The authority deficit

[marcinmoka]

The authority deficit

From The World in 2007 print edition

It will become more obvious in the coming years. The world has an authority deficit. Authority is draining away from international institutions, from the big world powers (including the superpower) and from the nation-state itself. And though other forces, such as religion, are surging into the places the state has vacated, religions—and especially Islam—have an authority deficit of their own. Less authority is not always a bad thing. Some would say it is just the corollary of a more equal distribution of power. But it makes the world less orderly, and therefore less safe.

Consider first the waning of the United Nations. In 2007 South Korea’s Ban Ki-moon will take over as secretary-general from Kofi Annan. But whatever Mr Ban’s merits, a Security Council dominated by the five veto-wielding victors of a war that ended in 1945 will probably continue to lose legitimacy unless it lets in India, Brazil and some of the other rising powers of the 21st century. The Security Council’s decisions, meanwhile, go humiliatingly unheeded. In 2006 the council ordered Iran to stop enriching uranium, North Korea to give up its bomb, Sudan to stop killing civilians in Darfur and Hizbullah to disarm in Lebanon. To date, neither Iran nor North Korea nor Sudan nor Hizbullah has complied.

What of the other institutions of the post-1945 order? The World Bank and the IMF once held great sway, but developed and developing countries alike nowadays have access to alternative sources of cash and economic expertise. As with the UN, the constitutions of the fund and the bank are leading to questions about their representativeness. Hopes of enlarging a rule-based trading system under the World Trade Organisation are in danger of vanishing with the stalled Doha round. Another prop of the world order, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, may swiftly unravel if the nuclear weaponisation of North Korea and Iran triggers a nuclear arms race in North Asia and the Middle East.

Global order of a sort was maintained by the stalemate of the cold war: the Soviet Union and the United States clashed in proxy wars but took care to limit their scope. In the 1990s the collapse of the Soviet Union made it seem briefly possible that America’s moral and military authority might keep the peace. No longer. Moral authority? Ask a politician in Moscow, Beijing or Cairo about America’s moral authority and they will at once counter with the fiasco of Iraq, Guantánamo, “rendition†and the alleged torture of suspected terrorists. Even America’s military pre-eminence is in question. Though its armed forces will remain stronger than anyone else’s, the past three years have cruelly exposed America’s inability to squash insurgencies or put failed states back together again.

The European Union has aspired to become a new source of supranational authority, at least within its own region. But since the voters of France and the Netherlands rejected the Union’s new constitution in 2005, the EU’s authority has slumped. Attempts to impose fiscal discipline and freer markets on recalcitrant members have lacked conviction, along with once brave talk of a common foreign and security policy.

The building blocks on which any international order has to stand are, of course, the nation-states. And therein lies a problem. The state itself is growing weaker in many parts of the world, and has collapsed completely in some. In the advanced capitalist world its authority is being eroded by globalisation and in the former communist world it is being eroded by the advance of capitalism. Even in China, where the Communist Party maintains its monopoly of power, orders issued from the centre are these days widely ignored by provinces and municipalities.

Abhorring a vacuum, newer and older forces have thrust into the spaces the state has left behind. NGOs aspire to spread good policy and governance. Religions offer the order and consolation of eternal values. The paradox is that these forces face an authority deficit themselves. Who elected the would-be defenders of the environment and liberty, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty? As for religion, even a newly self-confident Islam is hobbled by a lack of authority.

Where governments have failed completely, as in post-Soviet Afghanistan and Somalia, Islamism has filled the void. Political Islam—the idea that the will of God, not the decisions of man, must ultimately shape politics and society—continues to make strides in the Muslim and especially the Arab world. But Islam itself has a protean quality that makes it unfriendly to authority. Iran is exceptional in having a supreme leader who wields both spiritual and temporal power. In the larger Sunni world, no clergy mediates between man and his maker and no pope-like figure has a licence to lay down spiritual law. That leaves every Tom, Dick and Osama with access to the web and a Koran free to interpret the true path as he pleases. Commendably democratic—and dangerous.

But the alternative could be worse

Is there a way to fix the authority deficit? America itself invented much of the post-1945 institutional architecture. Now is the time to reinvent it. It no longer has the authority to do this alone but it could try to enlist self-interested others—the Chinas, Indias and Brazils—in a new push to reshape the UN, the fund, the bank and the non-proliferation regime in a way that broadens the decision-making and so renews the legitimacy of these and other institutions. For this to work, of course, America must also be prepared to defer more often than George Bush has to the decisions of international bodies.

Steadying the international order by renewing its institutions will be hard (Mr Annan tried and, lacking American support, failed towards the end of his UN stint). But restoring the authority of the state will be a good deal harder, and possibly undesirable too. The danger is that governments seeking to restore their fading authority will go too far, choking off the free movement of ideas, capital and labour that have lately made the world such a disorderly place—and so many of its people so much more prosperous and free. Better, perhaps, not to try.

Edited October 13, 2007 by marcinmoka

[ScottSA]

Great article in its analysis of the historical and current situation, but it's premised on the implicit notion that the UN or some variation of it is the needed "authority," and that is a very bad thing in the opinions of many and not, as suggested, confined to the opinion of Bush. It also ignores the fact that power vacuums are filled by war 9 times out of 10.

[geoffrey]

You re-typed that entire article? Methinks there is a copyright violation here... in the very least it breaks the forum rules.

[marcinmoka]

it's premised on the implicit notion that the UN or some variation of it is the needed "authority,"

True, although you do accept the fact that some sort of authority is indeed needed? However, on a practical level, which other institution/force could fullfill said role?

and not, as suggested, confined to the opinion of Bush.

I for one, do not think this is what the author was necessarily trying to convey. America is still the only nation capable of enforcing, if not legitimizing such an institution, and thus why the emphasis on the current POTUS. Without the U.S on board, there can be no credible, respected international authority.

[August1991]

Some basic ideas of this article are silly when they are not contradictory.

Consider first the waning of the United Nations. In 2007 South Korea’s Ban Ki-moon will take over as secretary-general from Kofi Annan. But whatever Mr Ban’s merits, a Security Council dominated by the five veto-wielding victors of a war that ended in 1945 will probably continue to lose legitimacy unless it lets in India, Brazil and some of the other rising powers of the 21st century. The Security Council’s decisions, meanwhile, go humiliatingly unheeded.

If the UN Security Council admits Brazil or India, it will not gain legitimacy.

Hopes of enlarging a rule-based trading system under the World Trade Organisation are in danger of vanishing with the stalled Doha round.

...

The building blocks on which any international order has to stand are, of course, the nation-states. And therein lies a problem. The state itself is growing weaker in many parts of the world, and has collapsed completely in some. In the advanced capitalist world its authority is being eroded by globalisation and in the former communist world it is being eroded by the advance of capitalism. Even in China, where the Communist Party maintains its monopoly of power, orders issued from the centre are these days widely ignored by provinces and municipalities.

So, the WTO is not successful but globalization is a threat to the state in "capitalist" countries. WTF? (BTW, in 1990, world trade attained the same percentage of world GDP as it had achieved in 1912. Since 1990, the world has never known such freedom to trade and move.)

In China, orders issued from Beijing have no effect in the regions. Amazing.

I kind of stopped reading at that point.

----

There is an army of government bureaucrat analysts who inhabit various ministries the world over and they write and repeat such nonsense as this for ministers and delegates to international conferences. The authority deficit concerns why the Canadian version has the authority to tax me and pay their salaries and livelihoods.

Edited October 14, 2007 by August1991

[marcinmoka]

If the UN Security Council admits Brazil or India, it will not gain legitimacy.

O.K, but can it ever? If such is the case, how to proceed?

Even in China, where the Communist Party maintains its monopoly of power, orders issued from the centre are these days widely ignored by provinces and municipalities.

Unfortunately, I do not live there, nor have I even been there, but gathering from what I've heard, explicit religious practice is making quite the comeback. China is more than just Shenzen, Beijing and Shanghai. Furthermore, when one has 1 billion +, I would imagine exercising strict control is no easy task, especially when faced with local pressure and/or bribery.

But seeing as you disagree, is there any information we should know about?

So, the WTO is not successful

I wouldn't call Doha a smashing success, would you?

In regards to your point, just because trade has never known such freedom one cannot automatically assume it will continue to do so. Thus the original reason behind GATT/WTO, a desire to establish rules and promote stability in international trade.

In fact, I was even going to quote you on this subject (invoking someone else - Trudeau)

Without order, there is no civility.

I kind of stopped reading at that point.

Dommage.

Though God forbid we question our own ideals.

Edited October 14, 2007 by marcinmoka

[marcinmoka]

One thing, before anyone tries to portray me as pro-bureaucracy authoritarian, I feel the need to re-emphasize the position of the ex - Bagehot, and that is that there is a fine line between too much and too little authority. Neither are an enviable position.

Afterall, our present day, civilized society is founded upon the rule of law. Yet without any authority, there is no force to create, nor maintain said laws.

[ScottSA]

Afterall, our present day, civilized society is founded upon the rule of law. Yet without any authority, there is no force to create, nor maintain said laws.

I think you are confusing concepts here. Civil society is founded on two things: Law and coercion. Law without a means of coercion is so much fluttering of lips and scratching of pens; and coercion without law is not civil society; it is arbitrary tyranny. There are other, softer aspects to civil society, like implicit legitimacy of the law and the coercive entity, but in essence the two will do to maintain a civil society with or without the other aspects.

What you are confusing here is a domestic civil society with the international state of affairs, which does not comprise nor resemble in any way a civil society. Since it's based on the Westphalian system; that is, a series of independent self-interested sovereign states within an anarchic system, the present international system is in every way incapable of creating a "global" society. That's why there is no "law" in the accepted sense of domestic law. There are principles, interpreted on a case by case basis by the only body with the perceived legitimacy to examine each case (the UNSC), but there is no real corpus of universally recognized law. If citizen A clacks citizen B over the head and runs off with citizen B's purse, the police will arrest A, because purse-snatching is illegal regardless of whatever justification A can come up with to excuse the purse-snatching.

In the international arena, on the other hand, a state can often get away with purse-snatching, depending on the importance of the purse or the snatchee to the "Judges." Iraq was "arrested" for Kuwait because the purse was important, but no one bothered to arrest Syria for Lebanon, because the purse was a cheap one and the snatchee wasn't strategically important, or at least not important enough to call the police.

And that's the other, and even more major difference: there is no police force, nor can there ever be under the Westphalian system, whether India, Brazil, or Timbuktu are admitted. There is now, and only ever will be a posse system. Even if the UNSC gets together and agrees that A is guilty, it makes no difference whatsoever unless someone or a collection of someones are willing to nab the criminal. The coercion available to the non-law of the international system is completely at the whim of the component states.

[August1991]

I think you are confusing concepts here. Civil society is founded on two things: Law and coercion. Law without a means of coercion is so much fluttering of lips and scratching of pens; and coercion without law is not civil society; it is arbitrary tyranny.

Don't underestimate the benefit obtained by respecting certain rules. Coercion is often not necessary to enforce rules - ostracism does the trick. Such is the basis of most commercial law and it works too for criminal law and even in the rules governing the conduct of states.

I agree however that coercion (or its threat) is usually required when market relations are not possible.

----

More simply put, there are six billion people in the world and it is not the threat of a police force that keeps them honest. It is the benefits they receive if they voluntarily respect the rules. It is possible but difficult to conduct one's affairs with a bad reputation or at least a reputation for insolvency.

In the international arena, on the other hand, a state can often get away with purse-snatching, depending on the importance of the purse or the snatchee to the "Judges." Iraq was "arrested" for Kuwait because the purse was important, but no one bothered to arrest Syria for Lebanon, because the purse was a cheap one and the snatchee wasn't strategically important, or at least not important enough to call the police.

Invasions aside, I don't think many politicians look at Saddam, Assad or Mugabe and say, "That's someone I want to emulate."

I'll agree that we haven't quite refined our methods of ostracism at the level of States. Refusal to let the elite of rogue states travel might be a good start. Dunno.

Edited October 15, 2007 by August1991

[marcinmoka]

There is now, and only ever will be a posse system

Good point. I should of written "legitimizing" in brackets, as there is no doubt that the international order cannot be an identical fascimile of our domestic civil society, and by that, legitimacy simply means having some sort of moral/ideological union amongst states, and this block (a.k.a posse system) would thus form the basis of this authority, even if not inscribed in stone.

Authority is not only legitimized by law, but mores, customs and acts as well.

In other words, like minded nations must learn to make concessions and get passed this incessant in fighting. Europe, and even many in Canada, must stop this masturbatory anti - Americanism, and certain groups in the U.S must realize the value of having alliances, even if they lack the sticks, they still have quite a collection of carrots and as August clearly pointed out the ability to ostracize subversive groups. There needs to be focus on the bigger picture as there is far more at stake in our world than just our pride.

Now if only we could manage to create a 'legitimate' a pro western Kalifah....

[Michael Hardner]

Don't underestimate the benefit obtained by respecting certain rules. Coercion is often not necessary to enforce rules - ostracism does the trick.

Yes, sometimes referred to as 'carrot and stick' or the poles of love and hate.

Most civilized people and nations will act with honour in most situations.

[August1991]

Most civilized people and nations will act with honour in most situations.

I wasn't thinking of honour.

Most people pay their credit card bills because bankruptcy would mean they wouldn't have access to credit at all. The long term benefit excedes the short term cost. Most people don't want a bad credit rating with Equifax because it means ostracism from modern finance.

The same principle applies to most governments and political leaders even in dictatorships. Muammar Gaddafi (and his family) got tired of never travelling.

[Michael Hardner]

Most people pay their credit card bills because bankruptcy would mean they wouldn't have access to credit at all. The long term benefit excedes the short term cost. Most people don't want a bad credit rating with Equifax because it means ostracism from modern finance.

The same principle applies to most governments and political leaders even in dictatorships. Muammar Gaddafi (and his family) got tired of never travelling.

Auguste,

I would think most people pay their debts because that's fair.