Leafless

Well, where are all the howls of approval and shouts for joy. Now it seems Quebec and the U.S. have an 'official language and it's only the ROC (rest of Canada) that doesn't. So when is the big day going happen?? It seems there isn't much interest in this subject when there should be. What's the matter is mostly every one on this site anti-English?

Army Guy You wrote- " What about Cypress, Golan, to name a few." You still failed to elaborate on these countries on what you consider the degree of success pertaining to Canadian involvement and what was actually accomplished and instead threw the question back to me. Below is the missing link that would not open and covers quite a bit. Read it the best you can and tell me what you think. I really think this whole issue boils down to personal opinion and if your in the military you could possibly think a lot differently than someone who is not. For instance I believe some countries you simply cannot do nothing for as perhaps they could have the wrong demographics, no resources, a backward people, totally corrupt and so many other obstacles that there is no way you would be able to turn certain countries around. Here is the link: This is the html version of the file http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/doc...WP29-Donais.pdf. G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:xbOSp...a&ct=clnk&cd=10 Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content. These search terms have been highlighted: long term successful peacekeeping efforts canada -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 Peacekeeping’s Poor Cousin:Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict PolicingTimothy DonaisYCISS Working Paper Number 29August 2004 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 2 1Research for this paper was made possible through the financial support of both the Canadian Consortium on HumanSecurity (CCHS) and the Human Security Program of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade(DFAIT). The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the CCHS or itsaffiliated institutions. The author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this paper of participants at theworkshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” organized by York University’sCentre for Internationaland Security Studies in conjunction with the Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, heldat the Canadian Police College in Ottawa on 30 April 2004. Particular thanks are due to Doug Coates, Paul LaRose-Edwards, and Katie Kerr.Peacekeeping’s Poor Cousin:Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict PolicingTimothy DonaisCanadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS)Post-Doctoral Fellow1YCISS Working Paper Number 29August 2004The YCISS Working Paper Series is designed to stimulate feedback from other experts in thefield. The series explores topical themes that reflect work being undertaken at the Centre. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1For much of the past decade, Canada has been deeply engaged in the effort to remake Haiti’s policeforces in the image of a modern, democratic police service. As part of successive United Nations policesupport missions, upwards of 700 Canadian police officers served in Haiti during this period, mentoringand training their local counterparts and carrying out some law enforcement responsibilities. Haiti’srecent descent back into chaos and lawlessness following the flight of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,however, has left this process, as well as the broader international effort to stabilize the hemisphere’smost volatile and strife-ridden state, in ruins. Once again, the outside world – while hardly innocent inHaiti’s most recent bout of instability – finds itself struggling to restore order, security, and somemeasure of democracy to Haiti. And once again, Canada is part of a longer-term international effort totransform Haiti’s police, which had become increasingly corrupt, politicized, and thuggish, into a forcefor peace, order, and stability. While seemingly a Sisyphean task, the stakes surrounding police reform inHaiti are particularly high. With the disbanding of the Haitian military in 1994, the Haitian NationalPolice now stands as the country’s key security sector institution, and the most visible means throughwhich the Haitian state has attempted to exercise its legitimate authority. For the internationalcommunity, failing to get it right this time may simply set the stage for Haiti’s next round of turmoil.Haiti’s recurring nightmare dramatically illustrates the importance of addressing questions ofsecurity sector reform in weak, unstable, or post-conflict states, and underlines the direct links betweenan ineffective security sector and human insecurity. A relatively recent addition to the internationalrelations lexicon, the notion of security sector reform refers to efforts to strengthen the full range of toolsat the disposal of states – from armies and police to courts, penal institutions, and intelligence services –with which to exercise their monopoly on the legitimate use of force. At its core, security sector reformis based on the principle that a state’s security institutions should be democratically controlled, anchoredin the rule of law, and most importantly, sources of security rather than insecurity for citizens.This paper examines Canadian experiences, policies, and practices with regard to police reform –a key element of the security sector reform agenda – in post-conflict or failed states. While an entiremythology has developed around Canada’s role as originator and long-standing champion ofpeacekeeping in its military guise, less attention has been paid to policing as the second core pillar ofsecurity in transitions from conflict to peace. This is gradually changing, as the limitations of militarypeacekeepers as agents of peacebuilding become more evident, and as it is increasingly recognized thatbuilding sustainable peace in the absence of minimal levels of public security is next to impossible. In many ways, post-conflict police assistance – including the provision of international civilianpolice for monitoring or law enforcement roles as well as longer-term training and institutionaldevelopment assistance – is an issue tailor-made for Canadian foreign policy, combining nationalcommitments to human security, to peacebuilding, and to the export of core Canadian values such aspeace, order, and good government. However, while Canada’s contributions in this area to date are farfrom negligible, neither has it been an international leader. The paper will assess Canada’s contributions,and the possibilities for greater Canadian involvement, in this area. It will consider both domestic and -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 4 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 21Annika Hansen, “International Security Assistance to War-torn Societies,” in Michael Pugh, ed., Regeneration ofWar-Torn Societies (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000), 35.international obstacles to a greater Canadian role – such as chronic personnel shortages,interdepartmental politics, and the hodgepodge of inadequately coordinated institutional actors alreadyactive in the field – and examine ways in which some of these challenges might be overcome.Policing Post-Conflict Zones: The Evolving International ContextWhile it is now widely recognized that most contemporary conflicts occur within states rather thanbetween them, the international community is only slowly coming to terms with this new reality in termsof its conflict management toolkit. In the early 1990s, Bosnia in particular demonstrated the inadequacyof conventional peacekeeping in the face of unconventional ethnic conflict, in which there were fewclearly-demarcated front lines, little distinction between combatants and civilians, and precious littlepeace to keep. At the same time, it has become evident that post-conflict peacebuilding in dividedsocieties is less about separating opposing armed forces and more about a sustained process of state-building. If state-building equals peacebuilding in the contemporary era, then the most that outsidemilitary forces can contribute to this effort is to create a reasonably stable environment in which thestate-building process – which involves not only establishing sustainable institutions but also generatingdomestic confidence in them – can occur.Given the violent context from which post-conflict states struggle to emerge, it seemsuncontroversial to suggest that among the most important institutions to be re-constructed as part of thepeacebuilding process are those related to security. Clearly, if the citizens of war-torn states cannot relyon state institutions to provide for their security, they will have little incentive to either put down theirarms or abandon ‘their’ side of the armed struggle. As Annika Hansen has suggested, “security is the keyto a “new social contract” between the population and its government or society in which the populationis willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”1It is here, then,that security sector reform and peacebuilding intersect, with success in the former realm a keycontributing factor in the success of the overall peace process.Particularly in cases of intra-state conflict, recent experience underlines the fact that thoseinternal security sector institutions underpinning the rule of law are just as important as militaryinstitutions in the transition from war to peace. A key task of international peacekeeping efforts has beento isolate, contain, and remove domestic military forces from the political process, and ultimately re-direct their energies towards external rather than internal security tasks. Sustainable peace, however,requires an equally concerted effort to establish internal security and the rule of law by strengthening,professionalizing, and de-politicizing police, courts, and penal institutions. In fragile and highly-politicized post-conflict environments, none of these processes can beexpected to unfold quickly or easily. Within the security sector, therefore, peacebuilding processes can -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 32Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars,” GlobalGovernance 7 (2001), 157; see also Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs 81:6(November-December 2002).usually be understood as unfolding in two, often overlapping stages: the direct international provision ofsecurity in the interim period before domestic institutions are up to taking on these tasks themselves, andthe necessarily longer-term processes of building capacity within domestic security institutions.With a few prominent exceptions, however, the international community has been reluctant toimpose both military and public security in post-conflict environments, despite recognizing theimportance of each. This reluctance has allowed significant post-conflict security gaps to emerge, withpredictably deleterious consequences for fragile peace processes. Typically, security responsibilities inpost-conflict environments are divided among military peacekeepers, local police, and internationalcivilian police. Just as typically, the former have been unwilling and unprepared to take on mundanepublic security tasks, the latter have been under-powered and under-resourced, while local policeestablishments are often as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. More recently, and moretroublingly, post-conflict operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have unfolded in the absence of anactive international civilian police presence. This situation has left huge gaps in security provisionbetween international military forces, focused on force protection and terrorism interdiction, and localpolice forces, which are hopelessly under-resourced and overwhelmed by the chaotic and lawlessconditions of the after-war period. The dangers of allowing post-conflict security gaps to persist in post-conflict environments aremany. In this relatively lawless interregnum between war and peace, petty thieves, organized criminalsand remnants of ousted regimes may begin to regroup and assert themselves, ethnic or factional tensionsmay boil over into open conflict, forms of retributive or vigilante justice may emerge, and there are realrisks of local communities turning against a peace process that appears incapable of delivering security. At the same time, international actors, in the face of persistent insecurity, may begin to lose bothcredibility and resolve as time lines for achieving sustainable peace grow ever longer. In the worst-casescenario, any viable peace process is swamped by the combination of an increasingly criminalizedpolitical economy, an untenable public security situation, and the re-emergence of ethnic or factionalconflict. To greater or lesser degrees, all of these malign consequences have been evident inpeacebuilding processes in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti.To a large extent, militarized peacekeeping or peace-enforcement forces are incapable ofadequately addressing many of the public security challenges faced by post-conflict societies. AsCharles Call and William Stanley have argued, “most militaries are not appropriate for public securitytasks, since their training, equipment, and doctrine emphasize use of overwhelming force rather than thecontrolled application of force necessary for police work.”2At the same time, soldiers are also reluctant -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 4agents of law enforcement, and most militaries tend to view public security work as thankless, dull, and amisuse of valuable war-fighting capacity.International civilian police missions, or CIVPOL in UN terminology, emerged at least partly inresponse to the unmet security needs of post-conflict environments. With the exceptions of Kosovo andEast Timor, however, where international police were given executive law enforcement authority,international police missions have typically been provided with weak mandates and inadequate resourcesand asked to radically transform domestic security environments. At the same time, the reputation ofinternational civilian police has not been helped by the UN’s inability to effectively manage internationalpolice officers from dozens of member states representing an equal number of different policing cultures,or to ensure that individual police monitors meet minimal requirements in terms of skills andprofessionalism. In terms of stature, organization, and resources then, the civilian policing component ofthe international post-conflict security architecture is unquestionably the poor cousin of its morecelebrated military counterpart.If anything, the difficult realities of contemporary post-conflict environments have made this gapbetween international capacities in military security provision and public security provision that muchmore apparent. Notwithstanding the current turmoil in Iraq, militarized peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions have become relatively efficient at establishing a base level of military security inpost-conflict environments, especially when backed by the overwhelming military power of the UnitedStates. The development of international capacities in the provision of post-conflict public security overthe past decade, on the other hand, has been somewhat haphazard and uneven. Consequently, findingways to simultaneously stabilize the public security situation in strife-torn states, while at the same timebuilding up domestic law and order capacities, remains one of the international community’s keypeacebuilding challenges.The Canadian Contribution: Past, Present, and FutureThe Canadian police experience with modern peacekeeping began in 1989, when some 100 officers weredeployed to Namibia to help oversee transitional elections. Canadian police officers have subsequentlybeen involved in many of the most prominent peace support missions of the past 15 years. Yet while therole of international police as an integral component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts has beengrowing, Canadian commitments and capacities in this area have evolved only marginally. WhileCanadian police officers are, and continue to be, widely respected abroad for their professionalism,Canada’s mechanisms for identifying, preparing, and deploying police officers for post-conflict workcontinue to be largely ad hoc and provisional. At the same time, over the course of the past half-decadeCanada has rarely managed to have more than 100 police officers deployed in peace operations at anyone time, despite widespread recognition among policy-makers that Canada could, and probably should,be doing more. While Canadian contributions are not markedly out of line with the contributions ofother Western states (even if well below the contributions of developing states such as Jordan), Canada is -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 7 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 53“Monthly Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations, 31 July 2004; Availablefrom http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contribu...aryJuly2004.pdf (accessed August 2004); tobe fair, it should be noted that Canada is currently contributing some 20 police trainers to train Iraqi police recruits inJordan, and has recently committed an additional 100 police to the UN’s Haiti mission.4These general conclusions, as well as others in this paper, are drawn from the “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing” workshop (see footnote 1 above).5Doug Coates, “Canadian Police as Peacekeepers,” (Unpublished manuscript, April 2002), 28-30.far from an international leader in contributing to multinational police support efforts. Presently,according to the UN’s most recent monthly statistics, Canada is contributing 45 civilian police to UNpeace operations, fewer than countries such as Fiji, Bulgaria, and Ghana.3Since 1997, the deployment of Canadian police personnel in international peace supportoperations has been governed by the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA), a funding and administrativemechanism involving four major government actors: the Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade (now Foreign Affairs Canada), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), theRoyal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Department of the Solicitor General. Foreign Affairsprovides the policy lead, CIDA provides the funding – some $19 million over three years under thecurrent agreement – while the RCMP provides the bulk of personnel. In recent years, however, theRCMP has developed partnerships with local and regional police forces across the country, which nowprovide close to half of all officers for international missions. Currently, the CPA provides sufficientfunding to enable some 42 Canadian police officers to be deployed internationally each year, although incases of larger deployments, CPA funding is topped up from other government sources. The CPA doesnot provide for a dedicated pool of officers on standby for international missions; rather it facilitates theselection and deployment of officers on a case-by-case basis, primarily in response to requests frommultilateral organizations such as the UN.While many of those familiar with the CPA insist that it has worked reasonably well over thepast seven years, there is also a widespread consensus that it is no longer adequate.4Indeed, the CPAwas initially meant to be a temporary arrangement, put in place until a more permanent arrangementcould be developed and implemented.5Now in its eighth year, however, the CPA appears increasingly tobe a permanent fixture of Canada’s foreign policy landscape.Lying as it does at the intersection of foreign policy, international development, and policing, theissue of Canadian support to post-conflict policing has been marked by divergent policy priorities amongthe relevant participating departments. While formally managed by an interdepartmental committeerepresenting Canada’s development, foreign affairs, and policing communities, the Canadian PoliceArrangement has never been firmly anchored in a coherent national strategic vision around Canada’s rolein post-conflict public security. For its part, Foreign Affairs has led on the policy side, and has a clearinterest in an effective Canadian contribution to post-conflict policing as a means of enhancing Canada’s -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 8 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 66Author interview with Susan Brown, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Ottawa, 14 January 2004.7The term “policekeeper” is closely associated with the recent work of Graham Day; see Graham Day andChristopher Freeman, “Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq,”International Affairs 79:2 (2003).stature abroad and advancing its international policy goals, but lacks the financial clout to impose a clearvision and direction. Within CIDA, despite a growing recognition that police reform is a legitimate focusfor development assistance, police assistance issues have never been effectively integrated within theagency’s broader development programs or strategies.6Limited resources and conflicting mandates have also generated considerable ambivalencetowards the issue of international and post-conflict police assistance within the RCMP. On the one hand,there is an awareness that Canada not only has a responsibility to contribute, as part of its broaderinternational commitments, to post-conflict stabilization efforts through police assistance, but thatCanada also benefits from such assistance. Not only does it help prevent instability from enteringCanada in the form of refugee flows or cross-border crime, but participation in international policingmissions gives Canadian police personnel valuable experience. On the other hand, the terms of the CPAoften force a trade-off between domestic and international policing. Since the arrangement does notallow the RCMP to hire additional policing resources, every police officer sent on an internationalmission is one less police officer available for active duty at home. This situation is hardly unique toCanada, and is one of the key distinctions between military peacekeeping forces, who are essentially onstandby when stationed in their home countries, and “policekeepers,”7who typically have ongoingdomestic law enforcement responsibilities. In Canada, this reality has tempered the enthusiasm of seniorRCMP officials for international police work, since they tend to view such missions as at best adistraction, and at worst an obstacle to the force’s ability to perform its core tasks at home.The absence of a dedicated Canadian standby force of police personnel available forinternational duty has had a number of implications for the practice of deploying Canadian policeofficers abroad. While Canada has committed itself to supplying UN police support missions with up to50 officers on short notice, each request from the UN requires a relatively laborious process ofidentifying potential candidates who are qualified, willing, and in a position to be released by theirsuperior officers. This system, in addition to being relatively inefficient, also has implications in termsof training for international service. Since officers are not pre-selected, and since Canada aims toprovide personnel within eight weeks of an official request, the time frame between selection anddeployment provides little opportunity for training. And while Canadian police personnel are widelyconsidered to be well-trained in modern policing methods, even the best-trained officers benefit fromadditional training aimed at preparing them for the rigours of international police work in unstable post-conflict societies. Such supplementary training could include courses on international humanitarian law,on dealing with refugee or displaced populations or with questions of disarmament or demobilization, -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 9 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 78Currently, for example, Canadian officers being deployed on international policing missions receive a two-hourbriefing on international humanitarian law; author interview with Paul LaRose-Edwards, CANADEM, Ottawa, 15January 2004.9Comments made by DFAIT’s Wendy Gilmour at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-ConflictPolicing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.10See Louise Bell, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK government approach to reducing conflict(London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, August 2003); Available fromhttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/global_conflict_prevention_pool.pdf (accessed May 2004).and on the political dynamics of the specific country and conflict to which they are being deployed.8Issues of training and advance preparation are even more pressing given the relatively short rotations –between six to twelve months – typical of international police missions. All too often, by the time anindividual police monitor fully understands the local environment and is able to operate effectivelywithin it, he or she is being rotated back home again. This revolving door approach to post-conflictpolicing has eroded both the credibility and the effectiveness of UN police assistance missions.At the same time, much as the Canadian Police Arrangement has suffered somewhat from beingowned by several departments and championed by none, there has been little effort to integrate post-conflict policing issues with other elements of the security sector reform agenda, notably corrections orjudicial reform. This issue is crucial, since perhaps the clearest lesson from international reform effortsin the rule of law sector is that an effective police force means little if the local judiciary is corrupt or thepenal system dysfunctional. In other words, there is a growing recognition that restoring the rule of lawin post-conflict states must be a single, integrated process.At the moment, however, Canada’s capacity to deploy justice or penal reform experts intointernational missions is even less developed than its ability to deploy police officers. While Canadianpersonnel in these areas have served in international missions, Canada’s approach is far from systematic,and there has been little effort made to focus Canadian deployments in the areas of policing, justice, andcorrections into a coherent and integrated security sector reform strategy.9Again, Canada is far from theonly country grappling with such issues, and both the United Kingdom and the United States may offersome useful models for Canada as it contemplates future approaches in this area. In 2001, for example,the UK initiated a Global Conflict Prevention Pool, an exercise in ‘joined-up government’ aimed atpooling resources and strategies from the UK Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice, and the Department for International Development into a coherent national strategy for conflictreduction. The pool has enabled the participating departments to develop and implement joint strategiesgeographically, as in Afghanistan or the Balkans, or thematically, as in the area of small arms and lightweapons.10The United States has also acknowledged the inefficiencies of decentralized approaches tosecurity sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding, and is working towards the establishment of an -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 10 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 811Comments made by Dick Mayer, former deputy director of the United States’ International Criminal InvestigativeTraining Assistance Program (ICITAP), at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,”Ottawa, 30 April 2004.12James Traub, “Nation Building: Making Sense of the Mission,” New York Times Magazine, 11 April 2004, 34.Office of Post-Conflict Stabilization in order to lend clearer focus and greater coherence to USpeacebuilding efforts.11Canada has neither the international clout nor the financial resources of its more powerful allies,and thus might ultimately have to choose between either broadening or deepening its commitments tointernational security sector reform. Yet whether Canada chooses to develop coherent security sectorapproaches to be applied in long-term engagements with countries such as Haiti, or strives to become aninternational leader in the area of post-conflict police assistance, either would be a significantimprovement over the current state of affairs. As it stands now, there is a real danger that Canada’scommitment to engaged multilateralism in international peace and security issues is becoming morelegend than reality.The Challenge of MultilateralismOf course, given the previously mentioned problems with existing international mechanisms for theprovision of post-conflict police assistance, there are legitimate questions to be raised as to whether, andwhy, Canada would want to funnel significant resources into a system that is highly inefficient, if notwholly dysfunctional. It is also the case that in the case of post-conflict policing, ineffective internationalmechanisms regularly meet nearly intractable problems within post-conflict environments. Post-conflictpolice reform – as the Haiti case demonstrates with striking clarity – almost invariably involvepainstaking, long-term commitments, multiple and overlapping tasks and responsibilities, and uncertainrewards in terms of concrete, measurable, and sustainable indicators of success. Why, then, should webother?With regard to the inherent difficulty and thanklessness of post-conflict policing, the shortanswer is that simply avoiding the difficult problems will not make them go away. As argued above, therestoration of effective policing is now a crucial element of any peacebuilding process, and failure herecomes with a high risk of renewed conflict and instability. And as James Traub has recently written inthe context of post-conflict nation-building more generally:What is almost impossible turns out to be indispensable. It has become obvious since9/11 that we cannot allow collapsed states, or rogue states, to fester: their failures havebecome our problem. Nation-building is no longer a subject for debate: we will get itright or pay the price.12Concerning the well-publicized inefficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions, one possible option forCanada could be to direct more of its international policing resources along bilateral channels. Over the -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 913Author discussions and interviews with well over a dozen North American police officers with internationalexperience, August 2003 - April 2004.past several years, in fact, CIDA has funded numerous bilateral assistance projects, among them acapacity-building project for the Afghan National Police and a multi-year project – carried out by thePearson Peacekeeping Centre – aimed at preparing military and police personnel from FrancophoneAfrica to participate in international peace support operations. While such projects clearly make animportant contribution, within post-conflict situations donor-state bilateralism regularly exacerbatesproblems of international coherence and coordination, problems which can dilute the impact ofindividual projects. For all its warts, and particularly within the context of immediate post-conflictenvironments, the UN is often the only institution with the credibility, legitimacy, and ability to take onthe complex and long-term challenge of re-engineering domestic security institutions. There is,therefore, is a strong practical case to be made for Canada continuing to work within multilateral policingframeworks, while at the same time pushing for improvements in the realm of policy and practice.Indeed, given Canada’s past experience and its strong policing tradition, there is much thatCanada could contribute to a broader, long-term effort to enhance international and UN capacities in thearea of post-conflict police assistance. Several key problems within the current UN approach to post-conflict policing can be identified, and in each of these Canada could potentially contribute at leastpartial solutions.Personnel Training and Preparation: An oft-cited problem with international policing missionsis the rather uneven quality of personnel deployed to such missions. Part of the problem is the UN’srelatively underdeveloped capacities in the area of pre-deployment and continuing training for its missionstaff, which are exacerbated by the failure of countries, like Canada, to provide pre-deployment trainingof any significance. A second issue, far more sensitive because of its racial overtones, is the question ofthe training and competence of international police officers from developing nations. A near-universalsentiment among Western police officers with experience in international missions is a sense offrustration with counterparts from developing nations who show up in mission unable to drive, to speakEnglish, or perform basic policing duties in accordance with accepted international standards.13To befair, the situation has improved over the past decade or so as UN standards have been graduallytightened. However, significant questions still remain, among both Western police officers and thepopulations of post-conflict states, about the qualifications and credibility of officers from developingcountries – especially those with dubious human rights records – as trainers, mentors, and role models.Regardless of the depths of the North-South divide in policing capacities, much more could bedone to prepare police officers from all nations for international missions. Canada, for its part, has adeveloping capacity in this area, which could feed into a broader international training regime forinternational police work in post-conflict zones. Organizations such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centreand CANADEM, an Ottawa-based non-governmental organization which manages the deployment of -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 12 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1014Comments made by Claude Rochon, Director of CANPOL, at the workshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.15See, for example, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Haiti,” Organization of American States, 20May 2003; Available from: http://www.oas.org/OASpage/Haiti_situation/CPdoc3750_03E.htm (accessed August2004).Canadian civilians into international peace operations, are expanding their efforts in the area ofinternational police training, one element of which involves training police officers of other nations forpeace support work. Building up a coherent Canadian capacity in this area, and coordinating thiscapacity with similar efforts in other countries, could form the basis of an integrated training system forinternational policekeepers.Strategic Planning and Development: At a recent Ottawa workshop examining Canadian andinternational responses to the challenges of post-conflict policing, one consistent theme concerned thelack of, and need for, coherent planning and development in international police support missions. Claude Rochon, a retired Canadian police officer with experience in missions all over the globe, notedthat missions in which strategic plans had been developed and implemented were very much theexception rather than the rule.14Such planning is crucial, however, both because of the inherentcomplexity of police reform and because of the chaotic and fluid nature of most post-conflictenvironments. In Haiti, for example, a relatively comprehensive international effort to build up theHaitian National Police (HNP) ultimately foundered on questions of professionalism and politicization,as senior Haitian police managers not only failed to ensure accountability within the ranks but also failedto resist politicization of the police apparatus as the country’s political crisis deepened.15While policereform in Haiti has in many ways been a victim of the country’s broader political crisis, the weaknesseswithin the HNP that the crisis exposed suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to the quality ofpolice leadership, to questions of accountability up and down the police hierarchy, and to the linksbetween police reform and the broader peacebuilding process.Strategic planning is all the more important given the regular turnover of personnel ininternational missions; setting goals, standards, policies and procedures that are clear, consistent andtransparent is crucial given endemic problems with personnel continuity, particularly within seniormanagement positions. On top of all this, the multidimensional nature of modern police supportoperations, which are often asked simultaneously to monitor and mentor local counterparts, recruit andtrain a new generation of officers, weed out bad apples from existing staff rosters, and re-organize entirenational policing infrastructures, requires considerable planning to ensure that these various elementswork together as a coherent whole. And while the UN’s Civilian Policing Division has been upgraded inrecent years, its strategic planning capacities remain largely inadequate in the face of such challenges.While a country like Canada could not realistically be expected to tackle the challenge of missionstrategic planning on its own, there are elements of the broader set of issues with which Canada could -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 13 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 11usefully engage in an effort to move international planning capacities forward. On its own or incollaboration with like-minded states, Canada could usefully explore options for improving UN post-conflict policing capacities in areas such as best practices and lessons learned, or in the development andinstitutionalization of standard rules, policies and procedures for post-conflict policing operations. Giventhe legal vacuums that often exist in post-conflict environments, there has also been some discussion ofthe need to develop a generic legal framework that could guide international police missions, particularlyin the early stages of a mission. Canada could also explore the feasibility and desirability of developingsuch a mechanism.Standby and Rapid Reaction Capability: Since most police officers have ongoing lawenforcement responsibilities in their home countries, questions of availability and staffing have doggedUN police support efforts for years. The challenge of finding enough qualified staff for internationalmissions also, of course, has had implications for the quality of international personnel, as it has forcedthe UN to focus on quantity over quality. And while there is growing talk of the UN moving to leaner,less personnel-intensive missions in the future, with the burden of law enforcement placed squarely onthe shoulders of domestic police within post-conflict states, this may ultimately prove to be wishfulthinking. In other words, major police missions à la Kosovo, East Timor, or even Bosnia may not beexceptions to the rule, but rather indicative of the range of post-conflict situations that will continue totest international capacities to deliver post-conflict public security. It may, therefore, not be so easy tosimply wish away questions of securing adequate personnel for international policing missions.In recognition of such realities, the European Union has moved to create a standby force of 5,000police officers available on short notice to respond to crisis situations. As discussed in more detailbelow, Canada could follow suit by improving its standby capacities through the creation of a standinginternational police support unit, which could also serve as both model and inspiration for other states. At the same time, through CANPOL, a division of CANADEM that provides retired police officers forinternational work, Canada already has a standing pool of experienced officers ready and willing to bedeployed on short notice. Working with the UN to institutionalize the use of such personnel, and tostreamline procedures through which retired officers are incorporated into international missions, couldbe another means by which the challenge of finding qualified and available policing personnel could beovercome.Coordination of Multilateral and Bilateral Efforts: Beyond getting the Canadian and UN housesin order on the question of post-conflict policing, there is also the question of enhancing coordinationamong the broader international community, including the range of bilateral and multilateral actorsinvolved in police reform in particular cases. Across the security and development sectors, the questionof international coordination is a difficult one, and levels of coordination are often so poor as to rendernonsensical the very notion of an ‘international community.’ In many cases, the relevant actorsrecognize that coordination should be improved, but feel powerless to make it happen. In post-conflictpolicing operations, the lack of overall donor coordination, combined with an absence of strategic -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 14 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1216Comments made by Glenn MacPhail, a retired RCMP officer with substantial international experience, at theworkshop “Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing,” Ottawa, 30 April 2004.planning and direction, often leads to inefficient and ineffective allocation of scarce resources. In somecases, local police forces receive computers when they really need pens and paper, or motorcycles whenthen need flashlights.16While acknowledging that coordination among a multiplicity of agencies in chaotic post-conflictconditions will remain a considerable challenge, there are things that concerned countries such as Canadacould do to improve matters. In the policing field, for example, Canada could seek to identify andpromote best practices in the area of international donor coordination. One such example comes fromAlbania, where an international consortium on law enforcement assistance has been relatively successfulin coordinating police assistance efforts across a range of relevant actors. In this area as in others, thereis no guarantee that Canadian advocacy will be either heard or heeded. What is certain, however, is thateffective police reform in post-conflict environments requires international resources and assets to beused as efficiently as possible, and that the failure of contributing states to take this issue seriously willperpetuate a situation in which disoriented and uncoordinated international responses to chaotic post-conflict situations will produce unsatisfactory outcomes. Future Policy DirectionsCanada is current engaged in a foreign policy review, and there is a compelling case to be made for areview of Canadian policies concerning this country’s role in post-conflict policing. As things currentlystand, four different options present themselves.Business as usual: While this option requires no new resources, it leaves in place a policy toolthat does not deliver much bang for the buck. It also leaves unaddressed the dissatisfactions of each ofthe main government players with the current system and leaves Canada without a coherent mechanismto deal with broader questions of security sector reform. However, unless each of the departmentsinvolved in the international police assistance file begin to make a clear and coherent case that this is anarea in which Canada should be playing a stronger role, this option is also the most likely. From agovernment decision-making perspective, status quo inertia is rendered more likely because post-conflictpolice assistance does not enjoy the high profile that the deployment of military peacekeepers does. Conversely, however, the deployment of a handful of police officers to work in relative obscurity inBaghdad or Pristina or Freetown allows Canada to claim that it is contributing to post-conflict publicsecurity across the globe without a major commitment of money or personnel.Greater use of retired officers: This option also entails minimal risk or commitment on the partof the Canadian government. CANPOL, the policing arm of CANADEM, currently has some 800 retiredCanadian police officers on its roster, most of whom have considerable international experience andrelatively few domestic encumbrances. Indeed, retired officers are becoming a fixture of international -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 15 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1317Author interview with Ajay Bhatnagar, UN Civilian Policing Division, New York, 6 January 2004.18Author discussions with DFAIT officials, Ottawa, 15 January 2004.police missions, even if they represent at best a partial solution to the deficiencies of current Canadianand international systems. On the one hand, the UN still prefers to recruit actively-serving officers,partly because of age and fitness issues,17but also because active officers tend to come seconded withsponsoring-government salaries, and are thus less expensive. On the other hand, Canadian policy-makersthemselves remain wary of an over-reliance on retired personnel, in part because retired officers are notas accountable to their home governments and in part because they may not enjoy the same kind ofaccess to information or resources in the field as they would if they were full-time employees of theirhome governments.18At the same time, the use of retired officers in international missions has raised ahost of logistical questions, from issues of liability and insurance to more mundane questions of whetherretired RCMP officers working abroad should be allowed to wear RCMP uniforms and badges. Whilenone of these challenges is insurmountable, combined they do suggest that while there is a role for retiredpolice officers in international police support missions, there are limits to how far the privatization ofpolice assistance services can be taken.A broadened and/or deepened Canadian Police Arrangement: If Canada does want to take on amore prominent role in the provision of post-conflict public security, one option would be simply todirect more financial resources into the current CPA. Given that overhead and administration costs arerelatively fixed, doubling the CPA operating budget to $12.6 million per year should allow Canada tomore than double its standing commitment to the United Nations. The fact that different pots ofgovernment monies are often drawn on to support larger deployments of Canadian police personnel alsomeans that this is not necessarily a question of finding new money, but rather of pooling existing funds. At the same time, or alternately, the current CPA could be transformed into a broader vehicle forthe delivery of Canadian expertise in the area of security sector reform. Much like the UK’s GlobalConflict Prevention Pool, such a transformation of the CPA would not only provide a framework for theinternational deployment of Canadian personnel in the justice and penal sectors, but would also allow thegradual development of a coherent Canadian approach to questions of security sector reform. Moving inthis direction would also require a greater commitment to inter-departmental policy coordination, sincethe CPA’s policy-level steering committee is currently required to meet no more than once a year.The principal drawback of this option lies in the fact that, at least in the policing field, moremoney will not necessarily fix the current flaws in the CPA. In the absence of a sustained, long-termfunding commitment by its government partners, the RCMP still will not be in a position to hireadditional police officers to offset the greater numbers of its staff deployed internationally. In this sense,more money might simply add to the current headaches of the RCMP (and of other participating policeforces) in terms of having to identify, release, and cover for even greater numbers of field officers. At -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 16 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 1419This estimate is based on the current CPA ratio of $150,000 per officer deployed per year. An annual budget of$30 million would provide for a 200-person standing force.20See also Paul LaRose-Edwards, “Canadian CivPol Division,” (Ottawa: CANADEM, May 1999).21Coates, “Canadian Police as Peacekeepers,” 46.the same time, while an expanded CPA might put greater numbers of Canadians into the field, it will not address existing tensions between adequate training and rapid deployment. Finally, as with the previoustwo options, neither a broadened nor a deepened CPA will facilitate a more robust Canadian contributionto improving current deficiencies within the international system around post-conflict police assistance. A dedicated International Civilian Police Division: The most ambitious option for upgradingCanadian capacities in the field of international police assistance – and the most logical if Canada is toestablish itself as a serious player in this area – is to establish a dedicated international police supportdivision within the RCMP. While requiring a considerable and sustained financial commitment on thepart of the Government of Canada – in the neighborhood of $30-50 million annually19– the creation of astanding unit would give Canada significant capacity not only to provide officers for internationalmissions but also to engage seriously in international training and research. Assuming that half of thestanding Canadian unit would be deployed abroad at any one time, this would still leave a substantialnumber of personnel available to either receive, develop or deliver specialized training in internationalpolice assistance, or to form the core of an Canadian policy unit on strengthening international capacitiesin the area of post-conflict policing. The idea for a dedicated Canadian international civilian policing unit is not new, and the RCMPhas been advocating such a move for a number of years.20From an RCMP perspective, the creation of aninternational standby unit neatly overcomes the tensions between international and domestic policingresponsibilities, as the unit would be fully separated from the RCMP’s domestic policing arms, and stablefunding would enable additional hiring to fill gaps left by police officers drawn into the unit. At thesame time, the formation of the unit would entail the automatic pre-selection of officers for overseasdeployments, enabling these officers to receive substantial pre-deployment training.The creation of an international civilian policing unit would also require alterations to currentadministrative arrangements. Given the level of funding involved, funding for this new initiative shouldcome directly from the Treasury Board, rather than through CIDA.21This would not only simplifyadministrative arrangements, but shift CIDA – which has proven to be somewhat ambivalent in itsapproach to the CPA – from the role of funder to the role of advisor. An inter-departmental committeecould still be struck to manage overall policy direction for the new mechanism, and this committee couldform the nucleus for an integrated Canadian strategy on security sector reform issues.Establishing a standing Canadian capacity for international police assistance would be a boldstep, and would send a strong signal that Canada is willing to put its money where its mouth is on -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 Donais g Canada and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Policing / 15questions of international peace and security. As well, since police assistance is increasingly consideredpart of official development assistance, it could also help bring Canada’s official aid levels back torespectable levels. Realistically, however, getting this issue on the government’s foreign policy agendawill require a considerable lobbying effort from a range of directions, particularly given the relativelylow profile of post-conflict policing both within the Canadian public and within the Canadiangovernment.ConclusionIn this paper I have made the case that questions of post-conflict public security are increasinglyrecognized as essential to the success or failure of peacebuilding operations, and have argued that Canadashould seriously consider upgrading its capacities in this area as part of a renewed Canadian commitmentto engaged multilateralism. Enhancing Canadian capacities for the provision of post-conflict policeassistance would not only be consistent with explicit Canadian foreign policy aims, it would also addsome needed balance between commitments and capabilities. At the same time, Canada currently enjoysa strong international reputation in the area of policing, and an equally strong – if slowly waning –reputation in the field of international peacekeeping. An expansion of Canadian capacities for post-conflict police assistance would build on both these traditions, and re-assert Canada’s stance as achampion of constructive solutions to international conflict. On the financial side, while establishing apermanent Canadian standby unit for international post-conflict policing would entail considerableexpansion of the monetary envelope currently devoted to such efforts, the required investment is not outof line given Canada’s $3.1 billion aid budget, and given the widely-acknowledged links betweeninsecurity and underdevelopment. If, as noted above, there can be no development without security, thenpractically speaking an investment in public security is an investment in development.More broadly, there is little question that expanding Canadian capacities for post-conflictpolicing would help fill existing gaps within international capacities in this area. Recent events in Haitisuggest that the provision of post-conflict public security will continue to stress the resources of theinternational community for many years to come. Conversely, ongoing instability in both Iraq andAfghanistan suggest that failing to respond to this challenge risks condemning post-conflict societies tofuture cycles of strife, conflict, and misery. By taking up its end of this challenge, Canada can not onlyposition itself as an international leader in this area and enhance its international reputation, it can alsomake a concrete and long-lasting contribution to international stability.

Black dog You wrote- " I think you mean "adopts" English." Excellent observation, but unlike federal officials I don't have a team of 57 secretaries to check and recheck a five word memo. But be aware I have noticed quite a few BD spelling errors, but does that make you a bad dog...hey, no way. Adapt fits in also as new immigrants will have to adapt to learn and speak the English language. You also wrote- " Surely they should adopt " American" as their official language." They did and it's called American English or U.S. English and it's also spoken with different dialects in different states or regionally across the U.S. Just like Canadian English dialect varies in different parts of the country and is a mix of American, British, Franglais and unique Canadianisms and is spoken by 85% of Canadians. Canadian spelling of the English language combines British and American rules. Quebec French is also different French than parisien French and contains a lot of slang.

Ladies and gentleman the 'national language of the U.S.' will be officially English. The U.S. Senate voted to make English the "national language" of the United States as part of legislation overhauling immigration policy. The amendment passed by a margin of 63-34. "This is a historic vote in support that has united Americans for more than two centuries" said Mauro E. Mujica, Chairman of the Board of U.S. English incorporated. " Making English the national language is a longstanding oversight that to-days Senate vote corrected. To-day's vote heeded the voices of the vast majority of Americans who believe English is a crucial part of being American." He also said " In our diverse country we must focus on things that bring us together. Without a common language, we we are not a nation of immigrants, but instead a group of immigrants living a nation." See story: http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=66084

Army Guy You wrote- " Perhaps you can explain our so many successes in regards to other long term/ peacekeeping endevours." Depends on the degree of success your talking about. Care to elaborate? See link 72.14.207.104 below. You also wrote- " But that is not what your really saying here is it, Afghan is not worthy of our help." What I'm saying it is like a war similar to the jungle war Vietnam except fought in the mountains and caves and financed by drug money. Nato forces are like sitting ducks...sacrificial lambs." see link- usdoj.gov, below. You also wrote- " Your numbers are right out of er, Nato alone gas 16,000 troops in place by years end plus there are 21,000 American troops plus 3500 under direct U.S. control." I said an ESTIMATED 17,000 U.S. coaliton troops NOW changed and is under under Nato control and you said 16,000 Nato troops by years end...so I was off by 1,000. American troop numbers are always changing they have presently 10,000 U.S. troops and WILL HAVE 21,000 U.S. troops only by November. Looks like you were off. See link below cbsnews.com You also wrote- " Installing democracy is not the goal as we know it in Afghan but rebuilding a government and nation that will improve the quality of life for all Afghanis." You will need the will of the people and some form of democratic government which you don't have. You cannot force a country to live under your idealistic conditons. You have already committed yourself in saying " are you suggesting soldiers are incapable of developing democracy." The least you can do is be consistent with your analysis. http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:xbOSp5...a&ct=clnk&cd=10 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/23/...in1534791.shtml http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct0...in1534791.shtml

geoffrey You wrote- " It's more than two cultures in Canada, it's argubaly 5 or 6." Then again factually it could be 30 or 40 or more cultures. I guess that's why they claim Canada is 'officially multicultural'. And I would say that could be an uneducated call since out of all those different languages spoken they only identify two that are official. Those two are one being English the international language of the world and language of commerce in Canada all 30-40 or more cultures speak and the other one being French a residential language that is only spoken in the province of Quebec and in small clusters elsewhere in other provinces in Canada. The cause of problems in Canada relating to federalism is when you take a single component out a cultural identity (language) and try to form a legitimate difference for political reasons is very problamatic because as we know for a fact we are all suppose to be multi cultural Canadians to begin with and are all protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But in the case of the Charter relating to Quebec is given more protection which presents a bias in relation to everyone else and forms a basis for discrimination since it is obvious we are all not legally equal. This makes it tough for a federal government to rule and appease in a fair equal manner applicable to all Canadians which were not.

Wilber Where I live we have an ample supply of buisness catering to small consumer electronics, computers, cameras etc. But even at that I found prices are really a whole lot cheaper in the U.S. and that's why I presently shop on line concerning small electronics. Warranties don't really mean a lot anymore unless you pay a premium for what should be a standard warranty regardless and are full of conditions.

Bakunin You wrote- " So i beleive down the road, Harper in the next 2 election will either lose the support of one of the 2 cultural groups." So you are basically saying federalism is basically unworkable in trying to interwine two different cultures politically. Funny thing...I've been saying the same thing for years!

Army Guy You wrote- " Perhaps you can explain what the problem is, are you suggesting soldiers are incapable of developing democracy." To be blunt, yes. Afghanistan is a country that wheels and deals in opium, full of war lords and their militias, militants and terrorism that has increased since the Iraq effort. There are different estimates of the number of coalition troops some peg at 17,000. but militants in Pakistan in the city of Karachi just across the border, it is estimated that over 25,000 graduates of Al Quaida training camp live along with several thousand renegade Taliban and militants in the border mountains. Coalition troops it seems are out numbered. If I were Mr. Harper I would use the extended two years to wind down our part in Afghanistan and write it off has a bad experience since that war has escalated and Canada really is not in the position military wise at this time to continue since it greatly exceed what our military is designed for primarily peace keeping efforts. The situation in Afghanistan will probably continue indefinitely without the U.S and it's allies taking another route of action. I wish you the best of luck with installing democracy since I believe that country will be corrupt for years to come as corruption is their buisness.

Canadian troops will remain in Afghanistan for another two years. A motion was passed in parliament approving this by a mere four votes, 149-145. Key Liberal leadership candidates voted against this motion as did the Bloc who were expected to support it with previous Liberal leader Paul Martin absent. Whether you think this is a good or bad move is entirely dependent on who you support and your reasons for acceptance or rejection for this extension. See story at: http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national...8d60a2d&k=51523

Renegade What does MSP mean? I'm familiar with MSRP which is the ' manufacturers suggested retail price' which hardly no retailers use anymore except those with high overhead expenses and rely on MRSP for maximum profit. The last place I would by camera equipment is a drug store chain.

Warwick Green You wrote- " Read the papers. She was there representing the government at the inauguration of the new Haitian President. Anything she said in the way of commitments- I have not heard of any-would have been approved by the PMO." I do read the papers and the paper I read did not specify initially she was there specifically as an official representing Canada. I did not see any official federal media explanation concerning this trip. The Ottawa Citizen did report her commitments involving Canadian aid to Haitia. This job should have gone to someone like Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay. The responsibilities and themes of the governor general do not include this type of representation. The GG's responsibilities fall under six major themes: 1- The Crown in Canada 2- Canadian Sovereignty 3-Recogniton of Excellence 4- National Identity 5- National Unity 6- Moral Leadership This of course included in her duties is acting a 'Head of State' and 'Commander in-Chief of the armed forces.' If you read my post correctly the onus of my post is concerning 'potential conflict' due to the fact Michaelle Jean was a previous citizen of Haiti and the sheer nature of Haiti being such a troubled country. There has already been in Canada troubling aspects concering if Michaelle Jean was removed for reason's concerning her separatist views, the Haitian community would rebel. Cultural identification should not have precedence over individual federal representation at any level. This could be a root problem with multiculturalism.

Wilber You wrote- " If one of my children had been abducted from a schoolyard, raped and murdered and you said something like that to me, I would rearrange your dental work." Only problem is no one said that to you. Take your big "IF" and take a hike!

Governor General Michaelle Jean's four day trip to her home country Haiti came to an end yesterday where she was hailed as a hero. With all the media coverage concerning this trip and commitments made by Michaelle Jean that Canada would help this troubled country including a visit to an electrical plant that was set up with the help of Hydro Quebec, I have a hard time distinguishing whether this trip is personal or official. Lacking any federal government information concerning this trip I presume it was a private trip. If it was a private trip who paid for this trip and what authority was given to her to make potential financial commitments on behalf of the federal government and tax payers of Canada. Even worse from the perpective of citizen's of Haiti it seems they ackowledged her as a political hero and someone as a previous citizen of Haiti was in the positon to do something about the dire conditons in that country. Is this one of the downsides of what official multi-culturalism has done to Canada. And that is more precisely, having ones home grown culture overide the importance especially in this case of the importance of bearing the title Governor General of Canada and Canadians which by anyone,s definiton should void personal culture of any importance. If Michaelle Jean really thought about this aspect she would have considered potential conflicts in political posturing and would not have made the trip initially to avoid possiably embarrassing the federal government.

As far as I'm concerned the state has no right to remove your body parts period without prior permission and on a strictly voluntary basis. The state must come to you for permission and not you go to them to protect your own body parts. I would like to see the reaction would be if legislation was put in place forcing all citizen's to donate blood once a year. Legally speaking I don't think this plan would be viable as it could violate your rights under our Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could also be pursued also concerning other legal areas.

schoop You wrote- " Do you have one example of this 'decay' (federalism)? -Sure, how about since the Trudeau era 36 years of rule by Quebec prime ministers hyper pandering to Quebec and dependent on Quebec votes that allowed mainly the Liberals to propagate similar Quebec style ideologies, socialistic policies and programs. This includes repatriation of our Constitution with the damaging changes that followed with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms resulting in undemocratic advancement of Quebec political ideologies and undemocratic political manouvres resulting with government implementing divisive laws resulting in diverse applications relating to the concept of marriage and leading to SSM. -This guarateed a Liberal stranglehold on Canadian politics making it virtually impossible for any other more right wing party to break this stranglehold unless oppostion parties DUPLICATED Liberal political ideologies especially in Quebec and postioned Liberals to bribe other parts of Canada with similar left wing social policies. This lasted until the Liberals finally buried themselves neck deep with their own political corruption namely the 'sponsership scandal'. -But what really is the weak link in federalism to-day ( resulting from years of Liberal control) is the uncontested acceptance of Quebec as a separatist nationalistic controlled province in a country based on federalism. How this factor can be decided and pursued as normal federal politics by polticians without the input of Canadians is needless to say mind boggling and extemely unsettling and dangerous. But now Stephen Harper is already poised in a postion to further hyper pander to Quebec with further federal concessions for his party to remain viable with the hope of securing more Quebec votes. How much longer can this conditon (Quebec hyper pandering) without the federal seams breaking has in my opinion reached the limit without breaking federalism entirely.

shoop You wrote- " What is the seriousness of the situation." The decay of federalism and democracy caused by Quebec hyper pandering primarily by a string of Liberal prime ministers including a Quebec Conservative one under the guise of the quest for 'unity', Quebec style that is. We already covered this and I know you have a hard time grasping the situation. You also wrote- " I have said over and over I do not agree with the OLA. However there are far more things to get upset over." You have already stated 'official bilingualism is "a fact of life" and you are learning French to advance your career as a federal public servant, if you are one that is. Aren't you being a little hypocritical by voluntarily succumbing to OLA standards and then stating " I do not agree with the OLA? What's more important in this country than the country itself being in a positon to be potentially destroyed, driven on a path of self destruction by inept politicians?

shoop You wrote- " Either you don't have the first clue what the word histrionics means OR you are presenting some very witty and biting satire." The way I read it is you are accusing me of using ' insincere and dramatic behavior designed to impress' "as an attempt to try and justify his (my) rage at the OLA." And I replied- " This would probably be viewed as histrionics by someone like yourself who lacks the courage, dedication and loyality to support the type of government needed to curtail and control abusive federal political attacks and demands from ANY province in Canada and take whatever measures to eliminate it." This in short means you do not recognize the seriousness of this situation and continue to go along with the will of the federal government, regardless and support the OLA and 'official bilingualism and are are willing to learn French to help your career in the federal public service while putting down others who do not share your view. In my years on this planet outside of written literature I have never once heard anyone in actual conversation use the word ' histrionics', except you. Maybe you have different types of associates than I do of the 'white wine type' which of course there's nothing the matter or wrong with that.

The argument here is ' should seasonal workers be entitled to extended E.I. benefits.' I think I heard the numbers of hours required for E.I. in Maritime provinces various according to the unemplyment rate which means, higher unemployment, seasonal workers need less hours to qualify. With that being said and in regards to importing Russian workers, what is the actual amount of time these jobs will last. In other words it would not be worth going off U.I. if the $9.00 per hr. job did not provide sufficient hours to re-apply for E.I. after that temporary $9-per hr. job terminates, thus the need for Russian workers. I think the federal government is to generous with equalization payments and an effort should be made to federally re-locate workers to areas of the country where the work is rather than guarantee a certain lifestyle. Here is a link to some stats in P.E.I. concerning this situation" http://www.upei.ca/islandstudies/art_wm_1.htm

shoop You wrote- " It isn't. It's just histrionics to as an attempt to try and justify his rage at the OLA." Your off topic with cheap personal shots! I'm expressing my opinion as an English speaking Canadian loyal to the country of CANADA and have serious reservations concerning the continuning decay of democracy and federalism caused primarily by an unacceptable degree of political pandering to a province that knows no limits concerning it's perpetual political demands based on cultural indifference. This would probably be seen as histrionics by someone like yourself who lacks the courage, dedication and loyality to support the type of government needed to curtail and control abusive federal political attacks and demands from ANY province in Canada and take whatever measures necessary to eliminate it.

seabee You wrote- " Why would it be a doomsday for Canada." Think of security alone. -What would happen if there was some sort of political upheaval between Quebec and the rest of Canada with the governments most politically sensitive documents falling into the hands of Quebec separatist, freely given to them by francophone senior bureaucrat sympathizers. -Or simply having classified information given to separatist looking for ways to gain an upper hand concerning various political situations. -Or considering what the animosity level would be from other Canadian provinces as the level of senior francophone bureaucrats rises dramatically would no doubt produce an unacceptable political crisis. The present situation to-day it seems provides no CULTURAL safegards concerning federal control of it's own resources and the safety of the citizen's of Canada. The federal government has a duty to provide at all times a safe and secure federal government and country. The sponsership scandal is an example of lax government controls with the root cause being cultural indifferences in which the government really had little control in the whole matter and in fact if it initially separated itself from trying to control culture the whole situation would probably never have occurred. But again the federal government continues to forge ahead in a volatile cultural area (OLA and official bilingualism) an area they really have no buisness in with the full potential of serious problems.

Argus You wrote- " On the other hand if we have a situation where 90% of the senior bureacrats are Quebecers, that could definitely pose a major danger to confederation." That is an understatement! This could be considered or postively reflect a doomsday politcal scenario for Canada. Totally unthinkable but entirely possible.

shoop You wrote- " Any support for that fiqure." Translating a SINGLE word from English to French cost taxpayers .22-.28 cents. Can you supply 'official federal cost fiqures' concerning all actual cost and hidden cost including provincial cost relating to the OLA and 'official bilingualism since 1969? THESE NUMBERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE and the ones that are are very questionable. http://temagami.carleton.ca/jmc/cnews/20102000/c2.htm The $700-billion estimate comes from a Toronto accountant. These numbers can be found at: http://languagefairness.ca

shoop You wrote- " Would you like see Harper try and repeal the OLA only to thrust another decade of Liberal government on us." This ultimately proves federalism does not work in this country with Quebec continually playing the constitutional blackmail game. What I would suggest is for Mr. Harper to allow Canadians to make the choice of allowing Quebec to continue to be part of confederation incorporating a national referendum to decide this. This democratic approach would be in my opinion the only way to save the country. Presently there is no way to satisfy the abnormal political appetite of Quebec without causing severe political animosity in the other nine provinces. The Liberals have been successful in doing this by selling out rights and freedoms of English Canadians ( also incorporating a transfer of power to Quebec) under the guise of official bilingualism incorporating the divisive OLA. I really don't call this nation building and have a name for this which I will not use for obvious reasons. You also wrote- " I read the article. Yes, it is a good thing that separatism is waning in Quebec. A repeal of the OLA would definitely move the province towards *moral assurance* of winning the referendum." This is the same old Quebec constitutional blackmail game they continue to play. Quebec can't separate and they know it but still manage to acquire more and more previous only federal powers and federal money and programs, playing the game the feds refuse to stop playing resulting in a dysfunctional federalism and more than ever contributing to the breakup of Canada.

shoop You wrote- " I have not stated that I support the OLA. The bigger question is how do we proceed that it is a fact of life." You have voluntarily succumbed by your own definiton "it is a fact of life" which in doing so support the OLA and 'official bilingualism'. Only a few Canadians have succumbed to OLA and federal 'official bilingualism' those being English speaking federal public servants who have sold out there language for employment and others in cities like Ottawa where private employer's following the federal lead and greed force their employees to be bilingual as part of their job qualifications. How do we proceed concerning the wrongful application of OLA and 'federal bilingualism'? That was answered a few posts back and is basically 'strong federal leadership' something that is sadly lacking from Canadian politics. A form of protest could be federal public service demonstrations and a backlash by angry City of Ottawa residents whose majority language is English and presently allow employers to demand bilingual qualifications for jobs in a majority English city. It takes guts to get things done and I don't think many English speaking Canadians have what it takes to set the record straight and defend their Majority English Canadian citizenship and associated democratic RIGHTS. You also wrote- " Why don't you share my fear regarding Quebec separation." Simply because they are the instigators and I'm not about ready to hand my country over to Quebec. Quebec has been playing constitutional blackmail for years and continue to do so. They have laid off the separation threat again temporally as Quebec think tanks obviously are eagrily waiting for more federal gift offerings from Prime Mininister Stephen Harper. Here is another instance how the 'Quebec wind blows.' http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/sto...PStory/National