Anonymous gives Toews 7 days ...

[Argus]

yes, it is ludicrous - yet you had no problem referencing CSEC as the ready in place entity that "obsoletes" the need for Bill C-30...

Not at all. What I said was with regard to privacy. If the government wants to know what you're doing it will know what you're doing.

notwithstanding you're quite obviously speaking out of turn in regards to the legal mandate reach of CSEC.

CSEC cannot legally peer into your computer without a warrant. But the NSA doesn't need a warrant to peer into your account. It can do any time it wants to. So they'll have a look-see, and tell CSES if there's anything of interest.

[dre]

Not at all. What I said was with regard to privacy. If the government wants to know what you're doing it will know what you're doing.

CSEC cannot legally peer into your computer without a warrant. But the NSA doesn't need a warrant to peer into your account. It can do any time it wants to. So they'll have a look-see, and tell CSES if there's anything of interest.

Yup need to fix that.

[Sa'adoni]

Not at all. What I said was with regard to privacy. If the government wants to know what you're doing it will know what you're doing.

CSEC cannot legally peer into your computer without a warrant. But the NSA doesn't need a warrant to peer into your account. It can do any time it wants to. So they'll have a look-see, and tell CSES if there's anything of interest.

Actually it couldn't legally. It would be illegal hacking and anyone doing it would be liable to arrest. If it was indictable any Canadians if proven could arrest any NSA person as aiding and abetting an indictable offence in Canada - more or less doing so by the NSA would be an act of war.

If the US perpetuates war against me it substantiates me to legally kill any American governmental agent as a legal self defence. The US has absolutely no legal right to access any computer accounts to obtain information about me contrary to the law, and doing so by compramising computer databases or breach of trust is criminal and those people should be arrested outright. (there are some exclusions to this such as already existing by treaty, however those databases that local police do not have access to, would not be legally accessible to the NSA without a warrant, you are incorrect) this is no different than saying the NSA or a script kiddie can get information without a warrant. It still makes it illegal whether the NSA or the Mafia or some random joe. It is a crime.

Any American engaging in those sorts of Activities should be arrested and if they resist all means should be taken to arrest them including lethal force if in flight or resistance.

If you have evidence the NSA is conducting these activities in Canada supply it to your local Justice of the Peace immediately failure to do so is perpetuating acts of war against Canada, and aiding those acts by your silence is paramount of treason.

Edited February 28, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[punked]

Not at all. What I said was with regard to privacy. If the government wants to know what you're doing it will know what you're doing.

CSEC cannot legally peer into your computer without a warrant. But the NSA doesn't need a warrant to peer into your account. It can do any time it wants to. So they'll have a look-see, and tell CSES if there's anything of interest.

However with your IP then could track your movements through out the Internet.

[Guest Derek L]

Actually it couldn't legally. It would be illegal hacking and anyone doing it would be liable to arrest. If it was indictable any Canadians if proven could arrest any NSA person as aiding and abetting an indictable offence in Canada - more or less doing so by the NSA would be an act of war.

You're absolutely right, the NSA (American), GCHQ (British), DSD (Australian) and GCSB (New Zealand) never gather SIGINT from within Canada. ECHELON does not exist.

[Sa'adoni]

You're absolutely right, the NSA (American), GCHQ (British), DSD (Australian) and GCSB (New Zealand) never gather SIGINT from within Canada. ECHELON does not exist.

I think you need to examine how ECHELON works, it does not involve hacking computer systems to retrieve data. Gathering latent data and maliciously attacking a system to obtain data are two different things.

A warrent generally implies invasion not acquiring through cachement within ones own property.

[Sa'adoni]

You're absolutely right, the NSA (American), GCHQ (British), DSD (Australian) and GCSB (New Zealand) never gather SIGINT from within Canada. ECHELON does not exist.

I think you need to examine how ECHELON works, it does not involve hacking computer systems to retrieve data. Gathering latent data and maliciously attacking a system to obtain data are two different things.

A warrent generally implies invasion not acquiring through cachement within ones own property.

Information however in government systems are subject to the privacy act.

The example I replied to was a warrentless search of someone elses property. That is not how ECHELON works.

Systems like Carnivore - if deployed outside US GOVT property or within Canadian jurisdiction on Non US government property would constitute illegal actions in Canada.

The main difference here is jurisidiction allowance, and the difference between compramising a system within personal property such as ones home, or within their possessions, and information which is not in their possession, such as in govertnment property, or property falling under acts, like the phonelines when they were owned by the government, and leased to companies.

Most internet for instance has end user contracts on information disimination, allowing for dissimination in accordance with law.

1.5 Government of Canada COMSEC Authority

1.5.1 CSEC Authority

CSE is the national lead agency for COMSEC and the GC authority responsible for the following aspects of ITS:

consulting with Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and the RCMP, to develop the operational standard on information technology security for the approval of Treasury Board and advising on its application;

developing, approving, and issuing particular technical documents on information technology security, including for COMSEC, and advising on their application;

providing departments with endorsed or approved cryptography and key management processes for the protection of classified information, as well as for the protection of protected information (this activity also covers the provision of endorsed or approved digital signatures to ensure the authorization and authenticity of financial transactions);

establishing procedures for the systematic review of cryptographic information and assets for declassification or downgrading, as required;

negotiating international agreements on COMSEC programs and approving the release of classified or controlled COMSEC assets to government and non-government entities;

providing advice and direction on the planning, acquisition, installation and procedures for using COMSEC systems and trusted products and systems;

reporting to the Secretary of the Treasury Board on the state of COMSEC in the government, when requested;

providing advice on threat and risk assessments and on system certification and accreditation, when requested;

evaluating security aspects of information technology products and systems;

providing a research and development and evaluation capability on security aspects of computer hardware, software and communications systems to ensure that information is available to the government on the security of computer systems and their use in government; and

carrying out specialized training on COMSEC and on other relevant areas of information technology security, either directly or with the assistance of other departments, as required and mutually agreed upon.

1.5.2 Telecommunications

In addition to the responsibilities listed in Article 1.5.1 of this publication, the GSP states that on request, CSEC will inspect, test and evaluate certain aspects of COMSEC, other than for the DND, and review government telecommunications to assess whether they adhere to prescribed COMSEC methodologies and practices.

1.6.3 Foreign Access

Accountable COMSEC information and other COMSEC information controlled by CSEC shall on no account be disclosed or released to foreign nations, authorities or nationals unless release is authorized by CSE. Individuals authorized to have access to COMSEC information or cryptomaterial shall not disclose such information or release the material to any unauthorized person. This disclosure prohibition remains in force when persons have ceased to perform COMSEC duties, or a need-to-have access to cryptomaterial or COMSEC information. Classified COMSEC information shall be restricted to personnel who are security cleared to the appropriate level and are authorized to receive it.

These directives are applicable to all GC departments and agencies listed in Schedules I, I.1 and II of the Financial Administration Act (FAA), and including the Canadian Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), henceforth called "departments". Compliance with these COMSEC directives is the responsibility of each department.

NOTE: See Annex J of this publication for directions that are applicable to other organizations that may require access to COMSEC.

These directives describe courses of action determined by the Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) required to achieve a minimum level of COMSEC in departmental communications operations. Responsibility for implementing these directives rests with the Deputy Head of each department.

Departments, Agencies or Organizations (DAO) must comply with the baseline requirements of these directives. In concert with the GSP, these directives are based on integrated assessments of threats and risks to the national interest and to government employees and assets. Departments must conduct their own threat and risk assessments to determine the necessity of safeguards above baseline levels.

O.3.2 Federal Departments and Agencies (refer to Articles O.1.2 to O.1.4 of this annex for FAA details)

Personnel representing the department/agency shall adhere to the following procedure:

Complete a Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form (Appendix 1 to this annex) ensuring that the –

intended application is indicated,

relevant departmental Material Requisition Purchasing Number is included, and

form has been signed by the DSO or DCA);

submit the completed Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form (one form per vendor), to the Head, IT Security Client Services, at CSEC (see Annex L of this publication for mailing address);

CSEC will return the approved original form, complete with a CSEC purchase authorization number, to the originating department or agency;

the originating department shall then forward a requisition, with the signed and approved Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form attached, to PWGSC for procurement (contract) action; and

the vendor will be directed to ship the equipment directly to the pre-authorized departmental address, for distribution to internal end users.

O.3.3 Non-federal Government Agencies

Personnel representing the sponsoring GC department/agency shall adhere to the following procedure:

Complete and submit to the Head, IT Security Client Services, at CSEC a Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form (Appendix 1 to this annex), an ACMCA - (Annex M of this publication), and a Type 2 Device Sponsorship and Key Services form (Appendix 2 to this annex);

CSEC will return the approved originals of the Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form and the ACMCA, and will forward a copy of the approved Device Sponsorship and Key Services form to CSE's Canadian Key Management System (CKMS);

CSEC shall forward a copy of the approved Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form and the ACMCA to the sponsored government/industry agency;

the sponsored agency may then order the equipment directly from the vendor (including a copy of the approved Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization form with the order); and

the vendor shall ship the equipment directly to the sponsored agency, and shall forward a copy of the shipping papers to the Head, IT Security Client Services, at CSEC (see Annex L of this publication for mailing address).

O.3.4 Canadian Private Sector

Type 2 cryptographic equipment may be acquired by a Canadian private sector organization in the same manner as Type 1 cryptographic equipment with the exception that in addition to the requirement for an ACMCA for the associated keying material, the sponsor shall ensure that a Type 1 and 2 Purchase Authorization Form (Appendix 1 to this annex), and a Type 2 Device Sponsorship and Key Services Form is completed and submitted to the IT Security Client Services, at CSE.

----

Exercise of Authority

Marginal note:Exercise of authority of officer or non-commissioned member by another

49. Any power or jurisdiction given to, and any act or thing to be done by, to or before any officer or non-commissioned member may be exercised by, or done by, to or before any other officer or non-commissioned member for the time being authorized in that behalf by regulations or according to the custom of the service.

R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 49; R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60.

Notification of Orders

Marginal note:Publication

51. (1) All regulations and all orders and instructions issued to the Canadian Forces shall be held to be sufficiently notified to any person whom they may concern by their publication, in the manner prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council, in the unit or other element in which that person is serving.

Marginal note:Registered mail

(2) All regulations and all orders and instructions relating to or in any way affecting an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is not serving with a unit or other element shall, when sent to the officer or non-commissioned member by registered mail, addressed to the latest known place of abode or business of the officer or non-commissioned member, be held to be sufficiently notified.

Marginal note:Saving provision

(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), all regulations and all orders and instructions referred to in those subsections shall be held to be sufficiently notified to any person whom they may concern by their publication in the Canada Gazette.

R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 51; R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60(E).

Power of Governor in Council to make regulations

12. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the Canadian Forces and generally for carrying the purposes and provisions of this Act into effect.

3. There is hereby established a department of the Government of Canada called the Department of National Defence over which the Minister of National Defence appointed by commission under the Great Seal shall preside.

R.S., c. N-4, s. 3.

Minister

Marginal note:Duties

4. The Minister holds office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for

(a) the construction and maintenance of all defence establishments and works for the defence of Canada; and

( research relating to the defence of Canada and to the development of and improvements in materiel.

R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 4; R.S., 1985, c. 6 (4th Supp.), s. 10.

Marginal note:Designation of person to execute Minister’s functions

5. The Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, may designate any other person in addition to the Minister to exercise any power or perform any duty or function that is vested in or that may be exercised or performed by the Minister under this Act.

R.S., c. N-4, s. 5.

Marginal note:Associate Minister

6. The Governor General may, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint an Associate Minister of National Defence to hold office during pleasure and to exercise and perform such powers, duties and functions of the Minister as may be assigned to the Associate Minister by the Governor in Council.

R.S., c. N-4, s. 6.

Powers of Command

Marginal note:Authority of officers and non-commissioned members

19. The authority and powers of command of officers and non-commissioned members shall be as prescribed in regulations.

R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 19; R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60.

http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/index-eng.asp

Yeah, and you got a day for this one...Effective February 29, 2012, the CFAO collection will no longer be available on Internet. Please contact Sonia Pion ([email protected]) if you require an electronic version.

"The CFAOs are in the process of being superseded by Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs), manuals, standard operating procedures (SOPs) "

http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/8000/8002-1-eng.asp

"direct the collection, collation and assessment of counter-intelligence (CI) security threat information at the national level to provide security intelligence, threat assessments and early warnings to DND senior managers and commanders"

"conduct investigations into allegations of inappropriate activities by the CFNCIU or National Defence Command Centre Security Intelligence (NDCC 2) associated with the NCIP. Allegation of illegal activities shall be referred for investigation to the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS);"

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/cfp-ggp/nis-sne/index-eng.asp

Operations and Services

Requests for CFNIS investigations come through regular military police organizations, but CF members and DND employees can lay complaints, or communicate directly with regional offices or individual CFNIS members.

Charges, through either civilian or military courts, can follow investigation and documentation of complaints that fall within the CFNIS mandate. Investigators receive dedicated, independent advice from military prosecutors throughout the course of their investigations.

The CFNIS works in close cooperation with other military police units and civilian law-enforcement agencies. Other countries with an independent military investigative capability include the United States, United Kingdom and France.

“peace officer” includes

[...]

(g) officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces who are

[...]

(ii) employed on duties that the Governor in Council, in regulations made under the National Defence Act for the purposes of this paragraph, has prescribed to be of such a kind as to necessitate that the officers and non-commissioned members performing them have the powers of peace officers;

[...]

http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/Search/Search.aspx?txtS3archA11=peace&txtT1tl3=%22Criminal+Code%22&h1ts0n1y=0&ddC0nt3ntTyp3=Acts

Edited February 29, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[Guest Derek L]

I think you need to examine how ECHELON works, it does not involve hacking computer systems to retrieve data. Gathering latent data and maliciously attacking a system to obtain data are two different things.

A warrent generally implies invasion not acquiring through cachement within ones own property.

Information however in government systems are subject to the privacy act.

The example I replied to was a warrentless search of someone elses property. That is not how ECHELON works.

Systems like Carnivore - if deployed outside US GOVT property or within Canadian jurisdiction on Non US government property would constitute illegal actions in Canada.

The main difference here is jurisidiction allowance, and the difference between compramising a system within personal property such as ones home, or within their possessions, and information which is not in their possession, such as in govertnment property, or property falling under acts, like the phonelines when they were owned by the government, and leased to companies.

Read the Patriot Act, in particular section 206 on FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and our Anti Terrorism Act, in particular it’s incorporation of section 273.61(1) of the National Defence Act....Then get back to me.

[Guest Derek L]

1.6.3 Foreign Access

Accountable COMSEC information and other COMSEC information controlled by CSEC shall on no account be disclosed or released to foreign nations, authorities or nationals unless release is authorized by CSE. Individuals authorized to have access to COMSEC information or cryptomaterial shall not disclose such information or release the material to any unauthorized person. This disclosure prohibition remains in force when persons have ceased to perform COMSEC duties, or a need-to-have access to cryptomaterial or COMSEC information. Classified COMSEC information shall be restricted to personnel who are security cleared to the appropriate level and are authorized to receive it.

How does that Canadian law effect the NSA?…….The NSA isn’t receiving information from CSEC……

[Guest Derek L]

Are you going to demonstrate which law prevents a foreign Government from collecting Canadian electronic intelligence? Or which law prevents CSEC from collecting intelligence from another country?

[Sa'adoni]

How does that Canadian law effect the NSA?…….The NSA isn’t receiving information from CSEC……

I am stating that the NSA does not have lawful authority in Canada to maliciously hack computer systems, or to obtain information from Computer systems in Canada without a warrant (or court order from a Canadian Judge etc..) other than systems they own in Canada in accordance with Canadian Privacy laws.

They require permission to do any sort of operation in Canada and this must conform with the law, otherwise it is illegal.

Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems;

Computer-related offences;

Edited February 29, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[Guest Derek L]

I am stating that the NSA does not have lawful authority in Canada to maliciously hack computer systems, or to obtain information from Computer systems in Canada without a warrant other than systems they own in Canada in accordance with Canadian Privacy laws.

Care to state which American law deems such authority?

And/or

The Canadian law that prevents us from doing likewise within the United States?

[Sa'adoni]

Care to state which American law deems such authority?

And/or

The Canadian law that prevents us from doing likewise within the United States?

THE CRIMINAL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN CANADA. It is espionage and criminal violations.

American law does not extend to Canada for Canadian purposes, except potentially aboard ships and at embassies - and this is quasi jurisdictional.

There are laws in the US too, but I'm not going to voice my opinion on US law and its legality. More or less the USA legally and openly has laws which violate other states laws by default when acted on.

However there are sometimes jurisidictional issues. Example this website is hosted in the US, so it is not in Canadian Jurisidiction. BUT messages from Canadians or to Canadians who are in Canada or in rare instance to a Canadian Citizen abroad from the website enter in to Canadian Jurisdiction.

The NSA could probably do whatever it wanted with this website, but it would not extend to a capacity to do whatever it wanted with my computer at law which is not in the US and not under US jurisidiction.

Part of the issue is that executive commands tend to be ultravires because they are legislated to upkeep the law and often have extrodinary capabilities which would otherwise be illegal.

There are however acts which establish executive organs.

The illegality of such act may be due to discharge of lawful duties which is a defence against conviction.

The lawful defence of executive functions by a foreign state, "could be a defence" such as diplomatic officials or combatants - however there are laws which mitigate those defences, such as expulsion (in diplomatic immunity) and POW status for combatants who arecaputured.. however after hostilities or during, combatants who were carrying out lawfulorders may be subject to war crimes trialsor release from POW holdings because their crime was lawful by the rules of war. as military law (martial law) is ultravires civil law.

Edited February 29, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[Guest Derek L]

THE CRIMINAL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN CANADA. It is espionage and criminal violations.

American law does not extend to Canada for Canadian purposes, except potentially aboard ships and at embassies - and this is quasi jurisdictional.

There are laws in the US too, but I'm not going to voice my opinion on US law and its legality. More or less the USA legally and openly has laws which violate other states laws by default when acted on.

However there are sometimes jurisidictional issues. Example this website is hosted in the US, so it is not in Canadian Jurisidiction. BUT messages from Canadians or to Canadians who are in Canada or in rare instance to a Canadian Citizen abroad from the website enter in to Canadian Jurisdiction.

So you’re making a case that it’s illegal for Government of Canada agencies to monitor Canadian communications? Edited to add: Without a warrant.

This point was made several pages back by Argus and myself. But thanks.

Edited February 29, 2012 by Derek L

[Sa'adoni]

So you’re making a case that it’s illegal for Government of Canada agencies to monitor Canadian communications? Edited to add: Without a warrant.

This point was made several pages back by Argus and myself. But thanks.

No it IS legal for the Canadian Forces to Monitor Canadians in Canada. It is not legal for other countries to monitor Canadians under normal circumstances, and this extends to monitoring their domestic communications. Canadian law does not extend to other countries -- this for example was used by GW Bush by contracting dutch companies and routing US domestic communication to the netherlands to eavesdrop on their communications there because "it wasn't legal, so said to conduct it domestically, but monitoring of foreign communications is lawful for the US government - even if it violates foreign countries laws.

Canada has the privacy protection laws which would make that sort of action in Canada illegal due to consumer protection laws.

However the Canadian executive is ultravires domestic law and can monitor within Canada lawfully (however there may be jurisidictional issues if consent is not obtained within a foreign country from that authority, except in instances of occupation, or acts of war)

The same is true of the for the US government - in terms of facing criminal charges for activities that would otherwise be lawful and not subject to charges if conducted from the US.

Jurisdiction is bifacetted that it can include more than one jurisidiction. Even if one jurisidiction exhonerates or makes lawful an act, any jurisidiction which a crime occurs in can press charges for a violation of their law or request the detainment and extradition should treaty exist to facilitate the charges. So a US agent carrying out activities from the US would not be subject to charges in the US but could be subject to detention and extradition for violation of the laws of another country, even if US law specifically exhonerates them for that crime. The US would be bound if party to extradition treaty to extradite the US agent to be tried in the foreign country at law. To not do so would be a breach of treaty which is a diplomatic infraction

Edited February 29, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[Guest Derek L]

No it IS legal for the Canadian Forces to Monitor Canadians in Canada. It is not legal for other countries to monitor Canadians under normal circumstances, and this extends to monitoring their domestic communications. Canadian law does not extend to other countries -- this for example was used by GW Bush by contracting dutch ompanies and routing US domestic communication to the netherlands to eavesdrop on their communications there because "it wasn't legal, so said to conduct it domestically, but monitoring of foreign communications is lawful for the US government - even if it violates foreign countries laws.

Canada has the privacy protection laws which would make that sort of action in Canada ilelgal due to consumer protection laws.

However the Canadian executive is ultravires domestic law and can monitor within Canada lawfully (however there may be jurisidictional issues if consent is not obtained within a foreign country from that authority, except in instances of occupation, or acts of war)

Define "normal circumstances". What if a person or group is listed as a terrorist?

So you’re confirming it’s legal, under US law, for the NSA to spy on Canadians? Let’s also assume the inverse in true….more to my point.

[Sa'adoni]

Define "normal circumstances". What if a person or group is listed as a terrorist?

Normal would mean during normalcy "peace", where no laws exist allow foreign states to monitor Canadians, and no court orders "orders" exist.

Peace officers may order assistance from non peace officers and those other parties whether citizens or non citizens are required to render assistance by law.

So you’re confirming it’s legal, under US law, for the NSA to spy on Canadians? Let’s also assume the inverse in true….more to my point.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act

US law doesn't matter in Canada so it is a redundant point.

Executive orders are a type of law in the US

https://www.eff.org/nsa/faq

In Canada there are things called order in council etc..

The President, invoking a theory of limitless executive power to disregard the mandates of Congress, has reauthorized this warrantless surveillance more than thirty times, including after the Department of Justice found the program to violate criminal laws, and has indicated that he intends to continue doing so.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Court

Ashcroft was a key supporter of passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. One of the provisions in that act was the controversial Section 215, which allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to make an application for an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court requiring production of "any tangible thing" for an investigation.

n. The Court also noted (but made no judgment regarding) "the President’s inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance" which relates to part of the government justification in the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy.

These issues demonstrate how Heads of state tend to have a political immunity due to being supreme commanders of the executive - although there are recourses, they do not occur often in history, perhaps only twice that we know of in US history.

Edited February 29, 2012 by Sa'adoni

[Guest Derek L]

Normal would mean during normalcy "peace", where no laws exist allow foreign states to monitor Canadians, and no court orders "orders" exist.

Peace officers may order assistance from non peace officers and those other parties whether citizens or non citizens are required to render assistance by law.

So what’s the result when a individual/group is listed as a terrorist(s) or perhaps aiding a foreign intelligence agency or a threat to ones own nation’s security?

http://en.wikipedia....urveillance_Act

US law doesn't matter in Canada so it is a redundant point.

Executive orders are a type of law in the US

https://www.eff.org/nsa/faq

In Canada there are things called order in council etc..

The President, invoking a theory of limitless executive power to disregard the mandates of Congress, has reauthorized this warrantless surveillance more than thirty times, including after the Department of Justice found the program to violate criminal laws, and has indicated that he intends to continue doing so.

http://en.wikipedia....veillance_Court

Ashcroft was a key supporter of passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. One of the provisions in that act was the controversial Section 215, which allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to make an application for an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court requiring production of "any tangible thing" for an investigation.

So the United States Government, via the NSA, can monitor Canadians right? And as a follow-up, the Canadian Government, via CSEC, can monitor Americans right? Both acts are legal under both countries current laws right? And there are no laws that prevent one nation, from sharing information, that they have obtained about another nation, with said nation right?

No need to try and baffle me in bullshit or legalise. I already know the answer, and if you could refute it, you’d already would have done so.

[Sa'adoni]

So what’s the result when a individual/group is listed as a terrorist(s) or perhaps aiding a foreign intelligence agency or a threat to ones own nation’s security?

that a good question. It really depends on what can be done with them,and what they are inclined to do with them. From the news stories, some are put in jail, some are assasinated, some have their financial assets blocked, some have their testicles attached to a car battery , some live, some are put into power in a bid to create failed states.

So the United States Government, via the NSA, can monitor Canadians right?

Not legally under normal circumstances.

And as a follow-up, the Canadian Government, via CSEC, can monitor Americans right?

If they are ordered to, but they might like to avoid doing that without getting permission from the US first.

Both acts are legal under both countries current laws right?

US law doesn't matter, for domestic practices in Canada, aside from courtesy.

And there are no laws that prevent one nation, from sharing information, that they have obtained about another nation, with said nation right?

No there definitely are laws that carry the death penalty, and long prison terms for information disclosure without proper consent, these are akin to Official Secrets Acts.

No need to try and baffle me in bullshit or legalise. I already know the answer, and if you could refute it, you’d already would have done so.

I won't try.

[Guest Derek L]

Not legally under normal circumstances.

Not legally in Canada or the United States?

If they are ordered to, but they might like to avoid doing that without getting permission from the US first.

So that's a yes?

US law doesn't matter, for domestic practices in Canada, aside from courtesy.

Are all laws “courteous”?

No there definitely are laws that carry the death penalty, and long prison terms for information disclosure without proper consent, these are akin to Official Secrets Acts.

But, in my example, if Canada wished to share surveillance information on Americans with the United States Government, there’s no laws preventing this?

[waldo]

Read the Patriot Act, in particular section 206 on FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and our Anti Terrorism Act, in particular it’s incorporation of section 273.61(1) of the National Defence Act....Then get back to me.

nice hand-wave - as I peruse the exchange this vacuous 'go fetch' routine seems to be the closest you ever come to offering substantiation for anything you're saying.

[Guest Derek L]

nice hand-wave - as I peruse the exchange this vacuous 'go fetch' routine seems to be the closest you ever come to offering substantiation for anything you're saying.

NDA

Public service

273.6 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council or the Minister may authorize the Canadian Forces to perform any duty involving public service.

Marginal note:Law enforcement assistance

(2) The Governor in Council, or the Minister on the request of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness or any other Minister, may issue directions authorizing the Canadian Forces to provide assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter if the Governor in Council or the Minister, as the case may be, considers that

(a) the assistance is in the national interest; and

(the matter cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the Canadian Forces.

Rather wide brush no?

USA PATRIOT ACT PROVISIONS SET FOR REAUTHORIZATION

Section 206:

Section 206 allows the FISA Court to authorize the use of roving surveillance, attaching the wiretap authorization to a particular suspect as opposed to a particular communications device. Because terrorists are trained to rapidly change their means of communication, section 206 greatly enhances the government’s ability to monitor sophisticated international terrorists by tracking individual suspects instead of individual modes of communication. This authority has long been granted to investigate ordinary crimes, including drug offenses. As of March 30, this provision had been used 49 times and has been effective in monitoring international terrorists and spies.

Edited February 29, 2012 by Derek L

[waldo]

Rather wide brush no?

perhaps a recap is in order? Just exactly what is it you're saying this "wide brush" affords CSEC, affords Canadian policing, in terms of domestic focused surveillance... most particularly, your premise that the U.S. NSA is an easy, end-around, go-to outlet to circumvent in-place Canadian protection requirements (i.e., judicial warrants). Equally, you could tie this all back to the initial Derek L/Argus premise that Bill C-30 is simply "steamlining" of what's already available/being done (ala CSEC).

[olpfan1]

interesting day ahead in the vic toews/ anonymous storyline as the 7 days ultimatum are up

lets see what anonymous has on friday!

Edited March 1, 2012 by olpfan1

[Guest Manny]

lol, funny rick mercer skit on anyonmous

Really funny!