic trading society like the one Afghans see themselves as how is it NOT going to benefit Afghans? Would it be better they stick with the poppies or sell some gas and oil? This is the basic problem I have with the view that this is only going to benefit America and the idea that oil and gas is all they have to offer (they are likely to have huge mineral commodities too which would do well for trade with BOTH Pakistan and India) I would also have to disagree that the 'terrorism' is soley an American interest. "Now I know you discounted installing democracy in Afghanistan but it seems Mr. Harper says otherwise-see story: " Did I discount democracy in Afghanistan? Actually I think you mean is I discounted that democracy was 'our' values and not something they wanted to do. Is that right? I'm going to go with that. I read the link but Im not so sure what you wanted me to see, but if it is a difference between my opinion and Harper's rhetoric I'm likely to just pass/concede on that one as I don't take what he is saying too seriously one way or another. Like I say (not being sarcastic) maybe I missed your point there...sry. * NCND = Neither confirm nor deny :-) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Argus Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 How about we start with my rant about human perception and the media? Am I wrong? Seriously, ask yourself: When was the last time you read about a reconstruction initiative or the 3000+ schools that have been put back into business? Does that mean it doesnt happen? Well it kinda does. If we dont read it - it doesnt happen and when we do read it, that's ALL thats happening. So when its 50%bad news and 50% good news but all we hear is the bad news then we're not in a real good position to make an 'informed decision', are we? Did you read the Sun today? The Sun is often depicted as an "extreme right wing" paper, but I've never thought it so. Today, we had the sob-story of Nichola Goddard's homecoming. Except the story wasn't so much about that as about the reporter's anger about not being allows onto the tarmac. It seemed as if she was using Goddard to stoke anti-government feeling, and to depict the death as dramatically and tragically as possible. Goddard was "part of our family" and we weren't being allowed to mourn properly. I could just see her outside the fence, outraged that her Gucci shoes were being dirted in the weeds, seething over the impertinance of a government not showing the media the proper degree of respect and giving them the access they know they deserve. You can read it here Goddard "belonged to us all", except that the national media has rarely expressed much more than contempt for the military before, so you have to wonder where this sudden affection comes from, this sudden desire for wall-to-wall coverage of each and every casualty, however minor, however incidental to enemy action. I think the media are, by and large, anti-military and anti-militaristic. I believe they are fat, smug, comfortable and happy, and have been raised in smug, comfortable familes of the upper middle class to see the world through eyes which said that the use of force was always the action of uncivilized, backward people. They were brought up to feel that all things can be negotiated by reasonable people, and with that kind of mushy liberal non-judgemental thinking which rules out the possiblity that some people aren't interested in compromise. Thus we hear so much about how our participation in "peacemaking" harms our international image of a peaceful (noble, holy, righteous) people. Canadians shoot at people!? Oh perish the thought! Nobly standing in the way of violence, sure, but responding to violence with... with.. VIOLENCE?! Us?! We can't do that! Soft, mushy liberals, and virtually all journalists are soft mushy liberals, can't bear the thought of violence. I think it comes from the way they were raised and educated. People raised hard, raised poor, don't go to university to become journalists. They want to learn a trade or skill that they are sure will reward them economically. Going to journalism school, given the dearth of jobs, is an economic risk, and those who take it, and other soft Liberal course like Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, and English, are those, by and large, who have never really known economic worry or hardship. They've always had an easy time, and can't foresee not continuing to do so. And so, these soft, comfortable, middle-class boys and girls enter journalism school, sitting in wide eyed delight as their fuzzy headed professors teach them all about the evils of the government, of the wonders of "fighting the machine" as you put it, no doubt with the great ambition of bringing down a government, preferably an evil conservative, war-loving government, like Woodward and Berstein. Quick quiz: how many conservatives are there in the ranks of academia? In the ranks of liberal arts schools (they ain't called LIBERAL arts for nothing) ? So these young people come out of journalism school eager to change the world for the better, filled with the empty-headed rhetoric of their professors, and with a sense of overbearing smugness towards those who don't believe as they do, particularly those silly, primiitive conservatives who are, you know, evil people who embrace police states and wars. And this is journalism in Canada today. Yes, everything you say about "if it bleeds, it leeds" is well-known, but when you add in people like this it assumes a whole other dimension. Bleeding, when it evokes a message they want heard, leads even more. Every death is lovingly covered in order to get across the message that war is terrible, awful, and only fit for primitives. Why do you think so many are uncertain about our role in Afghanistan, simple as it is, with the media and left-wing cultural figures and politicians so eager to decry it as an embrace of American style warmaking? And yes, there is a knee-jerk response to anything and everything American by such people. They are proudly, even nationalistically proud of Canada, because, by and large, we aren't American. The same ones who are so proud of us will then sneer at you when you decry the loss of Canadian values with "Canada has no culture anyway". There is a general consensus that everything American is bad, from its government, to its embrace of guns (eek!) to its militarism, its Christianity (none of the same elitists fear overmuch about too much religion in other countries) and unrepentant Capitalism. It just isn't up to our standard of nobility and moral and social superiority, don'tcha know! All of that meets up in your average Canadian journalist, and it's small wonder we get nothing but bad news, pesimistic forecasts, and "learned" opinion on what is going on which ranges from sneering contempt that anyone would think we could possibly do any good there, to outrage at our "murder" of poor Afghan and Iraqi citizens. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 Argis. I hear ya. Of course we wouldn't hear a beep if there was anything else going on. I've got one: A last week some reporter was asked politely to not take photographs of the prisoners while they were being held up for 'mug-shot' photos and searching. The paper (and a couple of others) ran the headline that the military was suppressing certain photos and that they didn't allow reporters to photograph them and that quite possibly the CA was breaking conventions by photographing them themselves. Well the CA photographing the enemy combatants was standard procedure and not at all in contradiction to the Geneva Convention that states (more or less) "that a prisoner may not be held up to ridicule or photographed for the purposes of public ridicule and that they should be protected from this". Well funny thing is, is that is precisely what soldier was doing: protecting the rights of these prisoners by restricting photography from public news sources ('public ridicule') while they were being processed. Funny how the story gets turned around when you piss off some little twit with a camera and a highly inflated sense of self worth. [rant] And of course this “story” has practically evaporated or fallen off the face of the earth a week later, leaving the impression to who had read it that we're running our own little Gitmo down there. I suppose it's the responsibility of the Army or the Government to run around correcting the media every 10 minutes...[/rant] As far as peacekeeping goes well that didn't do crap for Rwanda and it easily could've. All 'we' had to do in Rwanda is be willing to shoot and they would've parted the mobs to let refugees out and stayed clear of any'safe zones'....but what good is a safe zone or escorting refugees if you cant shoot? If it's well known by everyone that you won't? At some point one has to consider the fact that in the best interest of the masses that some people are going to have to get shot. It sucks ....it sucks an awful lot actually. It's not lost on anyone I know that when someone goes down thats also someones little boy or someone's dad. It is still better, far better than the alternative. But of course if we did that no one would know about the 500000 that didnt die. We would only know about the 100 or so we would've had to shoot to get the point across. We would've only heard about the blood on our hands. And of course there would be no 'happy ending'. You'd still (like you do today) just have thousands (is it millions?) of refugees. You often dont hear the success stories because there aren't a million bodies to point to. I do realize I'm probalby saying a lotta crap you already agree with. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
killjoy Posted May 21, 2006 Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 Goddard "belonged to us all", except that the national media has rarely expressed much more than contempt for the military before, so you have to wonder where this sudden affection comes from, this sudden desire for wall-to-wall coverage of each and every casualty, however minor, however incidental to enemy action. lol. Yeah I think what he meant to say is that he didn't know Goddard from a hole in the ground until she got killed. Now I'm all over her. So these young people come out of journalism school eager to change the world for the better, filled with the empty-headed rhetoric of their professors, and with a sense of overbearing smugness towards those who don't believe as they do, particularly those silly, primiitive conservatives who are, you know, evil people who embrace police states and wars. And this is journalism in Canada today. There are some hard realizations that must be made if you're gooing to go out into the world and report on it or help it in any way. I agree. Without getting into the details I will say that I have seen the after effects of complete mindless violence. The sort of things you just don't forget and don't relate simply because phrases like 'quad-amputee child' are the equivalent to a verbal assault, imo. But I also don't get into the details because it wasn't these scenes that affected me as much as the realization that morality, law and order and indeed civilization itself is superficial. Civilization - the fact that you can go to your corner store and get some beer without being flogged by police for the colour of your shoes - is like the clothes you wear: on the surface. And as a nation or people you are either wearing Gucci or a loincloth but either way it can disappear in a moment and we're left with our ugly selves. It wasn't my eyes that delivered unwanted memories. That is recoverable. But I never recovered from the realization that what we believe is written in sand, even though we say it's written in stone, waiting to be rewritten with every new tide, and that all any of us really worship in the end is the god of necessity. My world went grey. A lot of reporters are just reporting black or white. Maybe because that's all anyone would believe or maybe it's just easier....fewer details to keep track of. Maybe the world is easier to comprehend with 'good guys' and 'bad guys'. . Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Leafless Posted May 21, 2006 Author Report Share Posted May 21, 2006 killjoy You seem to be adamant in your views that Afghanistan is not occupied as you wrote-" were not trying to occupy them" and " the last thing anyone in Nato wants to do is occupy." Well by definition Afghanistan is 'occupied' under the title "Beligerant Military Occupations". I have included a list of different types of occupations and a written protest from MAWO a Vancouver anti-war coaliton, Mobilization against War and Occupation. http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:aAv7MI...ca&ct=clnk&cd=5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_occupations Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
.thumb.jpg.9a49e1b2f22a6d34a345152c50044aa9.jpg)
Recommended Posts
Join the conversation
You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.
Note: Your post will require moderator approval before it will be visible.