Motivation and terrorism

[myata]

As reported in the press, "motivation" clause of definition of terrorism (e.g. political, religious ) has been deemed unconstitutional by a judge of Ontario Superior Court. As far as I understand it, the only remaining clause that differentiates terrorism from a "regular" crime is the intent to "terrorise". To me it makes certain sense: imagine a group that conspired to terrorise (through violent means) for the sheer fun of it (or some kind of twisted tournament or any other weird reason). In what sense would they be better than a political or religious group or organization to receive preferential treatment by the law?

[Hydraboss]

This sounds like a Caledonia-related issue.

[FTA Lawyer]

This has proven to be a bizarre turn of events. Basically, the judge says that it is unconstitutional to include motive as an essential element of a terrorism offence, which then begs the question why does the rest of the terrorism legislation (manifested as sections of the Criminal Code) remain standing?

I ask this question because it seems to me that we are now left with a definition of "terrorism" that is simply duplicitous when considered along side the criminal organization, mischief, and other provisions of the Criminal Code.

Of course, the true irony is that by having this definition struck down, the defence lawyer has actually made it easier for his client to be convicetd! I guess the adage "be careful what you wish for" wasn't in his mind when he filed his Charter challenge!

FTA

[myata]

Well, there's still the intent part that sounds something like "terrorize with the intent to achieve goals" (don't have the exact quote). Which may, depending on the definition and/or interpretation include e.g. mass targeting of innocents.

All in all, the issue seems to be with the definition of the crime. I tend to agree with the judge that it should avoid including vague and subjective notions of "motivation".

[Argus]

Well, there's still the intent part that sounds something like "terrorize with the intent to achieve goals" (don't have the exact quote). Which may, depending on the definition and/or interpretation include e.g. mass targeting of innocents.

All in all, the issue seems to be with the definition of the crime. I tend to agree with the judge that it should avoid including vague and subjective notions of "motivation".

And yet, that is the the only consideration in hate crime laws, and those still stand.

[FTA Lawyer]

Well, there's still the intent part that sounds something like "terrorize with the intent to achieve goals" (don't have the exact quote). Which may, depending on the definition and/or interpretation include e.g. mass targeting of innocents.

All in all, the issue seems to be with the definition of the crime. I tend to agree with the judge that it should avoid including vague and subjective notions of "motivation".

And yet, that is the the only consideration in hate crime laws, and those still stand.

Intent is very much different than motive. In the hate-crime provisions, there is absolutely nothing about why a person spreads hate literature, just that they intend the literature to be hateful and incite a breach of the peace.

Consider an example...If I hit someone with a baseball bat with the intent of causing death and do cause death, you only know that I intended to kill the person...you have no idea what my motive was for doing so. My motive could be jealousy, greed, settling a personal grudge etc.

In simple terms, intent = what you meant to do...motive = why you meant to do it.

This is why the terror law was such a quagmire for prosecutors. They not only would have had to prove that the person put the bomb on the train with the intent of causing harm, terror, destruction or whatever, but they also would have had to prove that this intentional act was done for the purpose (or motive) of furthering a religious or political agenda...otherwise it would not amount to "terrorism"

With the motive element gone, we are really just back to proving the regular old criminal offences that deal with why it is bad to put a bomb on a train. So why have the special terror sections if the special motive element is now gone?

FTA

[Riverwind]

With the motive element gone, we are really just back to proving the regular old criminal offences that deal with why it is bad to put a bomb on a train. So why have the special terror sections if the special motive element is now gone?

Because politicians can't get elected if they tell people that terrorists are just another type of criminal....

[myata]

I thought maybe random indeterminate nature of terror attacks may deserve special consideration? But on the other hand - if we recall the case of the travelling sniper that created so much terror - no one seem to have been keen on branding it as "terrorism". It's definitely something interesting to discuss - what do we understand by "terrorism" and should it be treated (i.e. prosecuted - detection and investigation is another story) differently from the "regular" crime?

[Drea]

They are criminals.

We don't worry about the motivation of the guy who kills another guy so why should we worry about the motive of the terrorist.

Convict him of the crime so we can get on with prosecuting him instead of fishing around for "connections" to terrorist groups and whether or not he's a "religious" or "political" criminal.

[myata]

That would make sense. Not to say that certain tools cannot be added to help police investigate and prosecute specific kinds of criminal groups and organizations. But it should be done within the existing law. What's gained by creating this separate concept of "terrorism"? It looks like people who wrote these laws didn't quite undertand themselves what they meant. Or, more likely, were driven by political considerations more than logic and common sense (i.e. 9/11 bandwagon).

[Rue]

This has proven to be a bizarre turn of events. Basically, the judge says that it is unconstitutional to include motive as an essential element of a terrorism offence, which then begs the question why does the rest of the terrorism legislation (manifested as sections of the Criminal Code) remain standing?

I ask this question because it seems to me that we are now left with a definition of "terrorism" that is simply duplicitous when considered along side the criminal organization, mischief, and other provisions of the Criminal Code.

Of course, the true irony is that by having this definition struck down, the defence lawyer has actually made it easier for his client to be convicetd! I guess the adage "be careful what you wish for" wasn't in his mind when he filed his Charter challenge!

FTA

Absolutely agree with your susinct analysis.

[jbg]

This is a great argument to start using treason laws again.