Saddam, resolution 1441, and weapons inspections

[bradco]

Had an interesting discussion in a class on War Law today and thought I'd continue it here..

question: What was Saddam thinking with his response to SC resolution 1441? (SC resolutions are available on the UN website for those who are interested)

a little background: resolution 1441 is a mix of both US/UK and French positions on the Iraq War. It is the resolution that is used as the legal justification for the Iraq invasion (even though it doesn't explicitly authorize force). 1441 recalls the relevant resolutions from the first Gulf War: the 687 ceasefire and 678 authorization to use "all necesasary means" to uphold 660 (ordering Saddam out of Kuwait). Important to this discussion is that 1441 sets out certain requirements to be met by Saddam as a final chance to avoid invasion (including weapons inspections). These requirements were intentionally harsh to set him up for further "material breach" of 687.

According to my professor when he questioned Hans Blix about the weapons inspections he had expressed shock at how much cooperation Saddam had actually given. He had almost completely complied with the extensive requirements put on him by 1441 including allowing searches of pretty much anything (including palaces). There had been instances where missiles that were slightly over the allowed range were found and the Iraqi military would quickly say o go ahead and destroy them like it wasn't a big deal. One area he failed to comply was allowing for nuclear scientists to be taken out of the country for questioning. Given his willingness to comply as far as he did why would he not comply one hundred percent in an attempt to avoid invasion? Unfortunatly there seems to be no logical reason why he would comply with 99% of the requirements and not just say "Ill comply with everything 100%". But a few interesting, however unlikely they might be, explanations...

-ego: the guy had been in absolute power for a long time and was not used to people ordering him around. Anyone who says no to him would be shot on the spot . His ego, therefore, would not allow him to fully comply with the requirements of 1441. But then why comply at all? Or at least why comply to such a degree as he actually had?

-Lack of SC will: Did he think the SC was bluffing? Did he think they wouldnt have the will to follow through with authorization? The language used in 1441 is incredibly strong so it would be a heck of a gamble. Not to mention back in the early 90's they had authorized force against him before when he hadnt realized that the Soviet Union no longer existed. Did he think the SC was divided and frozen again? Did he doubt that the unilateral Bush adminstration would move without SC authorization? Doubtful.

-he thought he had something to hide: hey maybe he thought he actually had WMD and therefore couldnt comply 100%. Maybe his advisors were just too scared (of being shot) to tell him, "o hey boss you know those nukes we said we had.....umm ya we dont actually have them"

-Did he actually not care cause he thought he could win the war? Nah he isnt that stupid.

-Or did he think war was inevitable no matter if he complied 100% or not? But then why comply at all? Maybe just to drag things out a little for suspense....get a few more months in power?

-security: to me the only argument that makes any sense. Lets face it, the middle east isnt the safest neighbourhood. Saddam has Israel on one side, Iran on the other. Maybe he was a little worried what these guys would do if they knew he didnt have any weapons at all. By complying as far as he did he hoped to appease the SC while still maintaining some form of a deterrant against others from attacking since they wouldnt know for sure that he lacked a credible arsenal.

Anyone have any suggestions to exactly what he was thinking? Assuming he is a rational thinking dictator who wants to maintain power (which I believe to be true) why did he not comply 100 percent with resolution 1441?

[Riverwind]

Anyone have any suggestions to exactly what he was thinking? Assuming he is a rational thinking dictator who wants to maintain power (which I believe to be true) why did he not comply 100 percent with resolution 1441?

I think ego has to be it but not for the reasons you stated. Saddam complied with the resolutions because he had to but he wanted to salvage a small vestige of pride. As a result, he held out on what he hoped was something that the SC would let go as a face saving gester (I am not sure what difference it would make to question the scientists outside the country if their extended families or friends were still in Iraq).

[M.Dancer]

I think he was thinking that if his enemies within and without Iraq knew that there were no WMD there would be instant chaos as divisions wiothin the country would be spurred by their backers to set upon each other.

The threat of WMD attack was the "force de Frappe" that kept the Kurds, the Shia and the wahibbists sunni at peace and the sponsors in Syria, Iran and sauds at home.

...and given the anarchy in Iraq today, as the spiralling civilian death toll approaches the confirmed mark of 50,000***...shame the americans weren't as smart as Saddam

***Unconfirmed the mark is beyond 100,000 including Republican Iraqi Army, New Iraqi Army and militias

[bradco]

Anyone have any suggestions to exactly what he was thinking? Assuming he is a rational thinking dictator who wants to maintain power (which I believe to be true) why did he not comply 100 percent with resolution 1441?

I think ego has to be it but not for the reasons you stated. Saddam complied with the resolutions because he had to but he wanted to salvage a small vestige of pride. As a result, he held out on what he hoped was something that the SC would let go as a face saving gester (I am not sure what difference it would make to question the scientists outside the country if their extended families or friends were still in Iraq).

valid argument...

But was his ego sufficiently big enough to risk so much? 1441 clearly states that any failure to comply will result in "serious consequences". 1441 although offering him one last chance is in my opinion an attempt to set him up for failure. The US/UK negotiated 1441 very well and although the French secured the weapons inspections they were looking for the resolution clearly is meant to lead to an authorization for force (since Saddam would not meet the requirements). Did he not read it in such a way? Because if one reads it in this way it is clear there will not be any face safing gestures coming for the SC (and definetly not the US/UK who were itching to go and would go regardless of a clear authorization anyways). Or was his ego large enough to ignore this?

[Riverwind]

Did he not read it in such a way? Because if one reads it in this way it is clear there will not be any face safing gestures coming for the SC

A face saving gester by definition would allow Saddam to deviate from what is written on the document. We also do not know what Saddam was told off the record. It is possible that France and Russia gave him assurances that they would accept the face saving gester. This meant he knew that there would be no invasion authorized by the SC because of his non-compliance on this point. He may have assumed that if the US/UK were willing to attack without SC authorization then they would likely attack no matter what he did. It is also possible that France and Russia believed that the US/UK would not attack without SC authorization and told Saddam as much. In this case it would the egos of the French and the Russians that are too blame.

[bradco]

Did he not read it in such a way? Because if one reads it in this way it is clear there will not be any face safing gestures coming for the SC

A face saving gester by definition would allow Saddam to deviate from what is written on the document. We also do not know what Saddam was told off the record. It is possible that France and Russia gave him assurances that they would accept the face saving gester. This meant he knew that there would be no invasion authorized by the SC because of his non-compliance on this point. He may have assumed that if the US/UK were willing to attack without SC authorization then they would likely attack no matter what he did. It is also possible that France and Russia believed that the US/UK would not attack without SC authorization and told Saddam as much. In this case it would the egos of the French and the Russians that are too blame.

Of course by definition such a gesture would allow deviation from the written words of 1441 but we must understand the context that these words were written in. Bush had stated that the UN/SC would not prevent the United States from protecting itself. This can only be interpreted as him confirming to Saddam, The French and the Russians that he was coming, authorization or not. The only way to avoid an intervention would be to satisy the Bush administration that he did not pose a threat (by compyling 100%). 100% compliance would also have effected public opinion in the United States about the war and could have prevented intervention this way by convincing the American public he did not pose a threat (remember the justification for the war was he had WMD and was going to use them on the US). Pre-war polls showed around 70 percent of Americans wanted Bush to go to the SC and try to get authorization. Now if the poll had asked: Should America not invade Iraq if authorization is not given I think most people would have said screw the SC. But these polls show why Bush decided to go to the SC during the time it took to mobilize the troops. He was following public opinion which is a smart move for the leader of a democratic government. Changing public opinion about the threat of Iraq may have been the only way to stop an invasion. Why not comply then? This leads me back to the security issues. Stopping the Americans from attacking does no good to Saddam if he believes he is then vulnerable to attack from somewhere else.

[myata]

Good question, and here's something else I didn't quite understand in the whole affair: even assuming that the initial resolution did in fact authorise use of force in case of incompliance (big IF), does it automatically follow that any country can take it upon themselves to enforce it, without a mandate from the UN? In the regular practice of justice, a judicial order (for search, arrest, etc) is issued to the specific authority (police), not every citizen. How does it play internationally though?

[myata]

Also, I wonder if it's at all fair to label the situation as "the last mistake/gamble/etc of Saddam"? Recalling the way Bush and Blair were hell bent on going in, I wonder if anything he did, short of resigning all powers and crawling in chains to meet the liberators, would have changed the outcome. It looked more like the duo were simply playing the cat and mouse game (with the old SC resolution in hand) trying to corner him into breaking one of the conditions. The way I remember it, serious violations popped out almost daily, from the famous mobile laboratories to rusty missiles which were out of range by a few miles to access to Saddam's palaces to the scientists which had to be interrogated one on one (accepted) to the scientists which had to be interrogated outside of the country. In my view it just happened (sheer chance) to be the last one, on which BB decided to pull the plug.

[KrustyKidd]

Good question, and here's something else I didn't quite understand in the whole affair: even assuming that the initial resolution did in fact authorise use of force in case of incompliance (big IF), does it automatically follow that any country can take it upon themselves to enforce it, without a mandate from the UN? In the regular practice of justice, a judicial order (for search, arrest, etc) is issued to the specific authority (police), not every citizen. How does it play internationally though?

They can only if they are one of the 'nations assisitng the government of Kuwait' as mentioned in the origional resolution. As for lack of mandate, here is the logic.

As for reasons for not doing the 100% thing it is as Riverwind said 'ego' and ...... hedgemony of the region. There are three countries that sought that - Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Saddam played the world and would certinly have succeed in having the sanctions against him lifted sooner or later to resume his military buildup again. One does not have to actually attack another nation to impose their will, just pressure them from time to time economicly, militaritly or culturally. One hallmark of an Islamic country that seeks to be the leading power is hatred of Israel and the ability to harm it somehow, a sense of history (as being a desendant of Saladine) and, not kowtowing to infidels. Unless you fill all three of those criteria, you're just another truck stop.

How not to be an Islamic and Arab poserhouse is to be treated like a sheep by the US and the UN. It was a calculated risk and Saddam certainly, in my opinion, would have won had 911 not occured. Given the extremes with which he put on the big show in the midst of his country beingdivided and militarily constrained by No Fly Zones etc, and, his willingness to use his people via starving babies etc in order to garner sympathy to have sanctions lifted, he was on a single track voyage to resume his old ways.

[myata]

Good information, thanks. At least I can see the logic. However, if I recall it correctly, there were many more participants in the "coalition of the willing" than those "assisting the government of Kuwait". The two just don't appear to be one and the same thing. How was that addressed?

[bradco]

Good information, thanks. At least I can see the logic. However, if I recall it correctly, there were many more participants in the "coalition of the willing" than those "assisting the government of Kuwait". The two just don't appear to be one and the same thing. How was that addressed?

good point Im not sure it ever was.....but how many members of the coalition of the willing had men on the ground in Iraq? Giving support to and directly participating in our slightly different but ya their are some interesting legal questions there

[KrustyKidd]

Good information, thanks. At least I can see the logic. However, if I recall it correctly, there were many more participants in the "coalition of the willing" than those "assisting the government of Kuwait". The two just don't appear to be one and the same thing. How was that addressed?

There sure were. The UN used the term 'member states assisting the government of Kuwait' in order to identify those nations that held a physical threat over Saddam in order to get him to comply. The coalition of the willing as you know is also composed of UN member states and thus, can join in legally with the origional member states as they may use whatever means necessary to get Saddam to comply with the ceasefire terms.

but how many members of the coalition of the willing had men on the ground in Iraq? Giving support to and directly participating in our slightly different but ya their are some interesting legal questions there

There was officially something like 45 but in reality there were over ninety which includes natins that did not for obvious reasons wish to be formally included. Those would be places like Iran, France, Israel, China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia etc who have a lot to lose but provided assistance and, behind closed door support in intelligence, material or whatever.

What legal questions might there be considering the invasion was certainly not illegal and, more than likely totally legal?

[myata]

Here's only a few questions about the legitimacy of the coalitions's actions in Iraq:

1. Do a few words in a ten year old resolution serve as a proper authorisation of such a drastic measure as full scale military invasion of a sovereign state?

2. I recall that there was a big discussion as to whether the original resolution was in fact intended to be the mandate for a direct action, as opposed to a warning that such may follow in case of incompliance. Hand twisting of minor security council members by US / UK in order to obtain the second resolution only confirms these doubts.

3. Even more importantly, did the original resolution give the "states" in question the quasi-judicial power to decide what exactly constitutes incompliance and what not?

4. Finally, if the composition of the group "assisting the government of Kuwait" changed significantly over the time, that may have necessitated the renewal of the mandate.

I'm sure that those aren't the only issues that can be raised, but far from being expert in the international law I wouldn't even try to argue any of them. Maybe, more qualified members of the forum can clarify some of these. However what I feel to be of critical importance, is that there were an international venue where the instigators and perpetrators of this kind of action were routinely brought to to prove, with their laywers, the legality of their actions (and suffer punishment if it were to be proven, in the court of law that they were, in fact, illegal). Otherwise, it would be seen (and already is) worldwide as yet another manifistation of West's desire to establish its rule and order and will breed scores and generations of revenge seekers. With some innocent people sometime someplace in the feature taking the punishment instead.

[bradco]

Here's only a few questions about the legitimacy of the coalitions's actions in Iraq:

1. Do a few words in a ten year old resolution serve as a proper authorisation of such a drastic measure as full scale military invasion of a sovereign state?

-the US/UK argument: yes, by violating the ceasefire the initial resolution that authourized such drastic measures as full scale military invasion was still in effect

2. I recall that there was a big discussion as to whether the original resolution was in fact intended to be the mandate for a direct action, as opposed to a warning that such may follow in case of incompliance. Hand twisting of minor security council members by US / UK in order to obtain the second resolution only confirms these doubts.

-The UK (not the US) attempted to get a second resolution in addition to 1441. This was because the UK administration looked at the opinion polls and realized that people in Britain didnt believe 1441 authorized force (domestic support is always a governments main concern). I totally agree that it weakens the legal argument they used since it showed that they themselves did not think it a strong arguement. In the build up to the war Tony Blair was on a news show taking questions from the audience. A woman got up and quite passionately argued with him over going to war. Good ol' Tony asked her whether she would feel comfortable with going to war if the SC explicitly authorized force. She said "yes". He said would you feel more comfortable then if I went back to the SC for a second resolution. She said "yes".... Was this the moment that made him go back? Maybe, maybe not. Either way it was a poor decision on his part because it weakened his legal arguement.

3. Even more importantly, did the original resolution give the "states" in question the quasi-judicial power to decide what exactly constitutes incompliance and what not?

-any failure to meet the requirements of 1441 was considered to be incompliance. My reading of 1441 is that the SC would then decide further action. The US/UK reading is that any violation only had to be reported to the SC (which it was) and that authorization was already given for the use of force in 1441.

4. Finally, if the composition of the group "assisting the government of Kuwait" changed significantly over the time, that may have necessitated the renewal of the mandate.

-more important than the change in composition of the group is that they are no longer "assisting the government of Kuwait". Although this may not need another resolution it does bring in legal questions as to which states are actually authorized to use force in the "second" Iraq War. It may be that only the original states that assisted the government of Kuwait have the right to uphold the ceasefire agreement.

"However what I feel to be of critical importance, is that there were an international venue where the instigators and perpetrators of this kind of action were routinely brought to to prove, with their laywers, the legality of their actions"

-this is the SC. Lawyers, politicians etc do an immense amount of arguing, justifying and negoiating (mostly behind closed doors) to write out these resolutions....it takes them weeks and weeks to get these things done and if you read the resolutions they are usually only a page or two. The truth is that every single little word in each resolution is argued over and put in there for very specific reasons. Look at the original resolutions from the first war....they authorize the use of force to restore peace and security "in the area" not "in Kuwait" (the difference is huge and produces a legal argument for the second war)

"and suffer punishment if it were to be proven, in the court of law that they were, in fact, illegal"

-that is what is missing. However, I would argue that they still face punishment. Its a safe bet that many world leaders and diplomats resent very much that they were lied to by the Bush Administration who greatly exagerated the threat Iraq posed. How many of these world leaders and diplomats are now rushing to help out in Iraq? None. I think it would be foolish to think that certain people in diplomatic circles being upset with the US/UK isnt a reason why there is no support now for reconstructing Iraq. The view in a lot of places is probably "you created the mess, you are going to clean it up". Unfortunatly it is the Iraqi people who are the ones that are being penalized the most not the US/UK administrations. If the US had found WMD I bet there would have been quite a few countries helping clean the mess now, including Canada.

"Otherwise, it would be seen (and already is) worldwide as yet another manifistation of West's desire to establish its rule and order and will breed scores and generations of revenge seekers. With some innocent people sometime someplace in the feature taking the punishment instead."

-yup

My views on 1441:

It is intentionally ambiguous. While not explicitly authorizing force it at least gives the US/UK a legal argument (even if it is a weak one). The French/Russians wanted weapons inspections and diplomacy and they got that in 1441. The US/UK got what they wanted: a legal argument they could use at home to justify the war, not necessarily an explicit authorization. The French/Russians had to surrender at least some sort of legal argument in 1441 to the US/UK. The US was going no matter what and the only reason Powel was at the SC was because there was a bit of time before they were fully mobilized and they thought they might as well give it a go. The worst thing that could of happened, especially for the French, is the US went without any sort of legal argument because it would spell the end for the SC. And lets face it, the SC and the veto gives France some sort of power which they wouldnt have otherwise.

[myata]

Interesting analysis. I'd only like to comment on a few points you made.

2. I recall that there was a big discussion as to whether the original resolution was in fact intended to be the mandate for a direct action, as opposed to a warning that such may follow in case of incompliance. Hand twisting of minor security council members by US / UK in order to obtain the second resolution only confirms these doubts.

-The UK (not the US) attempted to get a second resolution in addition to 1441. This was because the UK administration looked at the opinion polls and realized that people in Britain didnt believe 1441 authorized force (domestic support is always a governments main concern). I totally agree that it weakens the legal argument they used since it showed that they themselves did not think it a strong arguement. In the build up to the war Tony Blair was on a news show taking questions from the audience. A woman got up and quite passionately argued with him over going to war. Good ol' Tony asked her whether she would feel comfortable with going to war if the SC explicitly authorized force. She said "yes". He said would you feel more comfortable then if I went back to the SC for a second resolution. She said "yes".... Was this the moment that made him go back? Maybe, maybe not. Either way it was a poor decision on his part because it weakened his legal arguement.

I guess only lawyers can argue that now. I wonder however, would they be able to come to any conclusion in finite time?

3. Even more importantly, did the original resolution give the "states" in question the quasi-judicial power to decide what exactly constitutes incompliance and what not?

-any failure to meet the requirements of 1441 was considered to be incompliance. My reading of 1441 is that the SC would then decide further action. The US/UK reading is that any violation only had to be reported to the SC (which it was) and that authorization was already given for the use of force in 1441.

Yes but who decides what constitutes incompliance? E.g., if I'm not mistaken, the inspection teams were running under UN auspices, not those of the "states assisting". It's hard to see how the interpretation of their findings in this case would/should be left exclusively to the "states" bypassing the SC.

"However what I feel to be of critical importance, is that there were an international venue where the instigators and perpetrators of this kind of action were routinely brought to to prove, with their laywers, the legality of their actions"

-this is the SC.

I doubt the SC can / does play the role effectively, but it'd probably require a separate thread to discuss. How would one bring the issue of legality of Iraq invasion to the consideration of the council though?

"and suffer punishment if it were to be proven, in the court of law that they were, in fact, illegal"

-that is what is missing. However, I would argue that they still face punishment. Its a safe bet that many world leaders and diplomats resent very much that they were lied to by the Bush Administration who greatly exagerated the threat Iraq posed. How many of these world leaders and diplomats are now rushing to help out in Iraq? None. I think it would be foolish to think that certain people in diplomatic circles being upset with the US/UK isnt a reason why there is no support now for reconstructing Iraq. The view in a lot of places is probably "you created the mess, you are going to clean it up". Unfortunatly it is the Iraqi people who are the ones that are being penalized the most not the US/UK administrations. If the US had found WMD I bet there would have been quite a few countries helping clean the mess now, including Canada.

While we can think this way here in the west, I'm not sure the rest of the world will find much consolation in this argument. Inability to execute any sort of formal justice in these cases greatly increases suspicion and resentment toward the West.

My views on 1441:

It is intentionally ambiguous. While not explicitly authorizing force it at least gives the US/UK a legal argument (even if it is a weak one). The French/Russians wanted weapons inspections and diplomacy and they got that in 1441. The US/UK got what they wanted: a legal argument they could use at home to justify the war, not necessarily an explicit authorization. The French/Russians had to surrender at least some sort of legal argument in 1441 to the US/UK. The US was going no matter what and the only reason Powel was at the SC was because there was a bit of time before they were fully mobilized and they thought they might as well give it a go. The worst thing that could of happened, especially for the French, is the US went without any sort of legal argument because it would spell the end for the SC. And lets face it, the SC and the veto gives France some sort of power which they wouldnt have otherwise.

I agree. And increasingly the rest of the world is beginning to see these legalistic games in the SC as yet another ploy of the West (or its part) to project its policies and influence (as seen in the ongoing drama around Iran). I wonder how much longer it has to exist as a meaningful power?

[KrustyKidd]

2. I recall that there was a big discussion as to whether the original resolution was in fact intended to be the mandate for a direct action, as opposed to a warning that such may follow in case of incompliance. Hand twisting of minor security council members by US / UK in order to obtain the second resolution only confirms these doubts.

It wasn't a mandate for direct action however, it laid out the terms of the ceasfire and terms with which Iraq had to comply with in order to be in co0mplience. Then it gave the member states the authority to use whatever mean necesary to ensure Iraq complied with those terms. Since then, inspections and whater regimes were set in place, none of which Iraq complied with. 1441 was Iraq's last opportunity to comply.

3. Even more importantly, did the original resolution give the "states" in question the quasi-judicial power to decide what exactly constitutes incompliance and what not?

Gave them the authority to use whatever means necessary to ensure that Iraq complied with the resolutions

4. Finally, if the composition of the group "assisting the government of Kuwait" changed significantly over the time, that may have necessitated the renewal of the mandate.

Might have but the main players remained the same.

I'm sure that those aren't the only issues that can be raised, but far from being expert in the international law I wouldn't even try to argue any of them. Maybe, more qualified members of the forum can clarify some of these. However what I feel to be of critical importance, is that there were an international venue where the instigators and perpetrators of this kind of action were routinely brought to to prove, with their laywers, the legality of their actions (and suffer punishment if it were to be proven, in the court of law that they were, in fact, illegal).

Take it like this. The UNSC is the only body able to make this action illegal and they have not even tabled it. The US has been condemned for many actions by this body including the invasion of Panama but not the invasion of Iraq. As I said before, it is not illegal and more than likely legal.

E.g., if I'm not mistaken, the inspection teams were running under UN auspices, not those of the "states assisting".

Hans Blix gave his final brifing to the UNSC just prior to the invasion and, he said that Iraqi cooperation was not forthcomming. A condition necessary to comply with 1441.

I doubt the SC can / does play the role effectively, but it'd probably require a separate thread to discuss. How would one bring the issue of legality of Iraq invasion to the consideration of the council though?

Any member of the council can table it. None have.

[myata]

As I said I'm not qualified to argue the legalities, and I'm not sure your evalution of the Blix's report is correct, it's not what I remember - but if only member of SC can bring an issue (including legality of a war) to its consideration, it leaves it far short of what people usually perceive as proper recourse to justice. Especially when two of the alledged perpetrators have the right of veto on any decision of the "court".

I'll only repeat that absence of an international body of justice is a double edged sword - it allows Western powers still dominating the SC to pull through some of their policies - but hardly improves their image in the world. After Iraq war I'll be surprised to see the SC (if it remains in its current state) making any significant impact for a long time, its recent record (Lebanon, Iran, Darfour) confirms that.

[KrustyKidd]

As I said I'm not qualified to argue the legalities, and I'm not sure your evalution of the Blix's report is correct, it's not what I remember - but if only member of SC can bring an issue (including legality of a war) to its consideration, it leaves it far short of what people usually perceive as proper recourse to justice. Especially when two of the alledged perpetrators have the right of veto on any decision of the "court".

I'll only repeat that absence of an international body of justice is a double edged sword - it allows Western powers still dominating the SC to pull through some of their policies - but hardly improves their image in the world. After Iraq war I'll be surprised to see the SC (if it remains in its current state) making any significant impact for a long time, its recent record (Lebanon, Iran, Darfour) confirms that.

I'm no lawyer, just explaining why the US is not on trial for illeagaly invading Iraq. When and if the UNSC meets and sombody tables the matter then it can be decided. Until then, it is not ileagal and can be considered legal unless of course, you are Michael Moore or somebody who wishes it to be without proof. As for vetoeing that condemnation, the US was condemed for their invasion of Panama but Iraq, no. As for the personal view of the west using the council to push through their policies try looking at it from another point of view where the second, thrid and fourth world uses it to pick the pockets of the first.

[myata]

Well, my point is that the composition and procedures of the SC make it fall far short of what most people normally associate with impartial and enforceable justice in everyday life. It's more of an emergency reaction tool and it's very hard to reconcile that mission with that of serving justice. It would be like combining police and court in the same place. A proper instrument of justice on the international scene is needed.

[KrustyKidd]

As I said I'm not qualified to argue the legalities, and I'm not sure your evalution of the Blix's report is correct, it's not what I remember

It is. Here is the reports and the actual resolution. As well, remember that Iraq is on the verge of being at war and yet, still does not adhere to the resolution's demands.

UNSC Res 1441 Iraq's final opportunity

“5.Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

Well here to jog your memory is Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated “immediately, unconditionally and actively” with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002).

I would say the following:The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as “active”, or even “proactive”, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute “immediate” cooperation.

[myata]

Thanks for the links, but what made you leave out the last two sentences of the evaluation from the quote, I beg to ask? Could it be that they'd give a somewhat or even entirely different meaning to it? Just as reading the entirety of the report (thanks for the link again) - as I encourage everyone to do. Am I wrong to conclude from it that H.Blix was proposing a continuation of the inspection program based on the new cooperation with the Iraqi side - so, it appears, memory serves me well after all?

[KrustyKidd]

Thanks for the links, but what made you leave out the last two sentences of the evaluation from the quote, I beg to ask? Could it be that they'd give a somewhat or even entirely different meaning to it? Just as reading the entirety of the report (thanks for the link again) - as I encourage everyone to do. Am I wrong to conclude from it that H.Blix was proposing a continuation of the inspection program based on the new cooperation with the Iraqi side - so, it appears, memory serves me well after all?

Keeping the relevence in the quote is all. Adding "Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues." changes squat. The cooperation was not immediate and unconditional thus giving the green light for action. And yes, he was recommending inspections to be continued however, it is not up to him to decide on the action to be taken.

[myata]

OK, let's just round up the conclusions of the report:

1. The inspections are making progress with improving but less than 100% perfect cooperation of the Iraqi side;

2. No proscribed weapons or activities has been detected;

3. Further program of inspection is suggested to eliminate any doubts that all prohibited weapons have been destroyed;

Now, despite the conclusions of the report, AND reluctance of the SC to give them direct mandate, certain leaders of certatin countries decided to blast their way in, destroy the civilan infrastructure, greatly undermine stability of the society and directly or indirectly cause deaths of tens of thousands of people.

Now the question (and yet another reason to review the actions of the coalition from the criminal perspective): would it be like a hugely disproportional response to the less than perfect behaviour of Saddam and his officials? Wouldn't it be, in a common example, like police blasting apart half of an apartment building and killing a few bystanders on the way, to arrest someone who was 15 min late for a parole checkup? And if it would, shouldn't someone be (directly) responsible for the result?

[KrustyKidd]

OK, let's just round up the conclusions of the report:

1. The inspections are making progress with improving but less than 100% perfect cooperation of the Iraqi side;

2. No proscribed weapons or activities has been detected;

3. Further program of inspection is suggested to eliminate any doubts that all prohibited weapons have been destroyed;

The insprections are making progress to Saddam's tune rather than the UNSC's. Proscribed weapons and activities were never proved to be destroyed and ceased as Saddam was responsible to do. Nice suggestion from Blix however he does not make decisions at the UNSC as he is hired to carry out inspections rather than make policiy.

Now, despite the conclusions of the report, AND reluctance of the SC to give them direct mandate, certain leaders of certatin countries decided to blast their way in, destroy the civilan infrastructure, greatly undermine stability of the society and directly or indirectly cause deaths of tens of thousands of people.

Certain leaders sat for twelve years giving peace a chance for Saddamto comply with the terms of a ceasfire which he did not. Weapons inspectors would have been more than happy to recive documentation from his goverment during that time unfortunately the time had run out in this cat and mouse game he was playing. As for killing tens of thousands of people, the US killed less people than Saddam did on average saving over a hundred thousand lives at least.

Now the question (and yet another reason to review the actions of the coalition from the criminal perspective): would it be like a hugely disproportional response to the less than perfect behaviour of Saddam and his officials? Wouldn't it be, in a common example, like police blasting apart half of an apartment building and killing a few bystanders on the way, to arrest someone who was 15 min late for a parole checkup? And if it would, shouldn't someone be (directly) responsible for the result?

Saddam was not a parolee. He was in violation of human rights abuses, war reparations, ceafire terms, had not repatriated thousands of foreign nationals and was supposed to prove that he had no WMDs but did none of the above.

UNSC Res 1441

Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

And Blix comes back saying the documentation is bogus and the cooperation is not immediate and unconditional. However, you feel that Iraq making an effort of sorts after twelve years on the eve of destruction is encouraging and should be nurtured. Yes, people like you are what kept Saddam from conplying for twelve years. In fact, he counted on it but, sad to say, after 911 the world changed.

[myata]

Proscribed weapons and activities were never proved to be destroyed and ceased as Saddam was responsible to do.

So you're admitting they were never found?

Certain leaders sat for twelve years giving peace a chance for Saddamto comply with the terms of a ceasfire which he did not.

Whatever it takes. Still not the reason to blow apart entire country.

As for killing tens of thousands of people, the US killed less people than Saddam did on average saving over a hundred thousand lives at least.

Of course this is irrelevant in this case. There were many many nasty people US were more than happy to deal with. Just being nasty doesn't seem to be and is not a legal reason for prosecution.

Saddam was not a parolee. He was in violation of human rights abuses, war reparations, ceafire terms, had not repatriated thousands of foreign nationals and was supposed to prove that he had no WMDs but did none of the above.

UNSC Res 1441

Again, you're quoting the original declaration which led to the inspections which, according to the report you yourself have referenced were making certain progress and most importantly did not produce any evidence of WMD nor immediate danger of Saddam hanging to some. I'll have to ask my question again: in this particular situation, with no immediate danger and inspections making slow progress, were the actions of the coalition within the limits of reasonable legal action, either enforcement of the resolution or self-defence? That is the question I'd like to be examined in the court of law because bouncing around yes it is - no it's not here in this thread would hardly mean much.