Paradox

Because it is not quite as straightforward as you've suggested. The method of selecting our honourable senators is subject to the 7/50 amending formula; however, any change to the principle of regional representation in the Senate requires the unanimous consent of the provinces, as does any change to the powers of the Governor General (including the authority to summon senators). Moreover, there is no mention in the amending formula as to how one would change the fundamental legislative process, including the fact that the House of Commons cannot pass a bill without the consent of the Senate.

It would seem that The Right Honourable Stephen Harper P.C., M.P. (Calgary Southwest), the Prime Minister, is going to have more of an uphill battle than he might have thought in convincing the Supreme Court of Canada that he can make changes to The Honourable the Senate without substantive provincial consultations. All ten provinces have served notice to the Supreme Court that they intend to intervene in the Supreme Court's deliberations on the Senate reform reference questions referred to it by the Governor General-in-Council. The Government of Nunavut has also served notice that it intends to intervene, and there is anticipation that the other territories can be expected to follow suit shortly. While Ontario favours the abolition of the Senate, there are several provinces—such as those in Atlantic Canada—which would lose considerable power on the national stage with the termination of the Upper House (these provinces collectively control over one-quarter of the Senate, while they represent only 7% of seats in the House of Commons). The Governor General-in-Council has referred six questions in a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, asking a range of questions related to what options might be within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada in respect of Senate reform. These include questions such as whether the property requirements for honourable senators can be abolished by Parliament acting alone; whether the abolition of the Senate requires a 7/50 amendment (the consent of at least seven provinces, representing at least 50% of the population), or unanimous consent; and whether Parliament acting alone can create "consultation" processes to inform the selection of senators. (Source)

The Honourable John Baird P.C., M.P. (Ottawa West—Nepean), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is an interesting part of Her Majesty's Government for Canada. He has won points with me over the years for having consistently voted in favour of equal marriage rights for same-sex couples, despite the position of the Conservative Party (having even assisted Her Majesty's Government for Ontario approve same-sex marriage in 2005).

The Parliamentary Budget Officer is appointed for a renewable term of up to five (5) years by the Governor General-in-Council, from a list of three persons recommended by a committee chaired by the Parliamentary Librarian. Mr. Page's term comes to its natural end on March 25, 2013. It has been made reasonably clear by Her Majesty's Government for Canada that, despite Mr. Page indicating that he would agree to a short extension to bridge the gap between terms, they will not be extending his term, and will instead allow the role to fall vacant. What is truly troubling about all of this is that the PBO was created by this current Government as a key plank of the Federal Accountability Act and, despite this, the Government has regularly clashed with and attempted to restrict the powers of the PBO. If a Government is going to create a role responsible for providing credible and independent budget advice and analysis, then that Government should be prepared to treat it seriously.

I do not know that this is necessarily true. The only party that is actually advocating for the abolition of The Honourable the Senate is the New Democratic Party of Canada. Since the NDP is likely to be overtaken by the Liberal Party of Canada in the next general election, once they are led by Mr. Justin Trudeau M.P. (Papineau), it is nearly a moot point. Granted, many of the prime minister's appointments have been less than perfect, but the majority of the Senate membership is of the highest calibre. The New Democratic Party has, frankly, acted irresponsibly in its role as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition in the way that they are criticising the Senate of Canada. This includes ridiculous accusations that democracy is subverted when the Senate initiates legislation, despite the fact that any Senate bills must be sent to the House of Commons and passed, amended, or entirely rejected. The NDP is misleading the Canadian public in its Senate discussions.

The House of Commons should be a place of youthful, passionate ideas; and it is in this way that "rookie" members should be encouraged. We need to bring in a constant rotation of new, energetic, and determined Canadians in the Lower House, as that is where Canada's national legislative agenda is driven. This does also, naturally, mean that we are not always going to have an ideal level of expertise in the House of Commons. Fortunately for us, the bicameral system of legislature established for us by the Fathers of Confederation addresses this shortcoming of the Lower House. The Honourable the Senate is responsible for the review of legislation to catch mistakes, and to slow down the process to ensure professional, expert scrutiny, and committee research and studies. Given, the appointments process is currently less than ideal; my advice for the prime minister is to create a sort of senate appointments commission, to ensure an appropriate balance of professions, experts, and perspectives, so that this function can be performed adequately.

Separate, yes, but related. Not only does the senator have to have at least $4,000.00 in real property (above debts and liabilities), but section 23(3) of the same part also states that the property must be owned in the province in which the senator is appointed to represent. Owning real property in a particular province goes a long way to proving residency.

Oh, please. The electoral process in Canada has nothing to do with the order of succession to the throne. Her Majesty the Queen of Canada is the head of state, whereas The Right Honourable Stephen Harper P.C., M.P. (Calgary Southwest), the Prime Minister, is the head of government. This is very much a structural contrast between the Canadian system and the United States system, whereby the president is simultaneously the head of state, and the head of government. Our system has the advantages of an appointed executive branch that is accountable to an elected legislature (in the directly-elected House of Commons). Ours is a system which allows for legislative decision-making and supervision of the executive to be driven by the elected House of Commons, with broad authority and mandate for Her Majesty's Government for Canada to make the decisions and to take the actions that are, in the opinion of the Government, the most responsible decisions for the executive governance of Canada. A decision is not the right one only because it is the decision of the majority, and this is an aspect of single-member plurality electoral system of which I am tremendously supportive. A Government should have some latitude, as should the legislature, to make decisions that are at times at odds with popular opinion, with the mature understanding (on the part of legislators, government, and the people) that it is the responsibility of the Parliament of Canada to act not only in ways that we want, but in ways that are in the best interests of the peace, order, and good government of Canada.

One of our honourable senators would have to own at least $4,000.00 of real property in the province that the senator represents, as this is a separate and distinct requirement of the appointment, as set out in section 23(4) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This has proven to be enforced in the past, when The Honourable Sister Peggy Butts was appointed to the Upper House as a representative of Nova Scotia; the Sisters of Notre Dama order needed to transfer a parcel of land to her name so that she could take up her seat (as she had taken a vow never to own property, as a part of her service to the Church).

The Conservatives have never seriously proposed the abolition of the Senate. They have mused about it, on occasion, if repeated attempts to reform the Upper House are unsuccessful, but they have never campaigned on transforming the Parliament of Canada into a unicameral legislature. It should be interesting to see what the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada might turn out to be. On the one hand, changes to the method of selection for senators requires the consent of the Commons, and seven out of ten provincial legislatures (representing at least 50% of the population); the Senate, in this case, has a suspensive veto of 180 days, and once that suspensive veto expires, the House may forward the amendment for proclamation, assuming they have the requisite provincial consent. Changes to the powers of the Governor General, which would include the power to appoint senators, requires the consent of the Commons, and the unanimous consent of the ten provincial legislatures, and the Senate, again has a 180-day suspensive veto. Even were the amendment not to concern the powers of the Crown, the right of a province to have a minimum number of the House of Commons members never less than its number of representatives in the Senate would render the amendment a reform under this part (i.e., all provinces' consent). On the other hand, changes to the powers of the Senate require the consent of only the Senate and the House of Commons, and the Senate has an absolute veto on these amendments. There is no amending formula set out, at least expressly, for the abolition of the Senate. If I were a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, my argument would be that we must meet the minimum standard for constitutional amendments based on all of the areas in which the amendment touches. And so, I would think that the abolition of the Senate would require the consent of the House of Commons and of the ten provincial legislatures, because of the selection of senators, provincial representation, and the powers of the Crown; and, the consent of the Senate, since the amendment would also extinguish the powers of the Senate, which is a substantive change to the Upper House outside of the scope contemplated in any of sections 38(1), 41, 42, or 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Honourable Christy Clark MLA (Vancouver-Point Grey), the Premier, is in some serious electoral trouble. Her Majesty's B.C. Government is set to be crushed in the general election, with the B.C. Liberals likely to be reduced to 20 seats or less, and the B.C. NDP to be handed a considerable majority. The management of the Ethnicgate issue by the premier is also causing her ministers to question her leadership, necessitating an emergency cabinet meeting yesterday. This was too little too late to quell grassroots B.C. Liberals' dissatisfaction with the premier's handling of the scandal, with several riding association presidents, vice-presidents, and executives in Surrey and Richmond resigning in protest. She is going to have major problems in ridings such as Surrey-Tynehead, where the riding associations themselves are unhappy.

I actually do not mind that this exchange happened. Certainly, it was in jest, but it's a real and valid emergency planning tool (the zombie apocalypse, that is). EmergencyInfoBC actually uses Zombie Awareness Week as a tactic to encourage British Columbians to better prepare themselves for emergencies and natural disasters. Zombie invasions or apocalypses are portrayed in popular media as the pinnacle of disasters, resulting in the massive disruption of social services, utilities, government, and authority, and if you're prepared for that, you're prepared for anything.

I am a defender of the current system of single-member plurality. Local Representation and Accountability The current system ensures that every person elected to the House of Commons is elected by and accountable to one electoral district, and they act as a liaison between citizens and government, and frequently as an advocate for citizens. This local accountability also means that every member of the House of Commons, if they act unreasonably and as a poor representative of the electoral district, can be removed by constituents during a general election. Under a system of proportional representation, this would be compromised. "Classes" of Members in the House of Commons The blended model of both single-member plurality and lists is tremendously problematic. You then have a system where a member of the House of Commons elected by an electoral district, needs to consider the views of an electoral district and the needs of the political party under whose banner they stand. A list member, on the other hand, only has allegiance to the party, and has no such local accountability. A list member also has lower stakes when they make unpopular decisions, as a list member who disappoints and angers Canadians can be repeatedly reappointed to the House of Commons by a political party for as long as the share of the vote supports it. What you have, then, are two classes within the House of Commons: one class of members who need to balance the needs of an electoral district with the views and campaign promises of the party; and, a second class of members who are beholden only to the prime minister or the leader of a party, as the case may be. A member who is appointed to the House only to support the agenda of the party is a member without critical thought, without responsibilities to the Canadian people, and who, in short, should not sit in the House of Commons.

I don't understand the suggestion that the prime minister could, if each province had a Senate vacancy, call some sort of "Senate election." There is no such thing as a Senate election, as the method of appointing senators is set out, quite expressly, by section 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This method is that our honourable senators are appointed by the Governor General. This method of selection cannot be changed except through an amendment to the constitution made pursuant to section 42(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, through resolutions of the Senate and Commons, consented to by seven provincial legislatures, accounting for a majority of the population. There is no provisions in the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982, nor in the Parliament of Canada Act, for the election of senators. This clearly amounts to a substantive change in the method of selection for senators and, therefore, cannot be made except through a properly-conducted amendment to the constitution. The prime minister has started to wake up to the fact that even many of his Conservative senators are not prepared to accept a Senate reform bill that is contrary to the constitution, and this is why the seven questions on Senate reform have been referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for its opinion. The prime minister cannot "call" Senate elections, period.

So there should be no rules for order or decorum in the House of Commons? They should just open the doors in the morning and dozens of people should start speaking at once?

That was a rather fantastic ramble, there. The Constitution Act, 1982, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (section 1, in fact), states that there are limits to rights and freedoms, provided that they are reasonable in a free and democratic society. This is an irrefutable fact. Also, the Supreme Court of Canada would have no authority whatsoever to hear a case about whether the House of Commons erred, or not, in the suspension of a member of Parliament. The Supreme Court is, remember, a statutory body that exists only because the Parliament of Canada says that it does. It has no authority to make determinations or orders in relation to the internal procedures of the House. A member of the House of Commons does not have the "right" to heckle and interrupt other members. The Speaker of the House has the absolute authority to preside over the House and to preserve its order and decorum, subject only to an appeal of the ruling of the Speaker, which may then be determined by a vote of the House. These powers are vested in and guaranteed to the Speaker by the Constitution Act, 1867, and are reinforced by the Parliament of Canada Act, 1985, which forms a part of the Canadian constitution (by reference of the Constitution Act, 1982). The Speaker of the House has the constitutional authority to preserve order and decorum. You seem confused about the workings of our parliamentary democracy. The powers and authority of the Speaker of the House were not somehow transformed when the constitution was amended in 1982. No individual has the choice as to whether to be bound by the Parliament of Canada; it is the supreme governing body of Canada, composed of the Queen (represented by the Governor General), the Senate, and the House of Commons. Laws passed by the Parliament of Canada bind all Canadians, including members of the House of Commons (except that members may not be prosecuted in court for anything said in the Senate or the House). The role of the Speaker is also enshrined in constitutional law. You will not accuse me of being "un-Canadian" when you so clearly have a very confused and incomplete interpretation of the Canadian constitutional framework, and the most very basic workings of Parliament.

The Parliament of Canada has the authority to manage its own affairs. If a member of the House of Commons is disruptive, then absolutely, the Speaker of the House has the authority to maintain order and decorum. The practice of naming members, and thereby initiating a motion to suspend the service of the member, is entirely within parliamentary rules. Canadians have the rights and freedoms set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms subject to such limits as can be reasonably and demonstrably warranted in a free and democratic society; and certainly, orderly debate in the elected national legislature is one such circumstance. A member of the House of Commons has expansive freedom to speak as the member deems appropriate and necessary, but there are rules of procedure. They need to be called upon by the Speaker and speak during their turn, for example; they cannot interrupt other members under the guise of freedom of expression. These are basic tenets of parliamentary democracy (any orderly and responsible democracy, really). No member of the House has some unencumbered right to disrupt the work of the Parliament of Canada under some perverted reading of the Charter.

It matters not. The people of the province still deserve equitable standards of social and public services. I can see no reason why the Parliament of Canada would cut off a province and its people from the support of the country. This is not about some provinces winning and others losing, it is about ensuring basic standards of services and care for Canadians on a national basis.

It is not an issue of whether the province has "failed." Canada has an obligation to uphold standards of social and public services, and there are some provinces—such as Prince Edward Island—which, by virtue of size or other factors, do not have the same capacity for revenue generation as other provinces do. The equalisation program attempts to maintain similar standards of social services, at similar levels of taxation, which is a key part of it.

There needs to be a level of trust that the Speaker of the House of Commons is going to exercise her (or his) powers, functions, and authority appropriately. History has shown this to be the case with our Speakers (of both Houses), and so this is unlikely to be much of a concern. It is tremendously rare, in Canada, that the non-partisanship of the Speaker is challenged by any member, never mind a party. The Government, and the Opposition, ought to be held to the same standards of order and decorum. Opposition parties do not get a pass just because they are on the opposing side. And like I said, this system already exists, and has been proven to work in other Houses of Commons/Representatives in other Commonwealth realms that use our Westminster system of government.

I think that the political risk, rather, is for the party(s) who would dare to act against the Speaker when it is a matter as non-partisan as the basic order and decorum of the House. Besides, the Speaker must be elected by the whole House at the start of each Parliament; so even in a case where it is an opposition Speaker (though they really cease to have any sort of partisanship once they are elected), they would already have a majority mandate from the House of Commons, and be vested with the power to deal with order and decorum in this sort of way. Besides, it is only the role of the Speaker to name the member and to thereby initiate a poll of the will of the House (through a motion by a House leader). Only the House of Commons can suspend one of its own members, it is up to the Speaker to determine when it might be the most appropriate time for the House to make that determination.

It is not about rewarding or punishing elected representatives, it is about ensuring a standard of social and public services for the citizens of smaller provinces. The people of Prince Edward Island, for example, should not be punished with poor service levels, just because the population of the province does not accommodate the type of revenue collection that provinces such as British Columbia, or Ontario, might have.

Perhaps he cannot be blamed for the actions of private citizens, certainly, but he can be blamed for the quality of appointments made on his advice to The Honourable the Senate of Canada. The prime minister decried previous governments for the types of appointments made to the Upper House, and yet appointments made at his direction have become more hyper-partisan than the Red Chamber has ever before seen. I should note that some previous prime ministers took a much more fair take on Senate appointments. For example, The Right Honourable Paul Martin P.C., P.C., the 21st Prime Minister, appointed seventeen senators—and among these were two appointments to the Conservative Party, one appointment to the New Democratic Party, and two independent conservatives. Contract this to the current prime minister, instead, who has appointed 58 senators. Every single one of these senators has been a Conservative.

Mechanisms to control order and decorum in the House of Commons already exist; they just aren't used. Our rules of order in the House provides for a concept called "naming." This is where a member of the House of Commons has generally been warned a few times for some inappropriate conduct (for example, shouting out during someone else's speech), and the Speaker, having warned the member on a number of occasions, then "names" the member (i.e., refers to the member by real name, and then says "you are named"). When this is done, a member (usually one of the House leaders) rises and immediately moves that "the member be suspended from the service of the House" for some period of time. You see this done at other Westminster-style Parliaments, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. The House needs to start using the mechanisms that are already available to it, before we embark on new mechanisms.

This is a complete non-issue. Ms. Mary Dawson, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, has already ruled that there was no violation of the Code. The commissioner stated that there could only be a violation of the Code were the member to vote on a motion that both related to the CBC in a way that affected his private interests. Since the contract between the member and CBC is already executed, and its performance is underway, motions related to the general funding CBC (even substantial increases of decreases) do not affect his private interests unless the bill seeks to somehow alter the CBC's compensation to Mr. Cash under an already-executed contract (which, as you might guess, is sensationally unlikely). It seems to me that Her Majesty's Government for Canada is latching onto this issue to distract Canadians from the real ethical dilemmas, which are the resignation of a Conservative minister for interference in the work of the Tax Court; interference in the independent work of the CRTC by two Conservative parliamentary secretaries, and even the Conservative finance minister himself. In the case of the parliamentary secretaries and the finance minister, the commissioner even issued official orders under her office. There is no moral authority on the part of the Conservative Government to lecture anyone else on accountability or ethics.