Real Reason America Went To War

[theloniusfleabag]

Dear KalosSkilo,

Al Quaida expected us to do just what we did....stir up violence and give them a reason to attack us. They wanted us to blow everything up so they could put the pieces back together and take over. They did not expect us to keep this war going until we win......

This is actually the opposite of what has happened. To quote Richard Dawkins, of The Guardian in early 2003, (quote taken from the book 'Imperial Hubris', 2004, author Anonymous)

"Usama Bin Laden in his wildest dreams could have hardly hoped for this." (the invasion of Iraq)

Further, it has been said that the USA is in a classic lose-lose situation. If they pull out, it will will appear that they have lost. If they stay, they will bleed to death. This is the hope of Al-qaeda, that the US Army will stay in Iraq and Afghanistan, continue to take casualties, continue to spend billions that they don't have, and continue to draw in insurgent fighters from other countries. As Gywnne Dyer said, "The US should have declared victory and pulled the troops out long ago...Now they are going to lose... The real problem is that they might not lose fast enough." (A bit of paraphrasing on my part, but this reference can be found in the book "Future: Tense by Gwynne Dyer, 2004)

[moderateamericain]

you realize that gwynne dyer spent only 2 years teaching military history and war studies, prior to that he was in the navy...... hes now a freelance journalist. id hardly consider him an expert on modern warfare as he stopped teaching in 1973.

[Black Dog]

you realize that gwynne dyer spent only 2 years teaching military history and war studies, prior to that he was in the navy...... hes now a freelance journalist.  id hardly consider him an expert on modern warfare as he stopped teaching in 1973.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

So? Dwyer is but one voice amidst a chorus who have been saying al along that the invasion of Iraq will only increase the threat of terrorism.

Michael Scheuer,, a CIA analyst writing as "Anonymous" in the book "Imperial Hubris" said:

"As I complete this book, U.S., British, and other coalition forces are trying to govern apparently ungovernable postwar states in Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously fighting growing Islamist insurgencies in each – a state of affairs our leaders call victory. In conducting these activities, and the conventional military campaigns preceding them, U.S. forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something Osama bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early 1990s. As a result, I think it fair to conclude that the United States of America remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally."

In other words, the U.S. has either bungled the war on terror nearly every step of the way so as to empower their enemies or something else is going on.

[KalosSkilo]

Dear KalosSkilo,

Al Quaida expected us to do just what we did....stir up violence and give them a reason to attack us. They wanted us to blow everything up so they could put the pieces back together and take over. They did not expect us to keep this war going until we win......

This is actually the opposite of what has happened. To quote Richard Dawkins, of The Guardian in early 2003, (quote taken from the book 'Imperial Hubris', 2004, author Anonymous)

"Usama Bin Laden in his wildest dreams could have hardly hoped for this." (the invasion of Iraq)

Further, it has been said that the USA is in a classic lose-lose situation. If they pull out, it will will appear that they have lost. If they stay, they will bleed to death. This is the hope of Al-qaeda, that the US Army will stay in Iraq and Afghanistan, continue to take casualties, continue to spend billions that they don't have, and continue to draw in insurgent fighters from other countries. As Gywnne Dyer said, "The US should have declared victory and pulled the troops out long ago...Now they are going to lose... The real problem is that they might not lose fast enough." (A bit of paraphrasing on my part, but this reference can be found in the book "Future: Tense by Gwynne Dyer, 2004)

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I should have made myself clearer, sorry. The worst thing that could have happened so Osama Bin Laden was our taking "control" of Iraq, not blowing things up there. Osama and Al Quaida only wanted us to come into Afghanistan and raise hell. Fortunetly, we kept going.

By the way loniusfleabag, any good forums around for me to check out?

[Black Dog]

The worst thing that could have happened so Osama Bin Laden was our taking "control" of Iraq, not blowing things up there. Osama and Al Quaida only wanted us to come into Afghanistan and raise hell. Fortunetly, we kept going.

So let me get this straight: invading and occupying Iraq (a country with no real connection to Al Q'aeda or Osama's brand of Wahhabist Islam) and creating a security environment where Al Q'aeda affiliates could operate with relative ease, not to mention further radicalizing the Islamic world against America and thus providing AQ with a steady supply of eager recruits are the worst things that could have happened to Osama? Jesus, what next? I know: why not give them weapons, maybe some nukes to use: that'll teach him!

In case you're wondering, I am making fun of you. Your premise makes absolutely no sense whatsoever.

[KalosSkilo]

Saddam's Ties To Al Quaida

Try reading it........

[Black Dog]

Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed

"No significant evidence tying Saddam's regime with Osama bin Laden's terrorist network."

Reports undercut Iraq, al-Qaeda link

Leaked British report rejects link

AQ bigwigs deny connection

C.I.A.questions Iraq/AQ connection

[KalosSkilo]

Saddam's Ties To Al Quaida

Try reading it........

[TokyoTakarazuka]

Further, it has been said that the USA is in a classic lose-lose situation. If they pull out, it will will appear that they have lost. If they stay, they will bleed to death.

You’re only exploring the two losing options, there’s no reason why the United States can’t win this war. The United States has in the past been successful at defeating tougher, more popular, and more violent insurgencies than this one. It's wrong to assume the United States will lose the war in Iraq simply because they haven't won it in two years. Insurgencies and guerrilla wars that the United States has previously won have lasted double or triple as long while resulting in double or triple the number of US casualties suffered so far by American soldiers in Iraq. For instance, despite pursuing one of the most efficient and original counterinsurgency strategies in history, it took American soldiers in the Philippines four years and nearly 5,000 men to suppress a widespread guerrilla rebellion. Afterwards numerous terrorist attacks and sporadic raids continued on several Philippino islands for another eleven years. If the United States can devise an effective counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan, then they will win the war, and if they can't they will lose. So far things are going decently. The intensity of the insurgency at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 surprised the United States, but recently the US army has been successful at adapting to changing circumstances, as noted by, for instance, this article.

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles...307/7afghan.htm

As I complete this book, U.S., British, and other coalition forces are trying to govern apparently ungovernable postwar states in Afghanistan and Iraq

I don't see why this author would consider Afghanistan and Iraq ‘ungovernable’ after only four and two years of occupation respectively. As I said, the United States has in the past successfully democratized nations after occupations of far greater length while sustaining far greater casualties. Moreover, the regime change strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq was a direct response to the failure of previous and more pacific policies. President Clinton’s pre-2001 strategy, surgical missile strikes against Al-Qaida bases, was a tactic that had promise but it was ineffective in retrospect. I think that September 11th demonstrated that such a small show of force would not be enough to persuade the fundamentalist Taliban to cease their sponsorship and harboring of Al-Qaida. Instead, I think Bush had the right idea to change this policy and remove the Taliban altogether. Most of the United States’ NATO allies agreed with this proposition, and of course Canada too participated militarily in the overthrow of the Taliban regime.

while simultaneously fighting growing Islamist insurgencies in each – a state of affairs our leaders call victory.

Firstly, the insurgency is probably not growing at present. Since the 2005 elections attacks have been in relative decline, as noted by this article (see below), among others. Although US combat deaths have also declined dramatically, this is because the insurgents are increasingly diverting their offensive energies towards the new Iraqi army.

http://www.s121291488.onlinehome.us/headli..._insurgenc.html

Although this could just represent a lull, it might also represent an important military victory, one of many that will be necessary to win the war. In Afghanistan the vigor of the insurgency has similarly been largely in decline for more than a year now. Secondly, the insurgency is, in Iraq at least, probably not mostly Islamist. Al-Zarqawi leads the fundamentalist faction, but most of the analyses I've read indicate that the majority of the attacks in Iraq are committed by Sunni Arabs who are sympathetic not with the establishment of a theocratic state, but with reinstating a Baathist-style regime that will favor them in national politics. Key evidence for this is the fact that more than 80% of terrorist and guerrilla strikes in Iraq occur within the Sunni Triangle and the Triangle of Death, both of which are regions overwhelmingly Sunni in their composition. In general I don’t see why fundamentalism would be so much stronger among the Sunni than among the Shia, so the insurgency probably has more to do with Sunni interests than religious extremism. Unlike the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, in general I don’t consider the war in Iraq to be part of the War on Terrorism. I outlined in a previous post that the origins of the present conflict in Iraq most likely lie in events that transpired in 1998, long before the September 11th terrorist attacks. The fact that the Iraqi insurgency is likely dominated not by terrorist fundamentalists but by discontented Sunnis and former Baathists, similarly indicates this.

In conducting these activities, and the conventional military campaigns preceding them, U.S. forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something Osama bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early 1990s.

This is just a hypothesis and unless there are events which clearly show that the radicalization of Islam has increased since September 11th, which remains the epitome of fundamentalist violence, it could just as easily be true that it is decreasing. The prognosis of several influential Council On Foreign Relations policymakers was that Clinton's ineffectual Afghanistan missile strikes on Al-Qaida bases after the embassy bombings in Africa actually emboldened Bin Laden into believing that the United States would not retaliate with significant military force should he organize still larger attacks. If instead it is this theory that is correct, then invading Afghanistan might have sent a strong, intimidating message to militant Islamists that the United States would not respond to their attacks with mere missile strikes. Historically, I would say fundamentalism is at a lower point now than it was several years ago. There are only three truly fundamentalist regimes in the Middle East today: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. The Taliban have of course been overthrown and Libya’s Gadafi has within the last six years intentionally moderated the fervent appeals to Islam that once characterized his speeches and actions. The brutal civil war in Algeria between fundamentalist and government forces largely ended in 2000. Fundamentalist violence is still a problem in Egypt, but has been reduced from its levels in the late-1990’s. The last significant spurt of violence in Palestine began in 2000, largely died down more than a year ago, and was formerly ended in 2005 when Palestinians elected the moderate leader Mahmoud Abbas. Indications that Islamic fundamentalism has continued to rise after September 11th include terrorism in Chechnya and the ongoing insurgent wars against the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani governments. However, all of these conflicts actually date originally from before September 11th. Thus, I haven’t yet seen anything in the Middle East that would demonstrate to me definitively that the radicalization of Islam had greatly increased in recent years.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

Saddam's Ties To Al Quaida

Saddam had plenty of ‘ties’ with al-Qaida, although none of them resulted in any significant cooperation between the two. The 9/11 Commission, the most detailed study of America’s intelligence on Bin Laden, noted that on probably at least two occasions in the mid-1990’s Bin Laden arranged meetings with prominent Iraqi intelligence officials in the hopes of making contact with Saddam Hussein, although in all instances he was eventually received rather coldly. It was only in 1998 that Saddam decided it would be prudent to seek closer relations with Bin Laden. In March, 1998, he invited two Al-Qaida operatives to Iraq for talks, and then in July of the same year he sent a delegation to Afghanistan to meet with Bin Laden. Although not much is known about what occurred during these meetings or if there were more of them in the future, the Commission found it highly unlikely that Saddam’s relationship with al-Qaida resulted in any important collaboration.

If the objective was to keep them out of power, I would expect the US to support Saddam Hussein, as he was resistant to Al Quaida.

Thus, although Saddam was not overly friendly with Bin Laden and his organization, especially before 1998, and although he never rendered to them any significant aid, neither was he particularly ‘resistant’ towards them.

That being said, some have falsely construed Saddam’s coldness towards Al-Qaida to mean that Saddam was not involved in supporting any terrorism abroad. On the contrary, few would now disagree that Iraq ranked in 2003 as among the world’s largest sponsors of anti-American terrorists, including, among other things, knowingly harboring the anti-American terrorists Abdul Rahman Yasin, Abu Abbas, and Abu Nidal, attempting to assassinate former president George HW Bush, funding radical Kurdish terrorists operating against Turkey, infiltrating the Jordanian government, ordering the bombing of pro-American radio stations outside Iraq, and training and funding Palestinian suicide bombers. Also, Vladimir Putin said that Russia intercepted intelligence shortly after September 11th that indicated that Saddam was beginning to plan several terrorist attacks on American soil as well.

[Black Dog]

You’re only exploring the two losing options, there’s no reason why the United States can’t win this war.

What are the parameters of a U.S. "win" in Iraq? If one is to believe the rhetoric, the criteria for avictory would be an independant, secular, democratic state. Right away then, we can see that these conditions are unacheivable. Rathe rthan go on at length, suffice it to say that Iraq, divided as it is along religious, ethnic and sectarian lines does not seem to possess the preconditions necessary for such a success. I think peace would have a beter chance in an environment where one disregarded the arbitrary borders of Iraq and allowed the country to be carved up into autonomus states along those lines, possibly operating in a loose federation. But that option is not on the table.

The United States has in the past been successful at defeating tougher, more popular, and more violent insurgencies than this one. It's wrong to assume the United States will lose the war in Iraq simply because they haven't won it in two years. Insurgencies and guerrilla wars that the United States has previously won have lasted double or triple as long while resulting in double or triple the number of US casualties suffered so far by American soldiers in Iraq. For instance, despite pursuing one of the most efficient and original counterinsurgency strategies in history, it took American soldiers in the Philippines four years and nearly 5,000 men to suppress a widespread guerrilla rebellion. Afterwards numerous terrorist attacks and sporadic raids continued on several Philippino islands for another eleven years. If the United States can devise an effective counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan, then they will win the war, and if they can't they will lose.

-It's pretty specious to compare the events of the Philippine-American War with Iraq today. The U.S was able to acheive success there due to overwhelming technical superiority and unflinching brutality. Iraq is a highly militarized society and it appears that the insurgency is not only undiminished since its start in 2003, but it is growing more sophisticated over time.

-Time is not on the U.S.'s side. They need to acheive concrete results quickly. The U.S. opublic does not have the stomach (nor, given the war's cost of approximatel $1 billion per week, the money) for a long war and occupation. They simply don't have a decade to get the job done.

[theloniusfleabag]

Dear TokyoTakarazuka,

few would now disagree that Iraq ranked in 2003 as among the world’s largest sponsors of anti-American terrorists, including, among other things, knowingly harboring the anti-American terrorists Abdul Rahman Yasin, Abu Abbas, and Abu Nidal,

I would disagree. Abu Nidal was killed in Bagdhad by Saddam's security forces, though initial reports said he was sick, and committed suicide. However, later reports said Iraqi agents burst into the room and he turned his gun on himself, and died from 15 self-inflicted gunshots. "Worst case of suicide we've ever seen", I'm sure they must have said. Interestingly, Abu Nidal tried to kill Arafat twice, and a Palestinian fatwa was issued ordering Nidal's death.

It's wrong to assume the United States will lose the war in Iraq simply because they haven't won it in two years.

Not entirely wrong, for the same goes for Afghanistan. How is Iraq like Afghanistan? The Soviets bled for ten years in Afghanistan and eventually pulled out. The locals were determined fighters, they weren't going anywhere and it cost them relatively little to wage war while the Soviets spent billions of Rubles that they coudn't afford to hold onto a land of dubious value. It became more costly to keep something than the return that they could possibly ever realize. The Afghanis themselves only wanted a Muslim ruled country. Iraq is much the same. The Afghanis were growing weary of the Taliban, and the majority didn't want that kind of totalitarianism. The fundamentalists and radicals have a better chance against 'a foriegn occupier' than they did against Saddam, who also 'wasn't going anywhere.

I have bought and read "Imperial Hubris", "The 9/11 Commission Report", and "Future:Tense" from Gwynne Dyer, and none of these indicate that the USA has taken the corrrect path in the past, nor are they on the correct path to win in the future. Nor does evidence indicate that the USA and it's leaders will ever take advice from anyone, no matter how many mistakes get pointed out or how sound or correct the advice may be.

Firstly, the insurgency is probably not growing at present. Since the 2005 elections attacks have been in relative decline, as noted by this article (see below), among others. Although US combat deaths have also declined dramatically, this is because the insurgents are increasingly diverting their offensive energies towards the new Iraqi army

US deaths are in decline because the US hurriedly put US-trained Iraqi sandbags in front of their own troops.

[cybercoma]

Saddam's Ties To Al Quaida

Try reading it........

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I'm willing to bet Saddam's ties to al-Qaeda are on a lower level to the United States' ties.

[KalosSkilo]

Why don't you read it and find out!

[PatM]

Read what? There was no link in your post.

The real reason for the attack of Iraq was money. Not JUST oil (which translates to money in the end).

The USA has had designs on mid-east oil for a long time but lacked the justification for simply walking in and taking it. They had to make do with manipulating governments to gain favourable treatment.

Afghanistan was attractive due to its proximity to the Caspian sea - the very reason the Soviets invaded the country earlier. A Pipeline that connects the Caspian Sea reserves to the arabian sea through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. That is what Afghanistan means to the USA.

Iraqi oil was a big reason for taking over the country, but not the only reason. Iraqi proximity to the pipeline would have been a threat, though a fairly minor one. As we know now (though some refuse to admit it), Iraq posed no real threat to anyone. So why the rush to war, breaking international law?

The reason is the value of the American dollar. The US Buck is the defacto world trade currency as well as the defacto oil currency. This status was initiated by the Marshall Plan - where the USA lent Europe money to rebuild after WWII and Europe used the money to buy American goods.

Due to its abundance in currency reserves and eurpoean control of middle east oil, US dollars were used for purchasing oil. Today, if you wanteto buy oil in this world, you have to buy American dollars first. Most countries have kept large reserves of American dollars because of this, making the American buck handy for trade as well. It is this status as the world trade dollar that allows America to create huge amounts of money without inflating their currency into oblivion. By "exporting the debt", America can keep an economic status that is worse than many South American countries that have already imploded.

Saddam Hussain threatened that status. In 2000 he sought, and got, approval from the UN to dump his US Dollar holdings and accept Eurosunder the oil for food program. This move wasn't much of a threat on its own, the amount of money involved was trivial compared to the world oil market. What it did do was spark interest amongst OPEC. Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea started dumping US dollars, OPEC itself listened to a presentation from the European union on just that topic. Saudi Arabia was listening instead of rejecting it out of hand as the US wanted.

If OPEC switched to the Euro, it would mean the end of the US dollar's dominance in world trade. The value of the US Greenback would tank and take the US economy with it. This would spell the end of the USA as a superpower.

This is the achillies heel of the USA that nobody talks about. The world could basically destroy the USA simply by refusing to use its currency. The USA could NOT let that happen so it attacked Iraq to show the rest of the world it would not allow anyone to threaten US dominance of trade.

Iran is in the hotseat at the moment, not only did it start dumping greenbacks - it had the nerve to annouce it would open its own energy exchange and accept Euro's as payment, not US dollars. It has already opened An Oil Embassy to the EU and is scheduled to open the exchange late this year or early in 2006. For the USA, this is almost the same as dropping a nuke on Washington. That is why Bush has been trying so hard to get other countries to "pitch in" concerning Afghanistan and Iraq - he's trying to free up the forces necessary to conquer Iraq.

Its not working though - as the GoldMoney site warned last year, the world is already changing to the Euro. This is what is causing the slide in the greenback's value against other currencies.

Some more details about the exchange EnergyBulletin.net

[luohan]

It really doesn't matter in the end. We will run out of oil before the end of this century, so let the U.S. have all they want.

[luohan]

Without the United States, Western Europe would be speaking German right now. The United States is the most underappreciated country in the world.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Actually, without the United States western Europe would be speaking Russian. The Soviet Union was doing an admirable job defeating the Nazi war machine long before D-Day. While the minor assistance they received from the west was helpful - it was not decisive.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Amen! Western Europe would probably be Communist too. Without her European allies, there would be no way that the U.S. can supress Communism. The Soviets would capture the Middle East oil fields, and they would overpower the U.S. by a huge margin. Hurray for Communism!!!!

....

*sigh* if only

[TokyoTakarazuka]

Afghanistan was attractive due to its proximity to the Caspian sea - the very reason the Soviets invaded the country earlier. A Pipeline that connects the Caspian Sea reserves to the arabian sea through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. That is what Afghanistan means to the USA.

The accusation that Afghanistan was a ‘pipeline war’ for Central Asian oil and natural gas is predominantly baseless. Firstly, at the time of the American invasion of Afghanistan the pipeline project was already largely dead. The only major American company that had expressed any interest in building the proposed natural gas conduit, the Unocal Corporation, had already withdrawn its support in 1998. As BBC correspondent Malcolm Haslett noted, since then “very few western politicians or oil companies have taken Afghanistan seriously as a major export route… The West, in contrast, and particularly the US, has put almost all its efforts into developing a major new route from the Caspian through Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Black Sea.” This new route, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, was funded largely by British Petroleum and the government of Azerbaijan, and began transporting its first oil and gas a few months ago. It was not until the end of 2002 that the prospect of a Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline was revived, and the plan is entirely the initiative of the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Neither the government of the United States nor any American or European company has been willing to finance the project. The Asian Development Bank eventually agreed to provide some economic aid to build the pipeline but Afghanistan has been so desperate for funds due to the lack of Western capital that they have unsuccessfully lobbied oil companies in Japan, Russia, and even India to help them. However, even if the Afghan government does eventually manage to entice a Western company to help them, it couldn’t possibly justify the cost to the United States government of overthrowing the Taliban and restoring stability to the country. If the United States believed that they stood to greatly benefit from a Trans-Afghan pipeline, then they would have provided at least an iota of vocal or material support to get the project off the ground.

Iraqi oil was a big reason for taking over the country, but not the only reason.

I also see several flaws with the theory that the war with Iraq was motivated largely to secure Middle Eastern oil. Firstly, the United States was already receiving large quantities of Iraqi oil at the time of the invasion; the United States was the largest importer of petroleum under the oil-for-food program. Because of oil-for-food, Iraqi oil was already circulating across the world even under the UN sanctions regime. However, if the United States wanted even quicker and easier access to Saddam’s oil, the cheapest solution would not have been a multi-million dollar invasion in which Iraq’s oil infrastructure could have been damaged further, it would have been simply to lift the economic sanctions. In fact, by 2002 French, Chinese, and Russian oil companies already had large private stakes in Iraq’s oil industry and both France and Russia intended to increase foreign investment in Iraqi petroleum whether or not the embargo was lifted. The only reason the United States refused to do so was because they believed that a strengthened Saddam would be a more serious threat to the security of the Middle East.

I’m not familiar with your second proposed motive for the war in Iraq, although it seems to me to be somewhat of a conspiracy theory. America’s economic dominance has been a fact since long before the implementation of the Marshall Plan. By 1913, America’s GDP per capita was 5,300 1990 dollars, already well above Europe’s strongest economies (Great Britain and Germany, at $4,900 and $3,600 respectively). By 1948, America’s GDP per capita had already climbed to a figure that equaled Great Britain’s, Germany’s, and Italy’s put together. Today, the United States has the third highest GDP per capita on the planet, was ranked the world’s second most competitive economy by the World Economic Forum, and commands 40% of the First World’s world’s productive strength. I seriously doubt that an industrial lead of that magnitude could ever be crushed by a currency anomaly. I would like to know of one instance in history where an economy so dynamic has been single-handedly destroyed by peacetime currency trading.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

US deaths are in decline because the US hurriedly put US-trained Iraqi sandbags in front of their own troops.

In addition to being highly cynical I think that statement is wrong on two accounts. The sandbags remark is not a correct analogy because the American military has gone to great lengths to protect the Iraqi army and police from the worst of the fighting. All the most difficult pacification jobs begin with US-led military sweeps, and once an area is relatively secure the Iraqi police then take over. Thus, the offensive in Falluja was undertaken almost entirely by American soldiers, but after the insurgents had been largely ejected the presence of the Iraqi police and army was subsequently vastly increased. US operations in Samarra and parts of Baghdad have followed the exact same pattern; first American troops mopped up arduous rebel strongholds, and then whatever insurgents managed to disperse were dealt with by deploying additional Iraqi army and police units. Similarly, it's the relatively peaceful cities like Karbala and Basra where the Iraqi police have a large presence relative to the American and British armies. Therefore, your explanation for increasing Iraqi military casualties, that the United States is callously relying on Iraqi ‘sandbags’ to protect them, is incorrect. I think a more likely explanation is the one proposed by both the US army and prominent leaders of Iraq’s government, that the rise in Iraqi combat deaths is largely due to the intentional targeting by the insurgents of Iraqi ‘soft targets’, which include policemen and untrained recruits. In recent months especially, this insurgent strategy has seemed to me to be particularly blatant. The rebels have focused recent attacks not simply on Iraqi troops and policemen on patrol, but specifically targeting recruiting facilities, training centers, and police stations. Although I can’t prove it using statistics, I strongly suspect that such locations are among, if not the, most popular targets for insurgent terrorism. By just casually looking over old newspaper transcripts I can report seven instances of major insurgent attacks on Iraqis lined up outside recruiting academies, two instances of suicide bombings during police graduation ceremonies, and four instances of major assaults on police headquarters. In every month since the beginning of 2004 there has been at very least several dozen deaths, and up to 400 deaths, of Iraqi policemen and untrained recruits under these circumstances. However, in the face of the increasing flexibility and severe ruthlessness of the Iraqi insurgency, the United States is certainly taking pains to decrease unnecessary deaths among raw recruits.

Ensuring that Iraqi security forces quickly receive both training and actual experience will be vital in defeating the uprising. By mid-2004 only 20,000 Iraqi police had been adequately organized and trained. Although the process has since then greatly improved and rapidly accelerated, early procrastination is believed by many to have been a key failure of the occupation’s first year. While the preparations that Iraqi troops and police undergo before deployment is important, it’s far less important than actual combat experience. For instance, despite the high quality of the training received by American soldiers who fought in Vietnam, statistics demonstrate that experience on the battlefield was unfortunately the best training of all; 40% of Americans killed in Vietnam died in the first three months of their tour of duty, while only 6% were killed within their last three months. However, despite casualties that will inevitably be high initially, turning over more security duties to Iraq is a positive development, and the process ought to be moving forward as rapidly as feasible.

Time is not on the U.S.'s side. They need to acheive concrete results quickly. The U.S. opublic does not have the stomach (nor, given the war's cost of approximatel $1 billion per week, the money) for a long war and occupation. They simply don't have a decade to get the job done.

There’s good reason to believe that the United States can afford to remain in Iraq for at least a decade, and probably considerably longer if necessary. In economic terms, the prospect of fighting a long war in Iraq is perfectly viable. In the past, the United States has managed to ford the cost of far more expensive foreign ventures for lengthier amounts of time. For instance, during the Korean War the United States expended a bill worth 13% of its GDP annually for nearly four years. The American economy was much larger in the 1960’s and 1970’s, so the direct costs of the Vietnam War over nine years amounted to no more than 4% of the United States’ GDP annually. By comparison, an article at factcheck.org (http://www.factcheck.org/article253.html), reports that the United States spent about 120 billion on the Iraq war during its first year. This amounts to a cost per year of just 1% of America’s GDP. In addition, the United States can, if necessary, easily afford to increase their debt in order to finance the war. Current US debt load in comparison to their GDP, which has been dropping for several months due to heightened economic growth, is at exactly 64.6% as of May, 2005. That’s still significantly lower than Canada’s debt burden, which at present stands at 67% of our GDP. It’s also far lower than the debt-to-GDP ratio of Euro currency nations, which is an average of 79%, as shown in this link.

http://www.optimist123.com/optimist/2005/0...debt_burde.html

Another point of concern is whether Americans can ‘stomach’ the human casualties of the Iraq war. This is more difficult to determine. In his book ‘Vietnam: The Necessary War’, Michael Lind asserts that managing the human death toll is a vital aspect of modern warfare in democracies; a country should only be willing to sacrifice so many soldiers before an objective must reasonably be abandoned. He believes that support for both the Korean and Vietnam wars began to decrease significantly once fatal casualties edged above 20,000 and plummeted precipitously as they reached 30,000. However, because the United States army has suffered about 65 fatalities a month since the Iraq war began, it should at this rate take more than 20 years before the death toll exceeds even 20,000. Moreover, I think that the United States has two important advantages in this field. Firstly, as the Iraqi army begins to grow in strength and quality, their increased presence will result in fewer American servicemen killed. Secondly, in both Korea and Vietnam conscription was pursued vigorously, and thus a significant minority of the 55,000 American dead sustained in each of those conflicts were draftees, the death of whom was no doubt a grave blow to the enthusiasm of the public. Recently the anti-war movement has been quite latent in the United States, and I think the situation will have to get far worse than it is now before that changes.

If the United States could afford the human and material costs of the Korean and Vietnam Wars for about four and nine years respectively, then there’s no reason why they shouldn’t also be able to hold out in Iraq.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

It's pretty specious to compare the events of the Philippine-American War with Iraq today. The U.S was able to acheive success there due to overwhelming technical superiority and unflinching brutality.

Actually, at the beginning of the conflict the American and Philippine forces roughly matched each other technologically. At the turn of the last century, the United States had not the best, but rather, among the worst militaries in the industrializing world; the entire peacetime army consisted of only 30,000 troops. The US was better equipped than the Philippine guerrillas only after more than a year of combat, by which time the insurgents were beginning to suffer from supply difficulties that would get even more serious towards the final year of the war. In 1899, however, most US soldiers were still using Civil War era rifles that were actually significantly inferior to the enemy’s. Although only the American army had field artillery, Gatling guns, and heavy naval guns, such weapons more often than not proved useless in the extremely mountainous and heavily-forested jungles that cover most of the Philippines: terrain which in many locations made Vietnam seem hospitable by comparison. However, I would say that the United States has about as great of a technological advantage in Iraq as they did in the Philippines. In the Philippines, neither side had bombers, helicopters, armored vehicles, or reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. In Iraq today, the United States maintains a monopoly on all this equipment. In comparing the two insurgent forces though, it was the Philippino guerrillas that possessed a substantially greater advantage in numbers, which indicates that this rebellion was probably more popular. The vast majority of credible estimates place the size of the armed Iraqi insurrection at little more than 20,000 strong, whereas throughout most of the war in the Philippines the enemy commanded more than 80,000 combatants. Although the United States eventually managed to recruit a total force of 125,000 soldiers (about the same size as the US army in Iraq), the initial invasion was mounted by only 11,000 troops.

Regardless of the specific circumstances though, it’s difficult to dispute that the Iraqi guerrillas have up to this point proven to be far less of a match for the US Army than the Philippinos were. Key evidence for this can be seen by comparing the average monthly death toll suffered by the American army in Iraq and the Philippines. It took the United States about 42 months to (mostly) defeat the Philippino insurrection, suffering losses of about 4,500 dead (although some sources give figures 100 to 200 troops higher or lower). This works out to more than 107 fatalities per month. By comparison, American deaths in Iraq have reached 1,700 within 27 months of fighting. Thus, the Iraqi insurgents are managing to kill only 65 American troops monthly. If the wars in Iraq and the Philippines aren’t to be compared, it should be because the war in the Philippines was a significantly tougher, deadlier, and more intense conflict. Those who propose that the USA is in a lose-lose situation in Iraq after only 27 months of fighting are clearly being inordinately dire. Even after the fighting officially ended in 1902 (although overeager presidents had prematurely declared the war officially over several times before that), about one hundred Americans would continue to die over the next eleven years while mopping up insurgent holdouts on a few southern islands. Interestingly, these rebel agitators, who weren’t completely pacified until 1913, were led by and largely composed of Muslim extremists.

On the matter of atrocities, both the insurgents and the United States often fought the war with great brutality, and both sides were responsible for shooting or massacring civilians, executing prisoners, and torturing captives sadistically. However, the conflict probably wasn’t unusually savage by nineteenth-century standards and those officers responsible for the worst atrocities were court-martialed or dimissed. It was probably little more brutal than the Boer War fought over the same period of time, and was vastly less severe than the outright genocide unleashed by the Germans and Belgians in their contemporaneous anti-colonial struggles. Regardless, over the course of the war I doubt that atrocity played a decisive strategic role for either side.

How is Iraq like Afghanistan? The Soviets bled for ten years in Afghanistan and eventually pulled out. The locals were determined fighters, they weren't going anywhere and it cost them relatively little to wage war

The newly-elected government of Iraq isn’t going anywhere either, although Iraq’s prime minister has recently requested that American troops remain in the country until their army is adequately trained.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4598761.stm

You’re wrong that it cost the Afghan guerrillas little to wage war against the USSR; guerrillas are rarely anywhere near as self-sufficient or ragtag as portrayed in popular archetype. Together, Pakistan, Great Britain, the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia provided the mujahideen with about fifty billion dollars in equipment over the course of the war, including assault rifles, blowpipe missiles, and heavy machine guns. The limpet mines which devastated Soviet logistics on the Darya River were provided by MI6, whereas rebel motor boats were contributed by the CIA. By the mid-1980’s, the United States and China were deploying to Afghanistan the infamous stinger missiles, the world’s most sophisticated and deadly surface-to-air weaponry, which proved absolutely decisive in smashing Soviet air supremacy. The Chinese also supplied nearly one thousand armored vehicles capable of launching surgical artillery strikes, some of which were airlifted into Afghanistan by the CIA. When necessary, regiments of mujahideen could slip across the border to Pakistan, where they would be provided with training, supplies, and sanctuary.

The main reason why the Carter administration began financing the Afghan resistance was due to dire CIA analyses which indicated that the thorough disorganization and supply shortages of the mujahideen would give the Russians a quick and easy victory in Afghanistan. These reports were likely accurate; guerrilla tactics are more often than not an unsuccessful method of warfare. Victories like Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Algeria are, by global historical standards, the exception and not the rule. One of the main weaknesses that frequently undermine an otherwise determined guerrilla force is a lack of equipment and supplies. In fact, according to ‘Autopsy on People’s War’, by Chalmers Johnson, no guerrilla insurgency has ever succeeded in toppling a government without significant state sponsorship. Without considerable foreign support, even extremely popular insurrections have floundered. Supply shortages were a severe problem for the Philippine guerrillas during the final year of the war, as well as a decisive factor in the defeat of such insurgencies as the Greek Civil War, Malayan Emergency, Mau Mau uprising, the South Korean civil war, and others. During the Vietnam War, by contrast, the Viet Cong were by the early-1960’s fully equipped with Soviet and Chinese mortars, rocket launchers, AK-47s, and grenade launchers, and by the early-1970’s, with NVA regiments of heavy tanks and anti-tank guns. ‘Inside the VC and the NVA’, a fascinating monograph on the army of communist Vietnam, notes that the Viet Cong never once suffered a supply shortage over the entire course of the war, due to the massive quantities of food, fuel, and ammunition that were being continuously sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Assuming that the Iraqi insurgency isn’t receiving major international assistance, save perhaps limited amounts from Syria, then this is a major advantage for the US army.

I see no reason why the Philippine insurrection, a guerrilla war which the United States won, isn’t just as good of a comparison to Iraq as the Soviet war in Afghanistan is. The Philippino guerrillas, like the mujahideen, ‘weren’t going anywhere’, but they did fail to elicit the massive state sponsorship that characterized the armies of Afghanistan and Vietnam. After forty-two months, the Philippino revolt was eventually ground down, much faster than it took for the British to finish off the Malay Races Liberation Army or the Mau Mau. There’s no reason why the Iraqi insurgency can’t eventually be cracked as well.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

Rathe rthan go on at length, suffice it to say that Iraq, divided as it is along religious, ethnic and sectarian lines does not seem to possess the preconditions necessary for such a success.

During the 1970’s, when only about 20% of the world’s population enjoyed democratic governance, it was widely believed that a stringent set of prerequisites were required for a nation to develop an elected government that could protect civil liberties. Recent history, however, has seen democracy become successful in every region of the globe. Even though most Middle Eastern countries have remained intransigent to democratic reform, there’s no necessary precondition that Iraq does not meet; the prospects for democracy are merely latent.

You note Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions as an obstruction to the development of democracy. However, there are today many democracies in the world, including both nascent and long-lasting examples, that are accommodating dozens of major ethnicities, languages, and religions, making Iraq’s ethnic and religious duality look positively meager by comparison. In fact, by global standards Iraq would certainly rank among the world’s more ethnically and religiously homogenous states; in many ways, even the United States is more heterogeneous than Iraq. Iraq’s religious diversity is dwarfed by that of the United States, Canada, and Germany, where there exists an even split between Roman Catholics and Protestants, which coexist with several other major religions. South Korea accommodates a divide between Buddhists and Christians that is much more distinct than between the Muslim denominations of Iraq. Iraq’s ethnic and racial diversity is not much greater than Switzerland’s, about the same as Spain’s, and far less than America’s. New democracies in the Third World present even more glaring contrasts. South Africa has a population that is 15% white, while the black majority consists of another half-dozen ethnicities, including the Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa, and Zulu, each with its own language. If necessary in the future, Iraq could move towards greater regional autonomy to satisfy each of its constituent nationalities. Spain, for instance, has given sweeping autonomy to regional legislative assemblies in several provinces, including Basque and Catalan regions, and a similar system is being established in the Kurdish north of Iraq. However, such measures probably won’t be necessary outside of Kurdistan. The ethnic and religious cohesion which you believe to be a precondition for democracy is fulfilled in Iraq better than it is in most of the world.

Another commonly-cited democratic prerequisite is that a country must be industrialized. America’s successful nation-building efforts in the aftermath of World War II are often dismissed because Germany and Japan were already modernized when the United States democratized them. This argument did seem plausible during the 1960’s and 1970’s, as the democratic governments left behind by most colonial powers crumbled away into one-party or military regimes. By the 1970’s, only a small but highly diverse collection of pre-industrial nations such as Botswana, India, and Costa Rica managed to retain permanent democratic institutions. Today, however, this small coterie of democracies has been joined by nearly half of the Third World. The absolute triumph of representative governance in the First World created a domino effect that convinced nation after nation that functioning democracy could become a path to greater freedom and prosperity. Today, the pressure that is on the people of the Middle East is to conform to the democratic norms that exist in most of the world.

The Republic of Iraq has a talented leadership, a people yearning for increased political liberties, a past history of democratic governance during the 1950’s, low ethnic and religious diversity, the diplomatic recognition of most of the world, and the military support of the United States. Thus, there is no particular imperfection in the Iraqi nation or people that is capable of holding them back from forging a new democracy in the Middle East, and once the insurgency has been suppressed Iraqis will be able to enjoy the same liberties and freedoms that most of the world does.

If one is to believe the rhetoric, the criteria for avictory would be an independant, secular, democratic state. Right away then, we can see that these conditions are unacheivable.

On the contrary, historical precedent demonstrates that such a goal is perfectly achievable. In fact, through the nation-building efforts of the United States and Great Britain, it has been achieved several times in the past under far more dire odds than the current situation in Iraq. Take, for example, the case of the Philippines, a nation which was democratized by the United States between 1900 and 1946. Certainly, the Philippines did not, in the early 20th-century, possess any of the oft-cited prerequisites for democracy which I discussed in the previous paragraph. In addition to having absolutely no past history of democratic governance, the Philippines rank among the most ethnically diverse nations in Asia. Not quite half of the population is divided into speakers of Tagalog (around Manila in the north) and the Cebuano language (spoken in southern islands). The other 50% of the population belongs to six other ethnicities, each of which has a unique language of between one and six million speakers. Since independence, however, the Philippines has been a pinnacle of secular democracy in Asia, having endured dictatorship for only 14 of the 60 years it has been independent; the only Asian countries that can report a better record are post-war Japan and India (democratized by the USA and Great Britain respectively). India presents another good case study of a pre-industrial country with an ethnic and linguistic diversity vastly overshadowing Iraq’s and with no previous experience with democracy, which nonetheless developed a stable, democratic, and secular system of government. The Indo-Aryan people who comprise 75% of India’s population speak 10 mutually unintelligible languages with between 20 and 180 million speakers. The other 25% of India’s population are Dravidians, who speak four unique languages of between 35 and 70 million speakers. Although British India was eventually partitioned in two due to religious differences, Muslims today still comprise 15% of the Indian population and their rights are protected under the Indian constitution. Granted, neither India nor the Philippines have ensured a perfect cultural harmony. Sporadic terrorism by fundamentalist Muslims has been a problem in the Philippine since the 1970’s, and after September 11th the United States thought it wise to dispatch several thousand soldiers to assist Philippino troops in stamping out the remnants of this long-lasting rebellion. India too, has experienced ethnic strife in the Punjab and Nagaland and recent religious violence between Muslims and Hindus. However, India and the Philippines have, for the vast majority of their post-independence histories, strived to maintain religious tolerance, ethnic pluralism, and respect for constitutional norms, and by Third World standards their success in doing so has been spectacular. In the 1960’s, they were among only about twelve democracies in the Third World. Today, they still rank among less than forty Third World countries rated as ‘free’ by the human rights organization Freedom House. Thus, the ethnic diversity of India and the Philippines haven’t compromised the quality of their democracy. Both nations have preserved and enhanced the American and British-styles of democracy which, as many forget, were being imposed upon them by military force not even 60 years ago.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

I would disagree. Abu Nidal was killed in Bagdhad by Saddam's security forces, though initial reports said he was sick, and committed suicide.

Abu Nidal entered Iraq sometime in late-1998 or early-1999 and his presence there was immediately reported by United States intelligence despite repeated denials from Iraq. However, it later became evident that not only Abu Nidal, but also several of his accomplices, had been allowed to establish themselves in Iraq. Although I agree that Abu Nidal fell out with Saddam Hussein in 2001 or 2002, before that Nidal was at least knowingly being harbored by, if not in active collaboration with Saddam. Iraq claimed that in 2002 he attempted to destabilize the government, and when presented with evidence of this he committed suicide rather than stand trial. However, a May 23rd Agence France-Presse article based on documents captured from the previous regime sheds light on the actual course of events. The documents reveal that in 1999 Saddam was seeking to forge ties with Islamist terrorists across the Middle East. Saddam wanted Abu Nidal’s cooperation in the creation of this terrorist network and although he was initially responsive he eventually decided that, being a radical socialist, he would not collaborate with Islamic fundamentalists. Therefore, Saddam ordered his secret police to have him assassinated. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who entered Iraq in 2002, was apparently also involved with Saddam’s proposed terrorist nexus, which explains why Saddam repeatedly refused to extradite him over to Jordan.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20050519/wl_mi...wi_050519140424

I have bought and read "Imperial Hubris", "The 9/11 Commission Report", and "Future:Tense" from Gwynne Dyer, and none of these indicate that the USA has taken the corrrect path in the past, nor are they on the correct path to win in the future.

I think that the present War on Terrorism has been well-orchestrated and is in fact the exact right strategy to defeat Al-Qaeda. The ‘war’ has taken the form of a complement of military, diplomatic, and covert activity to put strong pressure on Al-Qaeda cells on every corner of the world, and especially in the Middle East. America’s achievements so far have included removing Al-Qaeda’s key state sponsor in Afghanistan, hunting down or assassinating dozens of talented Al-Qaeda operatives, and convincing several Middle Eastern nations, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, to crack down on fundamentalist terrorism. Military training and assistance is being provided to dozens of countries across the world battling insurgencies linked to Islamist terrorists such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. The United States is destroying Al-Qaeda’s leadership, routing it from its bases of sanctuary, cutting off its sources of funds, and most importantly of all, demonstrating to Islamic militants that the United States is not, as Bin Laden, said, a “weak horse.” September 11th probably served more than any other event to embolden militant Islamists into believing that the United States was vulnerable and impotent. However, by prosecuting the War on Terrorism aggressively and energetically, the Bush administration is demonstrating to the world that the United States is fully capable of taking immediate and decisive action to lacerate anti-American terrorism.

[theloniusfleabag]

Dear TokyoTakarazuka,

I think that the present War on Terrorism has been well-orchestrated and is in fact the exact right strategy to defeat Al-Qaeda.

Hardy-har-har. The US is continuing a 'non-winning' strategy, and as 'Anonymous' states in Imperial Hubris, are merely deferring real war until a later date. The huge mistakes that have been made in Iraq and Afghanistan only ensure future conflict.

America’s achievements so far have included removing Al-Qaeda’s key state sponsor in Afghanistan, hunting down or assassinating dozens of talented Al-Qaeda operatives, and convincing several Middle Eastern nations, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, to crack down on fundamentalist terrorism. Military training and assistance is being provided to dozens of countries across the world battling insurgencies linked to Islamist terrorists such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. The United States is destroying Al-Qaeda’s leadership, routing it from its bases of sanctuary, cutting off its sources of funds, and most importantly of all, demonstrating to Islamic militants that the United States is not, as Bin Laden, said, a “weak horse.”

This sounds as though it was written by the US State Dept and is not at all based on reality.

[Technocrat]

My question is.. if the US is so intent on waging its 'war on terror' where does Saudi Arabia come in? 9/11 Hijackers were funded using Saudi money, most of them were Saudi's. The Saudi's are in fact funding the millitant brand of islam and waging war on Muslims and the 'western infidel'(US).

Afghanistan was just a training base for terror operatives, Saudi is their bank... wouldn't it make sense to cut off their source of revenue?... Of course that would involve pissing off Bush's friends the Bin Laden family. I guess Iraq was just an easier country to blow up and look like you were doing something about terror.

[TokyoTakarazuka]

My question is.. if the US is so intent on waging its 'war on terror' where does Saudi Arabia come in? 9/11 Hijackers were funded using Saudi money, most of them were Saudi's. The Saudi's are in fact funding the millitant brand of islam and waging war on Muslims and the 'western infidel'(US).

It’s true that some wealthy Saudi businessmen and aristocrats have played a role in financing Al-Qaeda in the past, and to a lesser extent still do today, but the government of Saudi Arabia was in no way complicit in either financing or abetting the September 11th terrorist attacks. Due to Saudi Arabia’s longstanding alliance with the United States and its swift condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration chose to engage Saudi Arabia diplomatically rather than forcibly, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia remains a dependable ally during the War on Terrorism continues to be a major challenge for the United States. Although dealing with the Saudis was no doubt a risky move considering the fundamentalist nature of the regime, diplomacy has fortunately yielded surprisingly effective results. Despite slow progress at first, Saudi Arabia began freezing suspected terrorist assets within several months of the September 11th attacks, and by the end of 2002 had frozen 5.6 million dollars in assets. In June, 2002, Saudi Arabia began mass arrests of Al-Qaeda suspects and in August facilitated a transfer of sixteen Al-Qaeda terrorists from Iran to the United States. Even more importantly, however, has been the substantial intelligence on internal and external Al-Qaeda operations which Saudi Arabia has readily shared with the CIA. Within a year of September 11th, Saudi Arabia established an “oversight commission” at US request to monitor private charities for links to terrorism, and by the end of 2002 extensive auditing of these organizations was underway. Recently-chartered Saudi commissions now also oversee various other external monetary transfers to help choke the flow of private donations to Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. This new counterterrorism policy has received good reviews from scholarly studies published by both the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, think-tanks which are often quite critical of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, there are still a few problems. One of the few outstanding concerns that remain to be resolved is the strongly anti-American attitudes that are believed to be held by the teachers of Saudi Arabian religious schools located outside the Kingdom but funded by the House of Saud. Whether these ‘madrassas’ promote terrorism is a hotly disputed issue. The United States also continues to insist that Saudi Arabia expend more effort to seal its borders from private transfers not just to Al-Qaeda, but also other regional terrorist groups such as Hamas. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to root out domestic Al-Qaeda cells, however, have been particularly aggressive over the last two years in response to a wave of fundamentalist terrorism directed against the government. This crackdown began after the Riyadh Compound Bombings of May, 2003 (sometimes dubbed “Saudi Arabia’s 9/11”), and continues to this day. Granted, the Bush administration’s success in convincing the Saudis to constrain Al-Qaeda was done largely for purely pragmatic reasons. The United States could not afford to alienate itself from the Saudi government while at the same time seeking the overthrow of the Taliban and preparing an invasion of Iraq. Pursuing a militant foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia was perceived under these circumstances to be impractical. Although it may indeed be true that the best solution to the Saudi problem would be to seek a regime change, from a practical standpoint two years of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia has yielded vastly greater results than ten years of negotiation with Iraq did. At least until more American forces are freed up from obligations in Iraq, a diplomatic solution with Saudi Arabia will likely prove cheap and effective.